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ABSTRACT 
 
The inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic 
has been a source of conflict between the ruling parties and the opposition. To determine its 
effect on democracy and peace, the study utilised a qualitative research approach employing 
a semi-structured interview method to collect data from elected Members of Parliament from 
the ruling and opposition parties in Zambia; leaders of Civil Society Organisations; and the 
electorate. The study found that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections causes 
intra-party and inter-party conflict that negatively impacts on democracy and peace. It has 
further led to the erosion of liberal democracy anchored in a system of checks and balances 
by weakening the opposition and the parliamentary oversight of the executive. Moreover, it 
has also led to the erosion of peace due to the conflict it sets off within and between political 
parties, as seen in adversarial and antagonistic relations and electoral violence. The study 
shows that the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s 
Third Republic undermines liberal democracy and peace. The study suggests that peace can 
be attained by banning the appointment of opposition MPs without consent of their parties; 
banning MPs that cross the floor from contesting by-elections and from public office 
appointments; introducing a system of proportional representation in the electoral system; 
ensuring that independent state institutions manage elections; curtailing Presidential powers; 
the use of coalition government; the promotion of on-going dialogue between stakeholders; 
and the building of ideology-based politics. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is an exploration of the inducement1 of parliamentary floor-crossing2 and by-
elections3 in Zambia’s Third Republic and how the related conflict it generates affect 
democracy and peace in the country. This phenomenon of floor-crossing and by-elections 
inducement has been a source of conflict between the opposition and the ruling parties that 
negatively impacts on democracy and peace. It leads to adversarial relations; creates a hostile 
political environment compounded by a lack of impartial and equal electoral process 
management and application of law and order that ultimately result in electoral violence. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Zambia is a country in Sub-Sahara Africa, whose name comes from the Zambezi river 
(Simson, 1985; Habson, Williams & Roberts, 2017). It was formerly known as the British 
colonial territory of Northern Rhodesia before gaining its independence on 24 October, 1964 
(Simson, 1985). It is a landlocked country covering a geographical area of about 752,612 sq. 
km with a population of about (2016 est.) 15.37 million (Habson, Williams & Roberts, 2017), 
with Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia as neighbours.  
 
 
 
                                               
1 Inducement in this study is a term used to refer to the ‘enticement’ or ‘payoff’ in the form of cabinet 
appointment that makes an opposition MP change their party loyalty to that of the ruling party without 
which they would not.  
2 Floor-crossing refers to the change of loyalty by opposition MPs from the party on whose ticket and 
support they were elected as MPs to the ruling party upon offer of position in cabinet. It is a de facto 
defection without the MPs’ resignation from the party that sponsored them for election to parliament 
for fear of their seats being declared vacant. 
3 By-elections are elections held before the expiration of the 5 year term of an incumbent MP who 
resigns or is expelled from the party they were elected to join another party, for the purpose of this 
study, the ruling party. 
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Figure 1. The Map of the Republic of Zambia 
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica 
 
Zambia has gone through three major political phases, from its founding as an independent 
state. The three phases being: 1) the First Republic (1964 – 1972) multi-party state; 2) the 
Second Republic (1972 – 1991) one-party state; and 3) the Third Republic (1991 – to date) 
multi-party state (Mbao, 2007; Phiri, 2006). Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, the founding president of 
the independent Republic of Zambia led the country as president in the First and Second 
Republic for 27 years (Baylies & Szeftel, 1992). It has had peaceful transfers of power, from 
Kaunda, of the United National Independence Party (UNIP)4, to Dr. Fredrick Chiluba, of the 
                                               
4 UNIP, the United National Independence Party was started by Mainza Chona in 1959 after being 
leader of ZANC, the Zambia African National Congress that was banned with its leader Kenneth 
Kaunda arrested. In 1960, Mainza Chona handed the leadership of UNIP to Kenneth Kaunda upon 
his release from prison. In the 1964 general elections, Kenneth Kaunda led UNIP to victory winning 
55 seats out of 75 seats becoming Prime Minister. He became President of the Republic of Zambia 
on 24th October 1964 after leading the country to independence. UNIP adopted the ideology of 
Humanism, a man-centred society which was a socialist oriented ideology. UNIP under Keneth 
Kaunda’s leadership and as the Head of State ruled from 1964 to 1991 after being defeated by the 
MMD (Meebelo, 1973; Rakner, 2003; Mwaangala, 2010) 
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Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)5, which was heralded as an example and a 
beacon of political transformation in Africa by the West, by international institutions and by 
academics (Bartlett, 2001; Joseph, 1992). Zambia, unlike many African countries, has been 
hailed as a stable and peaceful country in Africa (Burnell, 2005).  
 
In a multi-party democracy, President Chiluba recognized that if the party held the majority 
of Members of Parliament it would be able to change the constitution to pursue personal/party 
goals. And so, in 1996, Chiluba made use of his majority to block Kaunda from challenging 
him by amending the constitution to require a presidential candidate to be, a Zambian citizen 
born to parents who are Zambian citizens by birth or descent (Human Rights Watch, 1996; 
Mbao, 2011). Consequently, UNIP boycotted the 1996 election to protest the barring of its 
leader, Dr. Kaunda, leaving the MMD to win 131 of 150 seats compared to 125 of 150 seats 
from the 1991 general elections (Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, 2012). With 
more than two-thirds of MPs the MMD had won during the 1996 general elections, President 
Chiluba was determined to use that majority to amend the constitution to allow him to run 
for a third term but failed due to resistance by Zambians including prominent members of his 
own party (Simutanyi, 2005).  
 
Having failed to change the constitution to allow him to run for the third term, President 
Chiluba handpicked Levy Mwanawasa6, to run for the presidency. In the 2001 general 
elections, that followed his failed attempt to run for the third term, President Chiluba using 
the power of incumbency, extensively used state resources to ensure that his handpicked 
MMD party candidate Levy Mwanawasa won (Simutanyi, 2010). Mwanawasa narrowly won 
                                               
5 MMD, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy was formed in July 1990 after the re-introduction 
of multi-party democracy in Zambia under the leadership of Fredrick Chiluba. The MMD with 
Frederick Chiluba as leader defeated UNIP in the 1991 general elections winning 125 seats out of 150 
seats with the former ruling party, UNIP winning 25 seats in the national assembly. Its ideology was 
liberal and free-market economy. The MMD remained the ruling party from 1991 to 2011 when it 
lost to the Patriotic Front (PF) led by Micheal Sata (Bratton, 1992; Rackner, 2003). 
6 Levy Mwanawasa was one of the founding members and first vice-president of the MMD and after 
the MMD’s victory in the 1991 general elections served as the nation’s Vice-President from 1992 – 
1994. He was elected the nation’s President in 2001 and 2006 but died in 2008 before completing his 
second term (Baylies and Szeftel, 1992; Momba and Madimutsa, 2009; Tobolka, 2013).  
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the presidency and his party, the MMD, despite having won the most seats in parliament did 
not have the majority seats needed in parliament compared to the opposition and independent 
seats combined (Carter Centre, 2002; Kabemba, 2004). The results in table 1 shows the 
narrow victory the MMD got in the 2001 general elections giving the opposition a combined 
majority of seats in parliament over the ruling party (MMD); one of the reasons that prompted 
President Mwanawasa to engage in the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-
elections to gain a majority of seats in parliament. 
 
Table 1: 2001 Presidential and `Parliamentary Election Results 
Source: The Carter Centre, 2001 
 
The 69 parliamentary seats the MMD got from the 2001 general election results translated 
into 46% of the number of seats in Parliament, while the opposition and Independent seats 
translated to 54%. This result denied the MMD the simple majority in parliament needed to 
pass bills and be able to effectively govern by itself without some help outside the party, from 
the opposition and independent MPs.  
5 
 
 
Chart 1: 2001 Parliamentary election result seat allocation 
Source: Adapted from the Carter Centre, 2001  
 
President Levy Mwanawasa initiated and defended the unilateral co-optation of opposition 
MPs by offering them Cabinet or deputy ministerial positions to create a majority in 
parliament (Sishuwa, 2012). This strategy of inducing floor-crossing and by-elections 
enabled the ruling party (MMD), in 2002, to regain the majority in parliament that it lost in 
the 2001 general elections (Phiri, 2005). The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections 
has since been employed by successive administrations to date (Sishuwa, 2012).  
In the 2011 general elections in which the opposition Patriotic Front (PF7), led by Michael 
Sata8, defeated the ruling party the MMD, the PF won the most seats, 60, representing 41%, 
                                               
7 PF, the Patriotic Front the current ruling party in Zambia was formed in 2001 by Michael Sata as a 
breakaway party from the MMD. The PF won the 2011 general elections bringing to an end the 20 
year rule of the MMD (Rakner, 2003; Diakonia Zambia, 2013; Siachiwena, 2017).  
8 Micheal Sata became President of the Republic of Zambia in 2011 after winning the presidential 
election in the 2011 general elections but died in 2014 before completing his first term of office. Prior 
to forming the PF he had served in various cabinet portfolios in the Second Republic under the UNIP 
government and in the Third Republic under the MMD government. He resigned from the MMD to 
form the PF after the nomination of Levy Mwanawasa as the presidential candidate for the MMD in 
the 2001 general elections (Bartlett, 2000; Rakner, 2003; Siachiwena, 2017; Williams, Hobson, and 
Roberts, 2018).     
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while the opposition with the independents combined, not as single entities, got the majority 
of the seats in Parliament 59% (ECZ, 2011).  
The PF led government just like the former ruling party, the MMD, quickly embraced the 
floor-crossing and by-election inducement strategy it so vehemently opposed and condemned 
when it was in the opposition, in order to create the majority in the house. By 2013, the late 
former president Sata had appointed approximately 10 opposition MPs as deputy ministers 
in the PF-led government (Simutanyi, 2013). The PF had increased its total number of MPs 
from 60 to 79 during the 2011-2016 term through the inducement of by-elections. On top of 
that, they had through   induced floor-crossing, secured the seats of the MPs appointed as 
Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers from the opposition; and the 8 nominated MPs to 
ensure an absolute majority in the house. The table and pie charts number 2 show the extent 
to which the PF through the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections increased the 
number (share) of MPs after the genral elections of 2011 within the 2011-2016 term. 
PARTY/INDEPENDENT 2011 SEATS PARTY/INDEPENDENT 2016 SEATS 
 Patriotic Front PF 60  Patriotic Front PF 79 
Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy 
MMD 55 Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy 
MMD 36 
United Party for National 
Development 
UPND 28 United Party for National 
Development 
UPND 31 
Independent IND 3 Independent IND 1 
Alliance for Democracy and 
Development 
ADD 1 Alliance for Democracy and 
Development 
ADD 1 
Forum For Democracy and 
Development 
FDD 1 Forum For Democracy and 
Development 
FDD 1 
 
Chart 2: Parliamentary seat allocation change in one term between 2011-2016 
Source: Adapted from the Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2011 & National Assembly, 2016 
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The table and charts above show that the outcome of parliamentary elections in the 2011 
general elections significantly changed before the end of the 5 year term. The ruling party, 
PF increased the number of it MPs from 60 (41 percent share) to 79 (53 percent share) mainly 
through the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections.  
  
1.2 Rationale of the study/Problem Statement  
 
The subject of floor-crossing inducement in Zambia’s Third Republic has been just as 
contentious and bitterly contested as the by-elections it induces. The by-elections that flow 
from floor-crossing have been bitterly contested and increasingly ‘characterized by vote-
buying, threats to withhold government development projects, intimidation, and physical 
violence’ (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2014; Schendler, 2002). The 
political arena has been poisoned by bitter partisanship, name-calling, and insults, anger and 
hate; and has created a war like environment that, according to one politician, threatens the 
country’s future (Lusaka Voice, 2014, January 25). This environment is not only a threat to 
multiparty democracy and development but is also a direct threat to peace and security. 
 
Though the current volatile political environment in Zambia’s Third Republic cannot simply 
be ascribed to floor-crossing, it is, however, a major factor. In presenting a petition to the 
President for national dialogue aimed at diffusing tension in the country, the leader of Zambia 
Direct Democracy Movement (ZDDM) stated that the conflict between the ruling party, PF 
and the opposition parties, was caused by among others, the issue ‘...of the PF poaching 
opposition MPs...’ (Lusaka Times, November 19, 2012).  The ruling party, does not only 
desire to gain an absolute majority in the House but in the words of the current ruling party’s 
former Secretary General, Winter Kabimba “it was his duty to entice opposition 
parliamentarians to resign from their parties to join the PF, even if it meant having no 
remaining opposition MPs” (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2014: p. 8). 
Floor crossing is therefore embarked on not only to get a sufficient number of seats in the 
House for governance purposes but to strengthen the ruling party, weaken and even to destroy 
the opposition. The opposition parties see it for what it is, as an existential threat and treat it 
as such.  
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This study wishes to explore the two issues at the heart of political conflicts in Zambia’s 
Third Republic: (1) induced floor-crossing of opposition members of parliament from their 
political parties to the ruling party, and (2) induced by-elections. The current ruling party 
when in opposition strongly opposed and condemned the very practice they have now 
embraced and defend; while the MMD now condemn what they once pioneered and defended 
when they were the ruling party. 
 
A lot of attention is given to the subject of induced floor-crossing and the resulting induced 
by-elections in terms of how it undermines democracy, or as argued by its proponents, 
promotes democracy and development (Momba, 2005; PANA, 2003). Not much has been 
written about how it undermines or promotes peace. Yet, the political arena has been 
characterized by much antagonism, tension, political and electoral violence. This antagonism 
and violence does get media coverage (Election Violence, 2009; Mulenga, 2013; 
Kyambalesa, 2014; Mafa, 2016). The violence and the tension in the political arena are 
written about often without reference to some of the root causes. The political and occasional 
electoral violence get media coverage as the pictures in figure 2 vividly show: 
 
  
Figure 2: Political party cadres engaged in electoral violence 
Photos: ANP/ AFP Dawood Salim                                          
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Figure 3: A victim of electoral violence 
Source: Post Newspaper: Mufumbwe bye-elections violence 
And yet, for true democracy and development to take place there must be peace. And true 
peace also requires democracy and development (Galtung & Scott, 2008). Peace is more than 
just the absence of war or conflict. As distinguished by Galtung (1969) peace that is merely 
the absence of direct violence is negative peace while positive peace involves efforts aimed 
at ending the indirect violence which includes social, political, economic, structural and 
systemic causes.  Peace “involves working to eradicate that which works against equality…, 
changes in attitude and behaviour, so that we treat each other as equally valuable” (Nielsen 
& Froese, 1988).  
 
This study focuses on the conflict that has arisen out of the phenomenon of the induced 
parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections. The political conflicts in Zambia are not 
limited to these, but these have been chosen to provide focus for the study, and because they 
create a hostile, antagonistic and adversarial political environment that ultimately lead to 
political and electoral violence. 
This study shows that the desire on the part of politicians for domination, power, wealth and 
survival drives them to do things that run counter to the principles of democracy and peace. 
This study provides proposals that aim to contribute to a process that leads to the 
transformation of the conflict around induced floor-crossing and by-elections in order to 
contribute to a sustainable peace. 
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1.3   The aim of the Study  
 
The main aim of the study is to examine the underlying causes/ drivers of the phenomenon 
of floor-crossing and by-elections; and how the conflict it provokes impacts on democracy 
and peace in Zambia’s Third Republic and how it can be transformed. 
 
The fact that political parties when in opposition are vehemently opposed to floor-crossing 
but when in government embrace the very practice is an indicator of underlying issues that 
beg a study and understanding. Are politicians just looking for a majority in Parliament for 
the sake of governing which cannot be achieved through credible and genuine coalition/s or 
consultation with the opposition? For the opposition, are there better ways of solving the 
intra-party conflict that arises out of co-option of some of their MPs apart from resorting to 
expulsion? Are they conscious of the negative consequences of this conflict caused by floor-
crossing and by-elections? What are the underlying causes of this conflict and what should 
constitute the process to transform it?  
 
1.4  The objectives of the study 
 
This study, therefore, has the following objectives, which are to: 
1. Explore the conditions that facilitate floor-crossing by Zambia’s elected Members of 
Parliament. 
 
2. Assess the impact of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on democracy in 
Zambia. 
 
3. Examine the consequences of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on peace and 
security. 
 
4. Investigate possible ways of transforming the conflict generated by floor-crossing for a 
more democratic, peaceful and secure Zambia. 
 
1.5   Research Methods  
 
The aforementioned phenomena of the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-
elections have caused much antagonism, acrimony, tension and occasional violence in the 
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political arena. It has been widely condemned by civil society organisations, major church 
bodies, academics, opposition parties and ordinary citizens (The Council of Churches in 
Zambia (CCZ), the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) and the Zambia Episcopal 
Conference (ZEC), 2013; Momba, 2007). Despite this widely held opposition to floor-
crossing and the induced by-elections, they have not only continued but increased; and 
violence has also been escalating. While this problem remains and continues to be a challenge 
to multi-party democracy and peace, it also presents a unique opportunity for reflection, 
change of assumptions and attitudes; an examination of issues, institutions, structures and 
laws that support, entrench and sustain it.  
1.6   Key questions  
 
1. What are the conditions that facilitate floor-crossing by Zambia’s elected Members of 
Parliament? 
 
2. How do parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections impact on democracy in Zambia? 
 
3. What are the consequences of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on peace and 
security in Zambia? 
 
4. How can the conflict generated by floor-crossing and by-elections be transformed? 
 
1.7   Study design 
 
This study utilized qualitative methodological approach because it helps scholars to 
understand how individuals, organisations and communities make meaning of issues that 
concern them. Unlike quantitative studies that aim at generalizability and the statistical 
representation of data, a qualitative study is appropriate because it aims to provide the depth, 
insights and conceptual understanding of the data (Ulin, Robinson, Tolley & McNeill, 2002). 
Qualitative research sees things from the participants’ perspectives and allows for creativity 
and advocacy on the part of the researcher. This kind of enquiry allows one to focus on 
individual meanings (Creswell, 2009) in their social and political context. This approach 
helped the study explore what was relevant for the participants and how they make sense of 
their world (Lester, 1999).  
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Thus, the approach focused upon collecting, analysing and understanding information rather 
than identifying, isolating and controlling variables as is the case with the quantitative 
approach (Terre Blanche, Durrheim & Painter, 2006). Additionally, qualitative research aims 
at understanding complex issues that may elude structured quantitative research (Bryman, 
2001).  
 
1.8   Participants 
 
The sample from which data was collected consisted of three entities, namely: (i) Members 
of Parliament, (ii) civil society organisations / church-based organisations, and (iii) the 
electorate / ordinary citizens. Extensive open-ended interviews were carried out with nine 
elected Members of Parliament from the three major political parties, the PF, MMD and 
UPND.  
 
In the second sample, interviews were carried out with eight leaders of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and church-based organisations (CBOs) that are advocates for the 
ideals of justice, peace, development, equality, faith, democracy, participation, and 
transparency in Zambia. These are: The Executive Director for Foundation for Democratic 
Process (FODEP), Executive Director for Southern African Center for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), Secretary General for Zambia Episcopal Conference 
(ZEC), Executive Director for Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP), President for Young 
African Leaders Initiative (YALI), Director for the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection 
(JCTR), President for Transparency International Zambia (TIZ), and the Executive Director 
for Operation Young Vote (OYV). In the third sample, eighteen ordinary citizens, made up 
of twelve men and six women, were interviewed. This sample of citizens consisted of civil 
servants, farmers, the youth, and businessmen and businesswomen. 
 
All in all, this study conducted 35 one-on-one in-depth interviews. These different types of 
participants were chosen for triangulation purposes because as Kaplan & Maxwell (2005) 
observed, the results of a study have greater credibility when data from different sources is 
consistent compared to when it is from one source. These participants were recruited to meet 
the following criteria (1) those from political parties had to be current serving elected 
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Members of Parliament from the major political parties, and 2) those from civil society 
organisations / church-based organisations had to be holders of senior positions at national 
level, and (3) the ordinary citizens had to represent a cross-section of groups found in society. 
The mix of ideas and experiences from this mixed sample is necessary to get a clear picture 
that is not one-sided, partisan or ideological for the study. 
 
1.9   Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Humanities and Social Science 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The fieldwork 
was conducted in Lusaka, Monze and Choma in the Republic of Zambia. Participation in the 
study was voluntary; participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at 
any point without any harm to them if they chose to do but none of them chose to withdraw.  
The ethical principles (informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality and voluntary 
participation) were followed. The ethical approval for the study is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
1.10   Sampling of participants 
 
Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to identify and locate participants for 
the study. Purposive sampling provided an opportunity for the researcher to choose particular 
participants that were required to provide more insight into the research question. These 
participants can be individuals, groups, organisations or specific kind required for the study 
(Devers & Frankel, 2000). Purposive sampling, states Davies (2007, p. 57), “invites the 
researcher to identify and target individuals who are believed to be ‘typical’ of the population 
being studied.”  
 
Once initial contact had been made, snowball sampling was utilized. This method is suitable 
when a researcher needs a sample of people who are of the same background, characteristics 
or same trade as the ones first contacted who in turn refer the researcher to their kind 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). It is based on referrals of individuals who have an 
understanding of a given phenomenon (Ulin, Robinson, Tolley & McNeill, 2002). Even 
though snowball sampling does not claim statistical representation (Bryman, 2004), it is 
appropriate in this study because a more varied sample of organisations, parties and 
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individuals were chosen to provide more detailed information on different perspectives of 
conflict created by floor-crossing and the by-elections that follow. 
 
1.11   Data collection instruments 
 
This study utilised semi-structured, open-ended one-on-one interviews. The interviews were 
guided by an interview schedule. The semi-structured interview guide was developed from 
the literature. Semi-structured interviews give participants the free expression of their views 
and can provide data that is reliable and comparable (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). The 
interviews were conducted in English and fielded semi-structured, open-ended questions 
because they allow the researcher to source data in greater detail by remaining conversational 
and situational (Ulin et al., 2002). The interview guide with semi-structured questions was 
used to keep the interactions focused to allow for free probing (Britten, 1995). Unlike closed-
ended questions that limit the respondent to a set of responses determined by the researcher, 
open-ended questions allow the respondent to express opinions without being influenced or 
limited by the researcher (Foddy, 1993). 
 
1.12   Data collection procedure 
 
In accordance with the ethical principles followed, prior to each interview conducted, the 
nature and aims of the study were explained to each participant who was asked to sign an 
informed consent form. They were informed of their right to withdraw from the interviews 
or focus group discussions at any time if they wished to.  
 
Participants’ confidentiality was guaranteed through the use of pseudonyms. These 
interviews were conducted at convenient venues agreeable to, or identified by, the 
participants where they were comfortable. Before the start of the interviews, participants’ 
permission was sought to use the digital recorders to record interviews. The data collected is 
safely stored under encryption for a period of five years to be safely disposed thereof 
afterwards. 
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1.13   Data Analysis 
 
In preparation for analysing the data, all audio-recorded interviews were transcribed, 
verbatim. This study used a thematic data analysis technique to analyse the data collected 
from the interviews. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis is a method 
used to identify, analyse and report patterns or themes within the data. This type of analysis 
is inductive in that the researcher does not predetermine the themes but they emerge from the 
data. Data analysis is the process of systematically scrutinising and arranging the field notes 
and interview scripts in order to present the findings to others (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). 
 
Furthermore, a thematic analysis method was utilised because it is flexible and allows for the 
exploration of the context and meaning of the participants (Ulin et al., 2002). The data 
analysis process involved five steps as presented by Blanche, Durrheim and Kelly (2006). 
These are (1) familiarisation: this involves rereading of the data (2) identifying a thematic 
framework: involves identification of themes (3) Indexing (Coding): involves identification 
of codes for different themes (4) Charting: involves creating charts for the data set, and (5) 
mapping and interpretation: involves searching for patterns, associations concepts and 
explanations aided by the visual displays and plots. The final step involves putting together 
the interpretation of the data (Blanche et al., 2006) which will later be presented.  
 
1.14   Outline of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter One 
 
This chapter is an introduction to the study. It provides the background to the study and the 
research methodology. Specifically, this chapter lays out the background; aims and objectives 
of the study; research problems and objectives: key questions to be asked; study design; 
participants; ethical considerations; procedure followed for the sampling of participants; data 
collection instruments; data collection procedure; method of data analysis; and the outline of 
the dissertation 
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Chapter Two 
 
This chapter examines literature on liberal democracy, the roles that parties and the 
opposition play. It lays out the challenges liberal democracy faces among which are efforts 
by ruling parties to weaken opposition parties, undermining separation of powers through the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections that brings the legislature under the control of 
the ruling party. The second part of the chapter examines the concept of electoral conflicts 
and violence. It explores some of the factors that cause electoral conflicts and violence some 
of which are due to lack of impartial electoral process management and an un-even electoral 
playing field. 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
This chapter explores the theoretical frameworks that underpine this study: the theory of 
patron-clientelism; the theory of rational choice; and the theory of conflict transformation. 
The theory of patron-clientelism shows what the nature of relationship between the 
Republican Presidents (patrons) and opposition MPs (clients) is and why they enter into one 
through the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections. The theory of rational choice 
theory also adds more understanding as to the question of motivation for the choice of a 
course of action: inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections despite wide-spread 
condemnation and resistance from citizens; and its negative impact on democratic 
consolidation and peace. The theory of conflict transformation guided the study in the 
understanding of the dynamics of conflict and how it can be transformed into constructive 
outcome as opposed to destructive outcome. 
 
Chapter Four 
 
This chapter explores the conditions and  factors that motivate and allow the inducement of 
parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic. These include a 
weak and porous constitutional framework; greed on the part of opposition MPs; desire for 
power consolidation (domination) by the Republican President and the ruling party.  
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Chapter Five 
 
This Chapter examines how the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections 
in Zambia’s Third Republic impacts on democratic consolidation. It weakens and destroys 
the opposition thereby allowing the Republican President and his party (the ruling party) to 
have control over parliament which in turn disables or weakens parliament’s ability to 
provide meaningful checks and balances. A weak parliament becomes a rubberstamp that 
cannot stop the abuse of power and state resources by those in the executive (from the ruling 
party).  
 
Chapter Six 
 
This chapter is a critical examination of the impact of the inducement of parliamentary foor-
crossing and by-elections on peace. The conflict that ensue thereof, leads to intra-party 
conflicts creating discontent and divisions within parties. It also leads to anger and loss of 
trust by the electorate over inter-party conflicts resulting in adversarial and confrontational 
relations between parties. The hostile political environment compounded by lack of impartial 
electoral process management; and law and order enforecement results in electoral violence.  
 
Chapter Seven 
 
This chapter explores and proposes some elements of a framework that be a basis for the 
transformation of the conflict around the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-
elections in Zambia’s Third Republic for a more democratic and peaceful Zambia.  
 
Chapter Eight 
 
This chapter provides a genaral conclusion to the study. It provides a summary of the aims 
and objectives of the study; conditions that facilitate floor-crossing and by-Zambia’s elected 
Members of Parliament; the impact of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on 
democracy; consequences of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on peace; and 
recommandations. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter examines the peer-reviewed literature on the concepts of democracy and 
electoral violence. Various components of the concept of democracy, as it is applied, are 
interrogated such as the notion of i) liberal democracy; ii) political parties; iii) the role of 
opposition parties; iv) the state of opposition parties in sub-Saharan Africa; and v) 
parliamentary floor-crossing. The second part of the chapter examines the concept of 
electoral violence. It explores aspects of elections such as i) elections in Sub-Sahara Africa; 
ii) electoral conflicts and violence in Africa; and iii) elections and electoral violence in 
Zambia. 
The study chose to examine the peer-reviewed literature under the concepts of liberal 
democracy and electoral violence because the conflict around the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections have a negative impact on liberal democracy and peace. Secondly 
the literature review reveals a gap in available peer-reviewed literature, namely that the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections have been viewed as a challenge to liberal 
democracy excluding the challenge to peace they pose. The challenges to liberal democracy 
exclude the hostile and adversarial environment in the political arena created by the conflict 
around the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections that ultimately result in political 
and electoral violence that affect democracy and peace. 
 
2.1 Liberal Democracy 
 
The word democracy comes from the two Greek words: “demos” which means people, and 
‘Kratos’ which means power or rule (Dahl, 2017). The direct translation meant for democracy 
was rule by the people though the Greeks originally used it to mean the rule of the masses or 
the poor. So, the origins of the concept of democracy can be traced to the city state of Athens 
in ancient Greece in the 5th Century B.C. (Dahl, 2017; Ober, 2008; Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 2011). The assembly, usually composed of 5000 to 6000 adult citizens chosen by 
lot, not elections, as the belief by the Athenians was that any citizen was capable of holding 
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public office, was the central political institution in Athens that decided on all domestic issues 
by a simple majority vote (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011). Schumpeter, (1941) argued a 
minimalist model of democracy as a mechanism for competition between leaders through 
periodic votes by the general public for the legitimisation of government with a severely 
limited participatory role for the public. He defined democracy as a process of competitive 
elections by the people for elected representatives to carry out their will. 
There are different types of governments, those based on elections and those that are not; and 
there has been a debate as to whether the ones based on elections provide good governance 
and those that aren’t based on elections do not. One argument though that has been widely 
accepted is that, a democratic government is not possible without elections of some kind 
(Wright, 1971). In a multiparty democracy however, apart from the holding of elections, the 
wellbeing of liberal democracy depends, among other things, on the need for strong 
opposition political parties. 
2.1.1 Political parties 
 
There is a recognition that political parties are a prerequisite in a democratic political system 
(Aldrich, 1995; Müller, 2000; Dalton, Farrell & McAllister, 2011). Political parties play 
many critical roles in a democracy. As such, “democratic consolidation can hardly be 
achieved without political parties playing a significant role not only in the debate but also by 
practising the principles and policies they advocate” (Salih & Nordlund, 2007, p. 20). 
In a multi-party state, the existence of political parties should not only be tolerated but should 
be encouraged, supported and strengthened because they play a vital role in a vibrant 
democracy. In underscoring the importance of political parties, Diamond (1997, p. xxiii), 
states that they are,  
essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests, 
aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for 
office; organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, 
setting the policy-making agenda, forming effective governments, and integrating 
groups and individuals into the democratic process. 
 
At their core, political parties are representative institutions that produce leaders and, by 
means of democratic elections, form governments; provide ideologies that speak to 
20 
 
alternative economic, social and political interests and bequeath legitimacy to regimes. In the 
quest for democratic consolidation, political parties are at the centre of shaping programmes, 
political representation, public policies and government functions (Webb, 2005; Salih & 
Nordlund, 2007).  
2.1.2 Opposition parties in a democracy 
 
John Acton’s axiom cited in (Venter, 2015) “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely,” is a powerful reminder of the need to keep any government in check 
owing to the enormous power it holds. One of the vexing challenges of any government given 
the enormity of power it possesses is the need to control the government so that it does not 
abuse the power that the people have given it to govern. Schedler (1999, p. 13) notes that, 
“the earlier classical theorists knew: in politics, first comes power, then the need to control 
it.” Control, oversight or accountability over how the power to govern is exercised is 
important because human beings are not angels, as Madison (1788, para. 4) so eloquently 
argued:  
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing 
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies 
in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next 
place oblige it to control itself. 
In an effort to seek and to ensure that control, oversight and accountability is exercised in 
government, over its use of power or its application, the doctrine of separation of power has 
been devised. According to Kiiza (2005, p. 2), “The doctrine of separation of powers is 
designed to build institutions that guard against arbitrary rule via a system of checks and 
balances. The biggest danger to the separation of powers is usually the executive.” The 
absence or lack of checks and balances among the various branches of government 
(executive, legislature and judiciary) facilitates one of the worst indicators of unaccountable 
government, which is the abuse of state power (Ikome & Kode, 2010). 
Among the functions of the opposition in a multiparty democracy as outlined by Kiiza (2005), 
the ones that pertain to holding government accountable; and to promote and stimulate 
debate, relate directly to its role in the legislature. “In a multiparty system the opposition thus 
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becomes crucial as it challenges the incumbent and provides horizontal accountability of 
government to the legislature” (Chiroro, 2006, p. 102). The opposition as part of government, 
with its elected members of parliament in the legislature should be a watchdog that guards 
against, and challenges the abuse of power, corruption, waste of public funds, breaches of 
human rights, and nepotism that too often those in the executive are prone to (Kabgin, 2015). 
Thus, according to Lawson (2010, p. 108), the main function of opposition parties is, “to hold 
elected officials accountable, thereby ensuring a healthy political debate, generating 
competition over ideas and policies, exposing corruption, and thus serving the public interests 
and requiring a responsive government.” Holding the government accountable ensures that 
government conducts its business within the confines of the law and that once it steps out or 
abuses its authority those in the opposition would be on hand to expose it, fight it and 
hopefully stop it.  
Opposition political parties thus play a critical role in a democracy, that of providing 
oversight and accountability of the government in power. They make for “a powerful engine 
for enforcing accountability. The party in power all too often has strong incentives to evade 
accountability, but the opposition have their own incentives to uncover wrongdoing…” 
(Blair, 2000, p. 28). 
Among the three branches of government in which the opposition parties can provide one of 
its core functions of ensuring checks and balances is in the legislature. As noted by Rakner 
and van de Walle (2009, p. 109), “Stable and numerically viable opposition is a key requisite 
for horizontal accountability through legislative checks on executive power.” To offer 
effective checks and balances in the legislature, the opposition needs to be stable and have 
sufficient numbers of members of parliament. 
Parliament or the legislature as one branch of government needs a strong opposition for it to 
be able to effectively discharge its responsibilities. It is that one place, where, according to 
Diefenbaker (1949, para. 9) “in full discussion freedom is preserved, where one side 
advances arguments and the other examines them and where decisions are arrived at after 
passing through the crucible of public discussion.” Apart from being that one place where 
decisions are discussed, challenged and sometimes amended or stopped, parliament, states 
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Diefenbaker (1949, para. 8), has an important responsibility of supervising,  
all expenditures and prevent over expenditure by exposing to the light of public 
opinion wasteful expenditures or worse. It finds fault; it suggests amendments; it asks 
questions and elicits information; it arouses, educates and molds public opinion by 
voice and vote. It must scrutinize every action by the government and in doing so 
prevents the short-cuts through democratic procedure that governments like to make. 
Parliament is most likely to remain true to its functions if it is composed of a strong opposition 
representation. Without a strong opposition in the legislature, its watchfulness that is 
supposed to keep the executive in check by the arguments they make through debates and 
votes they cast is weakened. 
Parliament is the one branch of government where the opposition plays as oversight role over 
the executive. The control of parliament is central to the conflict around the inducement of 
floor-crossing and by-elections. The concepts of liberal democracy and electoral violence are 
related to the following themes being assessed by this study: a) reasons (drivers) for the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections, b) impact of induced floor-crossing and by-
elections on democracy, c) impact of induced floor-crossing on peace, and d) transformation 
of the conflict for consolidation of democracy and peace. 
2.1.3 State of democracy and opposition parties in Africa 
 
The state of democratic consolidation and political parties (especially the opposition) in 
Africa, while varying from country to country is fragile (Salih & Nordlund, 2007). Many 
governments in Africa give no sign of wanting to go beyond elections to transform to liberal 
democracy9 but instead, “…they often manifest patterns of personal clientelistic-based rule10 
                                               
9 Liberal democracy is a political system that allows political liberties and democratic governance. 
Political rights entail the right to participate, form or belong to a political party of choice and freedom 
to express political views through any media while democratic rule entails having a government that 
is accountable to the people; and allows them to participate directly or through their representatives 
in government (Bollen, 1993). 
10 A clientelistic-based rule is a political system whereby the President who is head of a dominant 
party discretionarily uses public resources, and government bureaucracy in order to preserve 
hegemony (Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff, 2002; Briquet, J-L., 2015).  
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reminiscent of African authoritarian regimes11, with the executive holding a preponderance 
of power” (Tripp, 2004, p. 5).  
 
Many countries across Africa, have experienced a reincarnation of the one party system 
dictatorship12 under the guise of multi-party democracy. Kura (2008, pp. 63-64), 
characterizes democracy in many African countries under the emerging dominant ruling 
parties as demonstrating, “… an inclination towards a new form of ‘modern’ democratic 
authoritarianism. In other words, the ruling dominant parties are appearing to be a 
‘reincarnation’ of the one-party system and military rule that held sway for about three to 
four decades in Africa (from the 1960s)”.  
 
The earlier promise of a new dawn of democracy in Africa is slowly being undermined or 
reversed by a return to one party autocracy13. Among other factors, ruling parties in Africa 
have been cited as major drivers of democratic authoritarianism14. African ruling (governing)  
                                               
11 This refers to the post-independence era that saw the personal type military and one party 
dictatorships that ruled most of the African independent states with impunity (Tripp, 2004) 
12 One party dictatorship is a single-party state with one political party having the monopoly of power. 
They are autocratic regimes that lack of democratic and human rights; without social and political 
liberties, and without checks and balance (Brooker, 1995; Brooker, 2000). 
13 One party autocracy is the characterized by the concentration of power in a single a party, the ruling 
party that relies on use of force to suppress the opposition without any effective means to rein in the 
abuse of power (Heslop, 2017).  
14 Democratic authoritarianism is the nominal adoption of democratic institutions such as holding 
multi-party elections by authoritarian regimes to gain and maintain legitimacy and power while 
forestalling democratization (Brancati, 2014).  
24 
 
parties, according to Kura (2008, p. 64),  “have been grossly destabilising opposition and 
perceived dissenters through clientelism15, patronage politics16 and extra-legal means17, 
thereby undermining the provision of social justice in the guise of democratization.” Ruling 
political parties under this new ‘democratic authoritarianism’ have become strong and 
powerful at the expense of liberal democracy and the opposition political parties. Apart from 
the aforementioned, ruling parties tend to build their political parties using state resources 
and blurring the lines between party and government. To this,  Salih and Nordlund (2007, 
p.21), argues that,  
 
The majority of African governing political parties are still heavily dependent on the 
direct or indirect (the embezzlement of public funds to finance elections) use or abuse 
of government resources. The party in power is hardly autonomous from government 
influence and it is difficult to draw the line where the influence of government begins 
and that of political party ends. The relationship between party and government is so 
blurred that the governing party tends to rely on the state resources to exact patronage 
in order to maintain the party organization and management. 
 
These and other factors undermine the genuine growth of opposition parties and liberal 
democracy in many African countries. The fact that abuse of state resources by ruling parties 
to build their parties means that the opposition parties cannot effectively compete due to the 
uneven playing field that is not only harmful to the opposition but also to the overall well-
being of liberal democracy. “Opposition parties’ evolving ability to compete politically 
should in theory correlate with the level and quality of democratic practice. Legislative 
dominance by one party over time often results from authoritarian tendencies, the misuse of 
state resources, or both” (Rakner and de Walle, 2009, p. 109). 
                                               
15 Clientelism is a relationship between individuals of unequal status (patron and client) based on 
reciprocal exchange which goes against the values of liberal democracy. As articulated by Briquet 
(2015, para 9), ‘It involves a discretionary usage of public resources, which contradicts the rule of 
law and the principle of bureaucratic impartiality. Also, it is based upon personalized exchanges and 
instruments that are antithetical to the ethics of political conviction…’ 
16 Patronage politics involves the distribution of favours or rewards like jobs in public office, 
contracts, subsidies, status and other benefits by the patron to a client. It is usually an unequal 
relationship in which an elected official to high office with such power to grant benefits is the patron, 
while the client provides the patron with services such as voting for the party of the patron (Lemieux 
and Noël, 2006). 
17 ‘Not regulated or sanctioned by law’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). 
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This also has a negative impact on good governance as the one part or branch of government, 
the legislature, which is supposed to play an oversight or watchdog role over the executive to 
prevent abuse of power and resources is also weakened as a consequence of a disadvantaged 
and weakened opposition in parliament. Parliament on behalf of citizens has a responsibility 
of representing their views, shaping legislation, overseeing and holding the executive 
accountable particularly overseeing the use of public funds (Africa All Party Parliamentary 
Group, 2008).  
 
The health of liberal democracy in a multiparty system also depends on the health of political 
parties, the ruling party and the opposition parties. In Africa, opposition parties tend to be 
weak and disadvantaged because ruling parties enjoy undue advantages over the opposition 
due to the access they have to countrywide state infrastructure and abuse of state resources 
the opposition parties don’t (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009). Furthermore, Rakner and van 
de Walle (2009, p. 113), argue that: 
The single biggest impediment to truly competitive democracy in Africa is the 
overwhelming dominance of the presidency…Thus the weakness of the parties, and 
in particular of the opposition, is embedded in the political system’s excessive 
concentration of power in the hands of the executive. 
While it is understood and accepted that opposition parties play an important role in a 
democracy, it cannot effectively play its rightful and critical role that of providing checks and 
balances if it is disadvantaged and weak. One such institution, in Africa, that suffers as a 
result of a weak opposition is parliament. President Barack Obama, in his address to 
the Ghanaian parliament underlined the need for strong independent capable 
institutions in Africa such as parliament as the key to success and democracy, saying 
that,  
In the 21st century, capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to 
success -- strong parliaments; honest police forces; independent judges; an 
independent press; a vibrant private sector; a civil society. Those are the things that 
give life to democracy… Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions 
(The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009, July 11). 
Sadly, in Africa, with the re-emergence of ‘authoritarianism,’ many of the supposedly 
independent institutions are under the ‘control’ of the very principalities they are 
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supposed to keep it in check. One such institution or arm of government that is 
supposed to make government self-regulating, is often targeted by the ruling party to 
ensure total dominance or rule without effective challenge. This is the legislature 
(parliament). Among other tools used to ensure that parliament is controlled by the 
executive (president and the ruling party) has been the inducement of parliamentary 
floor-crossing and by-elections, a phenomenon quite common in some countries in 
Africa (Lembani, 2007).  
2.2.1 Parliamentary floor-crossing 
 
Floor-crossing is called by different names such as party switching, carpet crossing, 
defection, crosstitution, and others. The term floor-crossing in this study refers to a process 
by which an elected Member of Parliament changes his or her allegiance from the party in 
which they were elected to office for, to another party. Parliamentary floor-crossing (party 
switching and defections) is not a phenomenon unique to Africa; it is an issue many other 
countries have had to grapple with (Desposato, 2006). It is common in many countries even 
though it is rare in most (Majola, Saptoe, & Silkstone, 2007; Desposato, 2006). In this 
literature review the experience of Nigeria, South Africa, Malawi and Zambia will be 
explored.  
 
The study selected these countries due to the similarities and differences for triangulation 
purposes to note constants and variations under similar and different circumstances under 
which floor-crossing happens in the case of Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia; and in the case of 
South Africa, happened. Nigeria uses the FPTP electoral system like Malawi and Zambia but 
Ministers are appointed from outside Parliament. Malawi like Zambia are identical in the use 
of the FPTP electoral system and appointment of Ministers from among MPs. South Africa 
on the other hand uses the PR electoral system concerning elections to the National 
Assembly.  
2.2.2 Nigeria 
 
Nigeria held its first democratic elections in 1999 after many years of military dictatorship, 
but has since been faced with a number of challenges hindering multiparty liberal democracy. 
One of these challenges is party defections (Aleyomi, 2013, p. 87). The 1999 Constitution of 
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Nigeria contained anti floor-crossing legislation. A member of the Senate of the House of 
Representatives, according to Section 68 (1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, may vacate his/her seat if:  
being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, he 
becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the period for 
which that House was elected; Provided that his membership of the latter political 
party is not as a result of a division in the political party of which he was previously 
a member or of a merger of two or more political parties or factions by one of which 
he was previously sponsored (1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). 
 
However, this 1999 anti-floor-crossing legislation is full of ambiguities that politicians have 
fully exploited, providing ‘an escape route for politicians to “party switch” “anyhow”’ 
(Aleyomi, 2013). 
 
The first part of the section prohibits floor-crossing but the second part allows it on the 
premise of division in the political party on which they were elected. It is therefore argued 
that since there is no political party that has no divisions, this in effect is not an anti-floor-
crossing legislation. 
 
The People’s Democratic Party (PDP)18, the then ruling party in Nigeria since its transition 
from military rule to democracy in 1999, though it was the most powerful, well-funded and 
organized party in Nigeria was shaken by the defections of five governors and 37 House of 
Representatives Members, in the run up to the 2015 presidential elections (Murdock, 2014, 
January 31). These defections have been from the ruling party to the newly formed opposition 
party, the All Progressive Congress (APC)19. 
                                               
18The People's Democratic Party (PDP) was found in 1998. It won the 1999 general elections under the 
leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo marking Nigeria’s return to democratic rule for the third time in its history. 
The PDP won 4 consecutive general elections ruling for 16 years from 1999 up to 2015 when it lost to the All 
Progressive Congress (APC) in the 2015 general elections. The PDP policies were based on neoliberal capitalist 
ideology (Omotola, 2009; Katsina, 2016). 
19 The All Progressive Congress (APC) political party in Nigeria, is an alliance that brought together the then 
three biggest opposition parties in Nigeria, the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive 
Change (CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and part of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) 
in 2013. The APC candidate Muhammadu Buhari won the 2015 presidential elections defeating the incumbent 
President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP. The APC also won majorities in the National Assembly elections: in 
the senate the APC got 60 vs PDP’s 49; while in the House of Representatives the APC got 225 seats vs the 
PDP’s 125 and 10 for other parties. The APC controls 61.29 % of the states in Nigeria having won 19 seats vs 
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Floor-crossing in Nigeria is mostly not motivated by political patronage as, ‘Nigeria operates 
a presidential democracy anchored on power separation, with little or no opportunity of 
cabinet appointments for defectors’ (Fashagba, 2014, p. 519). This is precisely because the 
Nigerian constitution does not allow the appointment of members of the legislature stating 
section 127(4),  
Where a member of the National Assembly or of a House of Assembly is appointed 
as Minister of the Government of the Federation, he shall be deemed to have resigned 
his membership of the National Assembly or of the House of Assembly on his taking 
the oath of office as Minister’ in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
of 1999.  
 
A consequence of which both the ruling parties and the opposition parties have lost their 
members of the legislature (the Senate and the House of Representatives) to each other. Table 
2 shows legislative floor-crossing in Nigeria from and to each political party in the period 
1999 – 2011: 
 
 
Table 2: Number and Percentage of Party Switchers Received by Parties in each of the 
Three Legislative Terms: (1999 – 2003, 2003 – 2007; and 2007 – 2011). 
Source: Fashagba (2014, p. 528) 
 
In the run up to the 2015 elections, the PDP lost 37 members of the House of Representatives 
to the APC, while in the Senate 11 PDP members defected to the APC (Badejo & Obah-
Akpowoghaha, 2015). In July 2018, the APC, the current ruling party lost 33 seats to the 
                                               
the PDP’s 12 in the 2015 gubernatorial elections. Ideologically, the APC describes itself as a leftist, 
progressive party (INEC, 2015; Thurston, 2015; Sule, Sani, & Mat, 2018).      
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opposition PDP and four others to the ADC through defections making the APC ruling party 
now the minority party in the Senate (AFP, 2018, July 24). 
 
According to some studies done on the subject of Legislative floor-crossing in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria it weakens democratic consolidation (Awofeso & Irabor, 2016). It has 
an effect on democracy which is one of the themes this study found to be negatively affected 
by floor-crossing. The second theme is on the factors that cause floor-crossing. The literature 
on floor-crossing in the Federal Republic of Nigeria indicate that it is mainly caused by lack 
of ideology; selfish interest (re-election concern, political careerism, and personal ambition) 
and intra-party conflicts; and patronage (Fashagba, 2014; Awofeso & Irabor, 2016). 
 
2.2.3 South Africa 
 
The South African Parliament in 2002 passed three legislative amendments and one Bill, 
whose ‘sole objective was to allow members of Parliament to switch party allegiances and 
loyalties in between elections while still retaining their legislative seats’ (Masemola, 2007: 
5). This change prompted a debate on its appropriateness, supported by the major political 
parties while a few small opposition political parties, intellectuals, electoral authorities and 
civil society actors opposed it (Boysen, 2006: p. 730).  
 
Controversy grew surrounding floor-crossing and, complaints abounded from the opposition 
parties that it was ‘detrimental to their sustainability and effectiveness, as it tends to benefit 
larger parties, especially the ruling party…’ (Masemola, 2007: p. 1). As a result of its negative 
impact on the party political system and representative democracy in the country, the 
30 
 
opposition parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA)20 and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)21 
among others, in 2006, unsuccessfully introduced a private member’s bill aimed at scrapping 
the floor-crossing legislation (Masemola 2007: p. 10). It was successfully amended in 2008, 
to prevent politicians from keeping their seats if they joined other parties, following the 
decision to reject floor-crossing by the African National Congress’ (ANC)22 at their 2007 
Polokwane National Conference (Carter, 2008). On 6th January, 2009 President Kgalema 
Montlante assented to the amendment after the bill was passed by Parliament (Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment Act of 2008, 2009).  
 
In the South African case, floor-crossing negatively affects democratic consolidation and 
party system in that benefited the dominant party at the expense of small ones and led to the 
                                               
20 The Democratic Alliance (DA) is a South African opposition party that was formed in 2000 out of 
a merger by the Democratic Party (DP) with the New National Party (NNP) and the Federal Alliance 
(FA). The DA is the current official national opposition party to the ANC-led government with 89 
MPs (22.23% share) in Parliament. It has a nationwide footprint in all provinces of the Republic of 
South Africa though the Western Cape is the DA’s stronghold and has been governing the province 
since 2009 to date. Mmusi Maimane is the current leader of the party after taking over from Helen 
Zille following the party’s elections in 2015, May 10 (IEC, 2014; Areff, & Khoza, 2015; Everatt, 
2016).     
21 The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) is an opposition South African political party that was formed in 
1994 from the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement (INCLM) by Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
who is still its leader. It is the fourth largest party in the National Assembly with 10 seats. It is a 
regional party with the Kwa-Zulu Natal Province being its stronghold, a province it governed from 
1994 up to 2004 when it lost to the ANC and has since fallen to number three in the Provincial 
Legislature with 9 seats after the 2014 elections. Ideologically, the post-apartheid IFP has a mixture 
of militant Zulu nationalism and inclusive conservative-liberalism (Piper, 2006; Rohanlall, 2014; IEC, 
2014). 
22The African National Congress (ANC) the governing political party in South Africa was found in 
1912 as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) before being known as ANC in 1923. 
Following the ANC’s ban in 1960, the party formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) to 
fight apartheid using sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Many of the ANC’s leaders like Nelson Mandela 
were arrested and imprisoned on Robben Island while others were killed and some went into exile. 
The ban on the ANC was lifted on 3 February 1990 followed by Mandela’s release from prison on 11 
February 1990. The Mandela-led ANC won the first post-apartheid democratic elections in the 
Republic of South Africa in 1994 and the ANC to date is still the ruling party. It has a national footprint 
and is the dominant single political party in all provinces except for the Western Cape. Ideologically, 
though the ANC is a member of the Socialist International and describes itself as a social democratic 
party, in practice it is liberal-capitalist (Saeboe, 2002; Kurtz, 2010; Ellis, 2011; Rohanlall, 2014; IEC, 
2014). 
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proliferation of small new parties. And perhaps most importantly, it sacrifices constitutional 
principles over political expediency as floor-crossing was instituted as a way of settling the 
battle for ‘control of the Western Cape between the ANC and the DA government and Cape 
Town City Council (Hoeane, 2008). Floor-crossing as the table below shows that the 
dominant party benefited the most through the increase in the number of seats. 
 
Table 3 shows the outcome in the National Assembly of the March/April 2003 and September 
2005 floor crossings at national level, compared with the results of the 1999 and 2004 general 
elections. 
 
 
Table 3: South African National Assembly 1999-2005 
Source: Kotzé (2007, p.77). 
 
Floor-crossing allowed individual legislators to take their seats with them through 
inducements by the incumbent party. This was frequently ahead of elections when they feared 
de-selection in their own party, or faced misconduct cases or feared being too far down the 
list that they would not get back into parliament. Thus personal interests were more important 
than considerations of democracy. It has a negative effect on the mandate given to elected 
representatives through their parties as it encourages personal opportunism such as a desire 
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to change one’s personal financial circumstances by alignment with the ruling party over 
preferences expressed by voters (Kotzé, 2007; Hoeane, 2008).  
In South Africa it was found to be unconstitutional in a party-list electoral system because 
the seat was in effect owned by the party. So at national and provincial levels it was 
unconstitutional and thus reversed. At local government level there are two electoral systems 
(a) one is a party-list system – where it was unconstitutional; (b) the other is a ward system 
where the individual first-past-the-post system is used – thus the seat is “owned” by the 
individual, not the party and floor-crossing is allowed (Spiess & Pehl, 2004). 
 
2.2.4 Malawi 
 
Malawi has experienced a lot of party floor-crossing and by-elections since the re-
introduction of multi-party liberal democracy in 1993 (Maganga, 2009). The Constitution of 
Malawi prohibits MPs keeping their seats if they defect to another party while safeguarding 
their right to free vote in the National Assembly without risking their seats. According to 
Section 65 of the 1994 Constitution of Malawi, 
(1) The Speaker shall declare vacant the seat of any member of the National Assembly 
who was, at the time of his or her election, a member of one political party represented 
in the National Assembly, other than by that member alone but who has voluntarily 
ceased to be a member of that party and has joined another political party represented 
in the National Assembly. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), all members of all parties have the absolute right 
to exercise a free vote in any and all proceedings of the National Assembly, and a 
member shall not have his or her seat declared vacant solely on account of his or her 
voting in contradiction of the recommendations of a political party, represented in the 
National Assembly, of which he or she is a member. 
 
The change of party by any elected MP according to the constitution would be grounds on 
which the Speaker declares their seat vacant. Any MP therefore who wishes to switch or 
change party would be required to resign from their party and seek a fresh mandate through 
by-elections. An MP going by subsection 2 cannot lose their seat even if one votes contrary 
to party stated position (Chigawa, 2008; Maganga, 2011).   
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In the 1994 multiparty elections, the former opposition party, United Democratic Front 
(UDF)23 won the elections with 85 seats out of 177 seats, while the defeated former ruling 
party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP)24 received 56 seats and the Alliance for Democracy 
(AFORD)25 obtained 36 seats. The opposition parties, the MCP and AFORD, formed a 
parliamentary alliance that gave them a combined majority of 86 seats. The combined 
majority of the MCP and AFORD enabled them to elect the Speaker, both deputy speakers, 
and seven Committees of Parliament that they chaired.  The committees in Parliament were 
heavily composed of opposition MPs; thereby making the smooth running of government by 
the UDF difficult (Maganga, 2009).  
 
The response of the UDF government in 1994 to this problem was to enter into a coalition 
government with AFORD. It created a second vice-presidential cabinet post for the AFORD 
party president and further appointed 7 AFORD MPs to ministerial positions (Maganga, 
2009). However, Malawi was thrown into a floor-crossing crisis in 2005 when the president 
(Mutarika) abandoned the UDF party under which he was elected in 2004, and formed his 
                                               
23 The United Democratic Front (UDF) political party in Malawi was found in 1993. The UDF won 
the 1994 multiparty elections under Bakili Muluzi defeating the MCP of former president Kamuzu 
Banda and was ruling party up until 2004. It has its stronghold in the South of the country; and the 
party has been seen to be grounded in Western liberal ideologies (Phiri, 2000; Chirwa, Patel, & 
Kanyongolo, 2000; Patel, 2005; Young, n.d.; Kameme, 2011). 
24 The Malawi Congress Party (MCP) the successor to the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) party, 
is the oldest party in Malawi that was found in 1959 as a national mass movement for independence 
from colonial rule. The MCP led Malawi to independence in 1964 and remained a post-independence 
ruling party under Kamuzu Banda until 1994, when it lost to the United Democratic Front (UDF). 
The MCP is the current official opposition party in Malawi. The MCP is ideologically a conservative 
party with a stronghold in the Central part of the country (Patel, 2005; Kadima & Lembani, 2006; 
Wikman, 2012). 
25The Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) is a political party in Malawi that was found in 1993 by 
Chakufa Chihana. It began as an underground movement aimed at ending President Kamuzu Banda’s 
autocratic one-party dictatorship and usher in multi-party democracy in Malawi. In the 1994 
multiparty elections, AFORD emerged as the third largest party in the National Assembly with 32 
seats. AFORD had its stronghold in the North where the founding party leader comes from and 
ideologically is a social democratic party (Patel, 2005; Tsoka, 2009; “Malawi’s political party,” 2013; 
Svåsand, 2014).  
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own party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)26 triggering a reaction that led almost the 
entire cabinet, some MPs from the UDF, MCP and independents joining his new party 
(Muriaas, 2013; Maganga, 2009). In the end the President managed to get 60 MPs from the 
opposition to the newly formed ruling party, the DPP, but in the process party politics in 
Malawi became strongly polarized and adversarial between the ruling party and opposition 
parties. This heightened the adversarial political landscape in Malawi and ensured that 
president Mutarika’s tenure of the DPP was spent in tense stand-offs with the opposition 
(Maganga, 2009).  
 
The floor-crossing case on Malawi has some differences and similarities to the Nigerian and 
South African cases. In the case of Malawi, floor-crossing was from the dominant established 
parties to a new party being formed from scratch. However, the new party (DPP) was being 
formed by the President who is the most powerful man in the country and MPs from the big 
political parties were drawn to it because, as succinctly explained by Cammack (2009) in 
Maganga, 2011,  
In Malawi (and in Africa generally, because it’s poor) there are relatively few avenues 
outside of politics to obtain access to real power and wealth. Being close to a powerful 
man who commands the state, its people and wealth is one of the few ways to gain 
the personal and financial satisfaction to be derived from being a ‘player’ at the 
‘centre of events’. Also, it’s easier than being a critic, which can deprive you of a 
livelihood and more (p. 47). 
 
The politics of patronage are a big factor in attracting MPs to the party the President of the 
Republic of Malawi belongs regardless of size. They are attracted by the prospects of power 
and wealth that come with the appointment into the cabinet and not by the electoral 
considerations (such as being in a party likely to win the next elections, the uncertainty of 
being the party’s candidate for the future elections, being far on the party list or due to intra-
party conflicts). Simply put, the circumstances may be different, but self-interest over the 
consideration of the democratic consolidation holds sway. Floor-crossing in Malawi, as 
                                               
26 The United Democratic Front (UDF) political party in Malawi was found in 1993. The UDF won 
the 1994 multiparty elections under Bakili Muluzi defeating the MCP of former president Kamuzu 
Banda and was ruling party up until 2004. It has its stronghold in the South of the country; and the 
party has been seen to be grounded in Western liberal ideologies (Phiri, 2000; Chirwa, Patel, & 
Kanyongolo, 2000; Patel, 2005; Young, n.d.; Kameme, 2011). 
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literature shows, undermines democratic consolidation as it results in political chaos and 
instability. 
 
2.2.5 Zambia 
 
In 1991, Zambia reverted to a multiparty liberal democracy after many years as a one-party 
autocratic dictatorship during which only one political party, the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP)27, was allowed to exist (Baylies & Szeftel, 1992). The return to 
multi-party democracy marked the beginning of Zambia’s Third Republic, a new era in which 
many political parties, other than UNIP were allowed to be formed, exist and compete for 
political power to run the government. Following the re-introduction of multi-party 
democracy and the general elections, a newly formed party, the Movement for Multi-party 
Democracy (MMD)28, led by the former Chairman-General of the Zambia Congress of Trade  
Unions (ZCTU)29, Fredrick Chiluba, defeated the former ruling party in a landslide electoral 
victory, winning 125 parliamentary seats out of 150 (Bratton, 1992). The peaceful transition 
                                               
27The United National Independence Party (UNIP) was formed in 1959 as successor party to the 
Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) that was banned with its leader Kenneth Kaunda arrested. 
Mainza Chona was the interim leader for the party and in 1960 handed the leadership of UNIP to 
Kenneth Kaunda upon his release from prison. In the 1964 general elections, Kenneth Kaunda led 
UNIP to victory winning 55 seats out of 75 seats becoming Prime Minister. He became President of 
the Republic of Zambia on 24th October 1964 after leading the country to independence. UNIP 
adopted the ideology of Humanism, a man-centered society which was a socialist-oriented ideology. 
UNIP under Kenneth Kaunda’s leadership and as the Head of State ruled from 1964 to 1991 after 
being defeated by the MMD (Meebelo, 1973; Bratton, 1992; Macola, 2008).  
28 PF, the Patriotic Front the current ruling party in Zambia was formed in 2001 by Michael Sata as a 
breakaway party from the MMD. The PF won the 2011 general elections bringing to an end the 20 
year rule of the MMD. Under the late President Michael Sata, the PF had a leftist pro-poor ideology 
bent, characterised by rapid expansion of social assistance though under President Edgar Lungu, the 
PF government has pursued a more free market friendly platform (NDI & FODEP, 2003; Rakner, 
2003; Siachiwena, 2017).  
29 The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was formed in 1965 as a replacement to the former 
United Trade Union Congress (UTUC). It is the central (mother body) trade union to which all trade 
unions in the country affiliate. Throughout its existence, even during the one-party autocratic 
dictatorship of UNIP, ZCTU maintained its autonomy and resisted being under the control UNIP. It 
has always advocated for liberal capitalistic policies contrary to the socialist orientation in the Second 
Republic and was instrumental in the fight for the re-introduction of plural multiparty politics in 
Zambia under the Chairman-General, Fredrick Chiluba (Rakner, 1992). 
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of power was cited as a good example; a model to an African continent that had seen too 
many bloody transitions of power (Bratton, 1992; Joseph, 1992).  
 
The constitution of Zambia was first changed in 1966 through Act No. 47 of 1966 to compel 
a sitting Member of Parliament to vacate his/her seat if one ceased to be a member of the 
party on which they stood as candidate for election to Parliament (Slinn, 1996). This, in effect 
was the first anti floor-crossing legislation in Zambia, four years after independence in 1964. 
The 1973 constitution that ushered in the Second Republic, changed Zambia from a multi-
party state to a one-party state with the United National Independence Party (UNIP) as the 
only political party in the land, stated that any MP who ceased to be a member of UNIP would 
inevitably vacate the seat as MP. The 1991 Constitution of Zambia that re-enshrined multi-
partyism stated that any elected member shall vacates his/her seat if one ‘becomes a member 
of a political party other than the party, of which he was an authorised candidate when he was 
elected to the National Assembly or, if having been an independent candidate, he joins a 
political party’ (Slinn, 1996: p. 115).  
 
Despite the Zambian Constitution having anti-floor-crossing legislation, floor-crossing has 
not only continued but increased (NDIIA and the FODEP, 2003). The problem of inducement 
of floor-crossing started in earnest after the tripartite elections of 2001 when the ruling MMD 
failed to get the absolute majority in the National Assembly and embarked on a strategy of 
encouraging defections. Members of the Heritage Party (HP)30 and United Party for National 
Development (UPND)31 who defected or were expelled from their parties, re-contested their 
                                               
30The Heritage Party (HP) was formed in 2001 by Godfrey Miyanda, former Zambian Vice President 
from 1994 to 1997 in the MMD government. Godfrey Miyanda formed the HP in protest of President 
Chiluba’s bid for third term presidential bid. In the 2001 parliamentary elections, the HP won 4 seats 
and failed to win any seats in the subsequent parliamentary elections to date and is described as one 
of the parties that exist on paper only (NDI & FODEP, 2003; Rakner, 2003).  
31 The United Party for National Development (UPND) political party was formed in 1998 by 
Anderson Mazoka the former Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) Chief Executive for Eastern and 
Southern Africa. The UPND is the second largest party in Zambia and is the official opposition party 
in Zambia having narrowly lost to the PF in the 2016 general elections. UPND has a social democratic 
platform with a commitment to provision of free education and healthcare. The current leader of 
UPND is Hakainde Hichilema (Mazoka finally retires from AAC, 1999; NDI & FODEP, 2003; 
Rakner, 2003; Siachiwena, 2017). 
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seats under the ruling MMD government and won, thereby strengthening the ruling party 
while weakening the opposition (Goeke & Hartmann, 2011). 
A review of the relevant literature, that includes South Africa, Malawi and Zambia, indicates 
that studies have been conducted on the phenomenon of floor-crossing as it relates to 
democracy and destabilization to the party system. These studies have shown, in the case of 
Zambia, that floor-crossing was a major cause of the erosion of parliamentary democracy 
through the buying off of opposition members of parliament. The buying off in the form of 
appointments of renegade opposition MPs into cabinet and the by-elections that follow are, 
Phiri claims, deliberately aimed at weakening the opposition (Phiri, 2005). 
While studies conducted have rightly focused on the impact of floor-crossing on democracy 
(Phiri, 2005), there have been no studies conducted on its impact on peace, as is a key concern 
of this study. Yet, these defections necessarily imply a conflict precipitating fierce opposition 
that led to the repeal of legislation that allowed it, in the case of South Africa. During this 
case, it threatened to resurrect violent conflict that had been witnessed between the ANC and 
IFP in their competition for power in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal (cf. Francis, 2011).  
In the case of Malawi and Zambia, it has undoubtedly been a source of conflict. In Zambia 
the by-elections that are a result of floor-crossing have increasingly become violent, and in 
some cases result in the loss of property and life as well. One such case in point is the 
Livingstone by-election32.  It resulted in violence between the ruling party (PF) and the 
opposition party (UPND); the killing of a PF cadre that led to the arbitrary arrest of 40 UPND 
supporters and leaders of the UPND (the party president Hakainde Hichilema and two MPs) 
on 25th February, 2013. However, the police eventually dropped all their charges and released 
them without any explanation on 11th March 2013 (Violence switches off by-elections, 2013; 
U.S. Department of State (BDHRL), 2013. In postponing the Livingstone by-elections, the 
Chairperson of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), Justice Irene Mambilima, stated 
                                               
32 This case refers to the violence that took place in 2013, February 23 in Livingstone during the run-
up to the by-election that led to the death of a cadre of the ruling party, PF. There was a lot of violence 
and intimidation between the major contending political parties: the ruling party (PF) and the 
opposition, UPND. The by-election was occasioned by the resignation of the opposition UPND 
Livingstone Central MP, Hon. Howard Sikwela from his party (UPND) and stepping down as MP 
(Sikwela steps down, 2013; U.S. Department of State, 2013; Political parties regret, 2014). 
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that: ‘This postponement is due to the high unprecedented levels of intolerance between 
political parties and violence which ultimately led to the loss of life’ (Violence switches off 
by-elections, 2013).  
The re-introduction liberal democracy entailed that Zambia would be guided by democratic 
principles among which are, free press; regular, free and fair elections; equality; 
accountability; transparency; bill of rights; separation of power; political tolerance; economic 
freedom; and control of the abuse of power (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011). In a multi-
party state, like Zambia, the existence of political parties should not only be tolerated but 
should be encouraged, supported and strengthened because they play a vital role in a vibrant 
democracy. As asserted by Diamond (1997):  
Political parties remain important if not essential instruments for representing 
political constituencies and interests, aggregating demands and preferences, 
recruiting and socializing new candidate for office; organizing the electoral 
competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy-making agenda, 
forming effective governments, and integrating groups and individuals into the 
democratic process. 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections (in some cases) as the Nigerian, South 
African, Malawian and Zambian cases have shown is not based on the need to consolidate 
democracy or improve the lives of citizens through improvement of governance and service 
delivery. It is rather based on self-interest that actually weakens democratic consolidation.  
 
2.3.1 Elections in Sub-Sahara Africa 
 
One of the hallmarks of a democracy is a political system in which politicians, in political 
parties, compete to form a government; where regular, free and fair elections are held 
allowing citizens to vote and where those citizens are guaranteed political and civil rights 
(Sandbrook, 1988; Alli, 2015). Citizens’ political participation; competition by political 
parties and the granting of civil and political liberties some of which are freedom of 
association, assembly, expression, and free press that safeguards credible participation and 
competition are fundamental constitutive elements of liberal democracy (Hoglund, 2009; 
Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1989; Sorensen, 1993; Sandbrook, 1988).  
 
39 
 
In democratic societies, Hoglund (2009) explains that, elections allow the public to have a 
say – a “voice” over their government, it allows political competition, participation, 
legitimacy and more importantly, permits the change of power and allows for accountability 
of the governing party. Apart from constituting an important element in democracy that 
confers leadership succession, change and legitimacy, the absence or failure of elections leads 
to dictatorship and personalised rule (Adejumobi, 2000; Norris, 2012). 
 
In a true and functioning democracy, credible elections are free and fair, but should not be 
seen as an end in themselves. As important as they are in the endeavour of democracy, they 
are but “just one of many indicators of a democracy’s health. Others include a democratic 
political culture characterised by accountability and transparency, an active and engaged 
citizenry, and a strong and independent institutional framework that represents and responds 
to the interests of citizens” (Sylvester & Eshetu, 2010, p. 169). In his address to the Ghanaian 
Parliament, President Obama (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009, July 
11) said: 
This is about more than just holding elections. It's also about what happens between 
elections. Repression can take many forms, and too many nations, even those that 
have elections, are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty. No 
country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich 
themselves… That is not democracy that is tyranny, even if occasionally you sprinkle 
an election in there.  
 
The fact there is still repression, poverty and exploitation of wealth by leaders means that 
tyranny irrespective of the holding of elections persists. While elections are a critical 
constitutive element in democratic consolidation, it is but a part of the whole (such as 
transparency, accountability, rule of law, equal and fair application of law, respect for human 
rights and freedom) that is no less important. Where there is respect for democratic values, 
there is improvement in people’s living standards; leaders exploiting the people through 
corruption are held accountable. 
 
The onset of the process of democratization that swept across the continent of Africa in the 
early 1990s, marked by competitive elections, brought a hopeful political renewal of Afro-
optimism (Lindburg, 2006). That initial hopeful Afro-optimism about the process of 
democratization on the continent of Africa has been challenged by a whole range of issues 
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such as disputed elections, electoral violence, electoral fraud, voter intimidation, vote-buying, 
semi-authoritarianism, neopatrimonial and clientelist politics; that has led to pessimism 
concerning democracy in sub-Sahara Africa (Collier & Vicente, 2012; Lindburg, 2006; 
Goldring & Wahman, 2016). There seems to be a gradual re-institutionalisation of 
authoritarian and autocratic rule under the guise of democracy with elections falling victim 
to the reversal of the gains made.  
In a democracy, elections do not only give legitimacy and power by the people to the 
government, but also, as distinguished by Huntington (1991), signify the end of dictatorship. 
Yet, despite all this, in Africa, ‘Apparently, elections and the electoral process are the major 
victims in this tendency towards democratic retreat. The precepts, structures and processes 
of elections are mostly characterized by reckless manipulations, the politics of brinkmanship 
and subversion’ (Adejumobi, 2000).      
 
One of the most worrying sad development is that, ‘The experience of many African 
democratic transitions, in particular during electoral periods, has been violent’ (Straus and 
Taylor, 2009: pp. 2). All too often, elections in Africa are increasingly accompanied by 
violence. Zambia has been no exception in this regard as it been experiencing repeated 
orchestrated incidents of conflicts and violence during elections that hamstring democratic 
consolidation and peace. 
 
2.3.2 Electoral conflicts and violence in Africa 
 
Elections are linked to democratic development in that they facilitate peace building 
(Omotola, 2010). As such, the main virtues of any electoral process is the ability to adhere to 
the electoral laws, transparency, accountability, competition and participation (Laakso, 
2007). Lack of adherence to these virtues can cause electoral violence (Omotola, 2010). The 
ultimate goal of electoral violence is to determine, delay or influence the electoral process in 
order to shape the results (Omotola, 2010). In other words, electoral violence is used for the 
purpose of influencing or shaping voting, turnout and preferences by instilling fear or 
intimidating opponents in order to win electoral support (Collier, 2009; Snyder, 2000; 
Wilkinson, 2004).  
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Fischer (2002, p. 3) defines electoral conflict and violence to be “any random or organized 
act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in 
seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process.” Electoral 
violence is a type of political violence orchestrated by the ruling parties or opposition parties, 
before, during or after the elections to achieve a political outcome by use of physical violence, 
threats, intimidation and harassment (Adolfo, Kovacs, Nyström & Utas, 2012).  
 
Electoral violence, can be in three forms: physical, psychological and structural, of which the 
physical aspect is characterised by beating, assassination of political opponents, looting, 
shooting, kidnapping, hostage taking and forceful disruption of the electoral campaigns, 
rallies, armed raids on voting and collating centres and also snatching of ballot papers or 
boxes at gun point (Onapajo, 2014; Straus & Taylor, 2009). Physical violence can also result 
in psychological violence aimed at creating fear in the people. As explained by Nwolise 
(2007), psychological violence does not only involve fear from actual experienced physical 
violence but can also be a result of threats to opponents such as using phone calls or text 
messages. Structural electoral violence involves the coercion of citizens to register or vote in 
a particular way, unequal opportunities for political parties and candidates, abuse of power, 
falsification of election results, politicizing security or electoral officials. 
 
Among the notable features of elections in parts of sub-Sahara Africa includes ballot fraud, 
vote buying and intimidation of voters (Collier, Pedro & Vicente, 2011). As already noted, 
electoral violence in sub-Sahara Africa is increasingly becoming a common feature before, 
during and after the elections. The study conducted by Lindburg (2004) on multiparty 
elections in Africa indicated that about 80% of elections experienced electoral violence of 
varying degrees; and that those that were not declared free and fair were not more violent as 
those declared free and fair. About 60% of elections held between 1990 and 2008 according 
to the African Electoral Violence Database by Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor, experienced 
electoral violence of varying levels and forms (Straus, 2012). This goes to show that electoral 
violence in Africa is quite endemic.  
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That is not to say that electoral violence is uniquely an African problem. Whether it be in the 
United States of America, Mexico, Haiti, India, Italy, Israel, Japan, Sri-Lanka, and other 
places electoral violence of some sort (that can include but is not limited to intimidation, 
assassination or killing of candidates or opponents) has continued to plague the world 
(Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000). 
 
 
2.3.3 Some causes of electoral conflict and violence in sub-Sahara Africa 
 
There are many causes of electoral conflicts and violence. The underlying causes of electoral 
conflicts and violence in sub-Sahara Africa, though many, can be reduced to structural 
factors, flawed electoral processes and weak institutions. According to Adolfo, Söderberg, 
Kovacs, Nyström and Utas (2012, p. 1):  
first, structural factors related to the underlying power structures prevalent in new and 
emerging democracies, such as informal patronage systems, poor governance, 
exclusionary politics, and the socio-economic uncertainties of losing political power 
in states where almost all power is concentrated at the centre; second, factors related 
to the electoral process and the electoral contest itself, such as failed or flawed 
elections, election fraud and weak or manipulated institutions and institutional rules 
governing the electoral process. 
 
Elections are formal contests for power to govern that always sets the incumbents (ruling or 
governing parties) against the challengers (opposition parties). The desire or aim of the 
incumbents is to retain power while that of the opposition is to wrestle or take away the power 
to govern from the ruling party. The prospect of losing power, privileges and economic 
security that come with being the governing party in uncertain and challenging socio-
economic conditions make the governing party to abuse the power of incumbency and state 
resources. This gives them (governing parties) undue advantage that makes it as hard for the 
challengers (opposition parties) to compete fairly. For the opposition parties, the experience 
of suppression and exclusion makes them more aggressive and determined to defeat the ruling 
party. And so, the motives for the employment of electoral violence between the two differs. 
More often than not, according to Straus and Taylor (2009, p. 8), incumbents, “employ 
violence to maintain power using the coercive means of the state, while challengers use 
violence to protest outcomes using non-state means.”   
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According to the results of the study done by Straus and Taylor (2009), of the 124 cases of 
electoral violence in sub-Sahara Africa, the incumbents (ruling party) in their determination 
to keep power were the primary perpetrators of violence accounting for 105 cases compared 
to 18 cases for the challengers (opposition parties). Mehler (2007, p. 204) also makes a similar 
determination, stating that, “Compared to oppositional hostility, violent behaviour more 
frequently emanates from ruling parties.” One of the reasons that ruling parties and groups 
associated with them engage in electoral violence is that they have control or access to the 
state security forces whereas the challengers (opposition) would risk a repressive response 
from the state security apparatus or even be removed from participating in the electoral 
contest if they engage in violent activities (Straus & Taylor, 2009). 
 
Electoral violence is most often than not perpetuated by those from the ruling than it is by the 
opposition. That is not to say that there are not instances when opposition parties engage in 
electoral violence. It can be done by both the power holders at the time, in order to avoid 
defeat and it can also be done by the opposition with the aim of gaining electoral power from 
the governing party (Lehoucq, 2003). 
 
Electoral stakeholders such as the voters, candidates, party agents, election workers, media 
and monitors are targets of violence and intimidation.  Electoral violence is also targeted at 
electoral information systems such as registration data, voting results, ballots, campaign 
materials like vehicles and public address systems. Other targets involve electoral facilities 
such as polling and counting stations as well as electoral events like rallies (Hoglund, 2009). 
Electoral violence is perpetuated in the aim to intimidate, harm and blackmail political 
stakeholders. These acts can take place before, during or after the elections. The introduction 
of violence in the pre-voting period (before) is aimed at influencing, shaping how the 
electorates are going to vote (Strause & Taylor, 2009). This could involve a whole range of 
different electoral violence tactics which may be aimed at intimidating the would be 
supporters of opponents from participating in the voting, making it hard for opponents to 
organise and mobilise their supporters and voters by acts such as disrupting their campaigns.  
It can also happen during elections and may include snatching of ballot papers or boxes, 
assaults on the opposition parties or agents, and intimidation of the security agents. After the 
elections, violence can occur through protests against electoral rigging. The violence during 
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protests can be stimulated by the state’s deployment of force in response to the protests 
(Omotola, 2010; Strause & Taylor, 2009). 
 
2.3.4 Elections and Electoral violence in Zambia 
 
Elections, in Zambia, like in other democratic countries in the world are the generally 
accepted norm and process through which citizens exercise their right to choose their 
government as voters or seek the mandate to govern as candidates. The re-introduction of 
multi-party democracy, unlike during the one-party dictatorship when only members of UNIP 
ran for elected office, allows eligible citizens to participate in the elections as voters, 
contestants or both for elected office regardless of which party they come from. Since 1991, 
Zambia has experienced regular general elections (presidential, parliamentary and local 
government), six times, every five years: 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and most recently 
2016.  
 
Despite the consistency in the holding of regular elections every five years, with the exception 
of the 1991 elections33, the subsequent elections have received damning criticism in as far as 
being free and fair, or being a true reflection of the will of the people as concerned by local 
and international observers. For instance, there is wide consensus, according to O’Donovan 
(2004, p. 26), that, ‘the 1996 and 2001 elections were fraught with malpractice, omissions 
and errors, which made it questionable as to whether the will of the people was reflected in 
the final results.’ 
 
2.3.5 Electoral Conflicts and violence in Zambia 
 
Elections by their very nature, anywhere in the world including Zambia are contentious as 
they inevitably pit different political players as candidates competing against each other for 
                                               
33 The 1991 elections were not perfect but were held in an environment relatively free and fair, and 
without the kind of impunity with which violence and intimidation in the subsequent elections have 
been conducted prompting grave concern from local and international observers. This was in no small 
measure because of President Kaunda’s determination to have a smooth transfer of power despite the 
negative attitude he had in the initial stages of dialogue to democratic dispensation (The Carter Centre 
& NDI, 1992; O’Donovan, 2004). 
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the right to govern. Often elections pit incumbents (ruling party) who wish to remain in power 
against challengers (opposition) who wish to take away power from those in government. In 
the context of Zambia which uses the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, which is an exclusive 
system where the winner takes it all (Adolfo, et al., 2012), the electoral contest is seen as a 
zero-sum game. A society like Zambia with a combination of an exclusive electoral system, 
with biased and weak institutions and were almost all economic resources and political power 
are placed in the winner, due to the FPTP electoral system, elections turn into a do-or-die 
situation (Adolfo, et al., 2012). This situation tempts political parties to want to win elections 
at any cost and by whatever means. The end result is electoral conflicts as parties violate the 
electoral code of conduct in pursuit of winning at any cost. 
The recently held 2016 general elections in Zambia experienced instances of political conflict 
and in some cases localised electoral violence before, during and after the elections. The 
violence was largely carried by party cadres resulting in rioting, the destruction of property, 
and physical assaults ending in some deaths (Carter Centre, 2016; EU-EOM, 2016). 
 
2.3.6 Causes of electoral conflicts and violence in Zambia 
 
There are a number of issues in the electoral process in Zambia that have been a source of 
conflict, and sometimes open violence, between political parties (ruling parties and 
opposition parties) over which the opposition, civil society organisations and electoral 
observers (local and international) have expressed concern. Among them are the lack of 
independence and impartiality by the Electoral Commission of Zambia, public media, police; 
and in the application of the public order act and electoral code of conduct The lack of 
impartiality and independence in the electoral process management emanate from a structural 
underlying cause related to the lack of or weak separation of power between the executive, 
legislature and judiciary that allows political leadership of ruling parties who control the 
executive through the presidency to pursue personal or party benefits (Smith-Höhn, 2009). 
 
2.4 The Management of the Electoral Process - The Electoral Commission of 
Zambia. 
 
In Zambia, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) is the body that manages the electoral 
processes. The ECZ has a dual responsibility of running the electoral process and ensuring 
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that elections in the country are free and fair (Electoral Commission of Zambia Act No. 25 
of 2016). It is important for the ECZ to be independent and impartial all throughout the 
electoral process to ensure free and fair elections. Impartial electoral administration has a 
bearing on respect of the electoral outcome and peace because without it (impartial 
administration) the outcome would not command respect and lead to conflicts and violence. 
“The centrality of elections to liberal democratic politics also presupposes the importance 
particularly of impartial electoral administration” (Jinadu, 1997, p.1).  
 
The ECZ has been accused of lacking independence and autonomy, and being in favour of 
the ruling party in the Third Republic of Zambia. This problem however is not unique to 
Zambia, as attested to by the SADC Parliamentary Forum (2001, p. 10): 
the establishment, composition, status, independence, impartiality and 
professionalism of some of the Electoral Commissions have come under serious 
scrutiny and doubts particularly from opposition parties and members of the public. 
These  commissions are accused of being pro the ruling party that has appointed 
them.  
 
The independence and impartiality of the ECZ has time and again been questioned - before, 
during, after and in between general elections held in Zambia during the 3rd Republic. Many 
political parties, civil society organisations, local and international observers have questioned 
the independence and transparency of the ECZ (Carter Centre, 2001; Baylies & Szeftel, 
1997). The most recently held 2016 general elections, were no different as the independence 
and transparency of the ECZ was again questioned (Carter Centre, 2016).  
 
Among the reasons why the ECZ is perceived and considered to lack autonomy and 
independence lies in its composition, funding and conduct. As the preliminary report of the 
Carter Centre (2016, p. 2) notes, "the president’s prerogative to appoint and dismiss ECZ 
members contributes to mistrust that the electoral body is free from political interference." 
Added to that, the fact that the ECZ relies and depends on government funding controlled by 
the executive who are from the ruling party and who choose when to release the money and 
how much makes the ECZ's autonomy and independence suspect (Carter Centre, 2002).  
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More than composition and funding, the conduct of the ECZ in the management of the 
electoral process lacks transparency that makes the suspicions appear credible. For example, 
the ECZ, in the 2016 general election, as stated by the European Union Election Observer 
Mission EU EOM (2016, p.14) report, did not allow international nor domestic observers to 
access a number of important activities, such as verification of results at national level, a 
series of stakeholder and mediation meetings, the arrival of ballot papers, nor did it provide 
copies of all draft regulations and an electronic list of voters per polling station, thus missing 
opportunities to enhance the transparency of, and trust in, the process. 
 
There is a perception that the ECZ seems to tolerate the ruling party's noncompliance with 
the electoral code of conduct by failing to take punitive measure against the ruling party's 
violations of the electoral code. This among other factors has led the opposition parties to 
accuse the ECZ of both making decisions in favour of the ruling party and taking directives 
from them (SACCORD, 2016). The EU EOM (2016) report also observed that during the 
suspension of campaigns by the ECZ in Lusaka on 8 July 2016 due to violence34, the ruling 
party didn’t fully comply with the ECZ imposed suspension35.  
 
2.4.1 Law enforcement during the electoral process – the Zambia Police Service 
 
Free and fair elections are a major hallmark of a liberal democracy that are almost impossible 
to imagine without effective law enforcement. To ensure that different political parties, 
candidates, citizens and organisations engage in a peaceful, secure, free and fair electoral 
contestation requires firm and impartial law enforcement provided by the police. The police 
play a vital role that ensures that citizens as voters and candidates can peacefully, securely, 
                                               
34 This incident happened on 8th July, 2016 following the last minute cancellation of the rally in 
Chawama within Lusaka for the opposition UPND on the pretext that the security environment was 
not conducive. The UPND cadres and supporters marched to the venue where the campaign was 
scheduled to be held in defiance of the Police’s late revocation. This prompted the Police to employ 
teargas and live ammunition against the crowd that resulted in the injury of many and killing of a 
young 22 year old UPND female member Mapenzi Chibulo (Zambia Elections Information Centre 
[ZEIC], 2016; “Police shoot dead,” 2016). 
35 The ECZ in response to the 8 July, 2016 violence that resulted in the killing of Mapenzi Chibulo, a 
UPND member, ordered the entire suspension of all campaigns in Lusaka and Namwala for 10 days 
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freely and fairly exercise their right to vote or be voted for. Accordingly, the Zambian Police 
has a duty as mandated by the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016, Section 107(6), to: 
 
(a) enforce law and order at campaign meetings and processions in order to maintain 
peace  and order; (b) ensure that police officers do not abuse their authority or 
Government resources to campaign for the benefit of any political party or candidate; 
(c) refrain from disrupting any campaign, rally or meeting which is legally convened 
by any political party; and (d) ensure that police officers do not use their office to 
oppress any political party, candidate or supporter. 
      
This Electoral Process Act requires of the police to apply the law equally and fairly to all 
involved in the electoral contest regardless of the party or organization that they belong to as 
long as they do so legally. Zambia's experience in the Third Republic with law enforcement 
by the police during elections has not always lived up to this constitutional prescription. 
Apparently, the police service is one of the critical state institutions in Zambia that 
disadvantages the opposition political parties (Moomba, 2005). The issue of lack of 
impartiality by the police in the recently held 2016 against the opposition in favour of the 
ruling party were noted by various monitoring groups, local and international (SACCORD, 
2016; CCMG, 2017; Carter Centre, 2016; EU EOM, 2016). 
 
One of the issues around biased law enforcement application by the police that has been a 
source of conflict is in their application of the Public Order Act (POA). In the 2016 elections, 
as noted by various stakeholders just like in other previous elections in the Third Republic, 
the POA which only requires notification to the police prior to public gatherings and not a 
permit was applied selectively. According to the report by the Carter Centre (2016: p.16), 
"stakeholders noted that police did not invoke the POA proportionally and that PF rallies 
were not prohibited. UPND rallies, on the other hand, were routinely denied or cancelled." 
The Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes' report 
(SACCORD, 2016, p. 4), ‘also observed with great concern the selective application and 
administration of the Public Order Act (POA) with a number of opposition political party 
rallies cancelled on the last minute with very unjustifiable reasons.’ This selective application 
of the POA by the police led to widespread political tension and electoral violence, as was 
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the case in Lusaka on July 8, 2016, when the police denied the UPND permission to hold a 
scheduled rally resulting in the death of one of their supporters36 (Carter Centre, 2016). 
 
The second issue around biased law enforcement by the police that leads to conflict and 
violence is the failure or refusal by police to equally protect citizens, political parties and 
organisations from intimidation, harassment and violence regardless of party affiliation. 
Related to this is the refusal or failure by the police to stop, apprehend or deal with 
perpetrators of violence regardless of which party they come from. The police is supposed to 
“protect persons who are properly exercising their right to assemble from those that are 
threatening to infringe upon that right" (EU-EOM 2016, p. 12).  To ensure free, fair and 
peaceful elections the police is, in accordance with the law, supposed to protect law abiding 
citizens during elections regardless of their party affiliation and apprehend or prevent those 
trying to intimidate, disrupt or harm legally convened political public gatherings.  
 
The opposition, according to SACCORD (2016), felt they were not being protected by the 
police when they were attacked. For instance, a woman in UPND clothing was stripped naked 
by the PF cadres in the presence of the police37 and some incidences of shooting took place 
without any arrests known to have been made. In cases where the perpetrators of violence 
were from the ruling party, ‘Police tended to act very slowly whereas in instances involving 
opposition party supporters, they acted very swiftly in apprehending the perpetrators of 
violence’ (SACCORD, 2016, p. 4). Such incidences of biased law enforcement by the police 
led to animosity and eventually intimidation and violence between the members of the ruling 
party (PF) and the largest opposition party (UPND). 
                                               
36 This incident happened on 8th July, 2016 following the last minute cancellation of the rally in 
Chawama within Lusaka for the opposition UPND on the pretext that the security environment was 
not conducive. The UPND cadres and supporters marched to the venue where the campaign was 
scheduled to be held in defiance of the Police’s late revocation. This prompted the Police to employ 
teargas and live ammunition against the crowd that resulted in the injury of many and killing of a 
young 22-year old UPND female member Mapenzi Chibulo (Zambia Elections Information Centre 
[ZEIC], 2016; “Police shoot dead,” 2016). 
37 Zambian opposition member stripped naked. (2016, March 17). News24. Retrieved from 
https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/watch-zambian-opposition-member-stripped-naked-
20160317 
 
50 
 
The harassment, intimidation and violence during elections in the Third Republic are not 
limited to members of the ruling party and opposition as was the case in 2016. Some 
journalists and media organisations were subjected to harassment and intimidation by the PF 
cadres reportedly in the presence of the police without any efforts to protect them (Carter 
Centre, 2016).  
 
2.4.2 Public Media – Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation  
 
The media plays an important role in a democracy, that of exposing citizens to different and 
sometimes conflicting ideas and perspectives (Barber 1984; Bellah et al. 1985; Habermas 
1989). Exposure to different viewpoints is essential in valid choice or opinion making as 
citizens would have been exposed to different or other perspectives from the other side/s 
(Arendt 1968; Benhabib 1992).  
 
The media, during elections, provides a platform through which political parties and 
candidates can make a case to citizens as to why they should vote for them and thereby allow 
citizens to make an informed decision in their choice. In this way, the media does not only 
provide information to citizens but helps educate citizens about the parties and candidates 
asking for their vote. In Zambia, the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 Section 107 (7) 
speaks to that need by requiring print and electronic media, private or public to, "provide fair 
and balanced reporting of the campaigns, policies, meetings, rallies and press conferences of 
all registered political parties and candidates during the campaign period."  
 
The law requires the private and public media to provide fair and balanced reporting when 
covering political parties and candidates during elections. However, the law makes a specific 
requirement of the public media, in the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 Section 107 (8) 
(1) stating that, "A public television, radio and electronic media shall allocate public air time 
equally to all political parties and candidates for their political broadcasts." Unlike the private 
media, the public media is funded by the government through taxpayer's money from citizens. 
As such, ZNBC belongs to all the people of Zambia and should be used in a way that benefits 
all and not just some. 
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While the law is clear in Zambia concerning equal coverage to political parties and candidates 
by the public or state owned media, in practice, it is not. This problem is not uniquely 
Zambian, as noted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum (2001) that the public media in most 
SADC countries is controlled by the government and does not offer an equal playing field 
through selective and short coverage of the opposition. The public media – state owned media 
(newspapers, television and radios) are brazenly partisan in their reporting, usually in favour 
of the ruling parties but rarely and negatively covering the opposition (Burnell, 2002; Carter 
Centre, 2002; COG, 2011; EU-EOM, 2016; MISA Zambia, 2016).   
 
The bias by the public media has and continues to be a source of conflict often between the 
governing party and the opposition parties. The reach of public media (state owned), unlike 
the private ones is nationwide (EU-EOM, 2009). This conflict becomes heightened during 
campaigns as the opposition parties seek a nationwide platform that the public media’s reach 
provides while the ruling party seeks to monopolise it while seeking to limit or restrict 
coverage to the opposition. According to the EU-EOM (2016) media monitoring, ZNBC TV 
1, for instance in prime time news and current affairs gave 60% mostly positive coverage to 
the PF and its presidential candidate in the period between 6-July-2016 to 10-Aug-2016, 
while providing about 3% mostly less positive coverage to the largest opposition party 
president of UPND and less than 2% to the remaining opposition presidential candidates in 
the same period. Diagram 2 demonstrate the glaring disparity, bias and lack of impartial 
campaign coverage by the public media, contrary to the stipulation of the constitution. 
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Diagram 2: Public Media (ZNBC TV 1)’s 2016 elections coverage of Political Parties 
Source: EU EOM (2016) Media Monitoring Results 
 
The graphic representation of the public media’s 2016 general elections campaign coverage 
of the ruling party and the opposition shows how significant and overwhelming the bias was 
by the public media. For ZNBC TV 1 to have given 60% coverage to the PF (ruling party) 
and only 3% to UPND (the biggest opposition party) and the remaining parties getting 2% 
and below each, borders on public media blackout of the opposition. Such a blatant violation 
of the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 Section 107 (8) (1) should not have gone 
unnoticed and unchallenged by ECZ, the body that has the responsibility of ensuring free and 
fair elections. The second graph shows the bias in tone. While the ruling party was 
overwhelmingly covered in positive and neutral terms with no negative tone coverage, the 
major opposition party, UPND, mostly received a negative tone coverage. 
 
Such blatant public media bias and abuse prompted MISA Zambia Chapter and Press 
Freedom Committee of the Post (PFCP) to petition the constitutional court in an effort to 
restore balanced coverage of all politicians in the run-up to the August, 2016 general elections 
(MISA Zambia, 2016a). ZNBC, against the electoral code of conduct, even refused to air 
some of the paid adverts by the opposition party the UPND’s (MISA Zambia, 2016a). The 
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UPND challenged the director general on ZNBC’s refusal to air the advert, and on the 9 th 
August, 2016, two days before the elections, the court ordered ZNBC to air the advert before 
the end of the the election campaign period (Phiri, 2016, August 3). 
 
While the public media is biased and restricted in its coverage of the opposition during 
elections, the private media on the other hand offers an alternative campaign coverage to the 
opposition despite its lack of nationwide reach (COG, 2011). However, the private media 
houses have especially been a target of intimidation, harassment and threats mostly by ruling 
party cadres, state security agents and government officials for hosting opposition party 
candidates (Carter Centre, 2001; MISA Zambia, 2016a; SACCORD, 2016). Some private 
media houses had their licences suspended by the the government on charges of 
unprofessional conduct threatening "national peace and stability" (MISA Zambia, 2016a). 
 
2.4.3 Abuse of state resources 
 
In pursuit of providing a level playing field during elections, for all candidates and political 
parties, the Code of Conduct 15(K) in section 107 of the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 
stipulates that no person, except for the President and Vice-President, shall for the purpose 
of campaigns, use government or parastatal transportation and facilities. According to the 
Electoral Code of Conduct 3(b) in the the Electoral Process Act No.35 of 2016, the Electoral 
Commission of Zambia is mandated where possible and practicable to "ensure that political 
parties do not use state resources to campaign for the benefit of any political party or 
candidate." These particular pieces of legislation are among others aimed at ensuring a level 
playing field for all candidates in an election regardless of the party to which they belong. 
 
Unlike the Second Republic one party system, when there was no separation between state 
and party, a system that allowed UNIP party officials and ministers to use government 
resources for campaigns, the Third Republic constitution does not. Nonetheless, the lines 
between state and party in the Third Republic are still blurred, especially during elections. 
The elections held in the Third Republic tend to be skewed in favour of governing parties as 
a consequence of a blatant use of public/state resources which is a violation of the electoral 
code of conduct and concept of fair elections (Rakner and Svåsand, 2005; Bertelsmann 
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Stiftung, 2020). The abuse of state/public resources by ruling parties in the Third Republic 
prohibited by the code of conduct includes government or parastatal property, facilities, 
motor vehicles, fuel and drivers except for the President and Vice-President; the distribution 
of money, food, chitenge (cloth) material and T-shirts to voters and influential people such 
as chiefs (COG, 2016; Simuntanyi, 2010).  
 
The abuse of state resources during elections for the benefit of the ruling party has been, and 
continues to be, a source of conflict between the ruling parties and the opposition in Zambia's 
Third Republic. In the first presidential election petition in Zambia following the 2001 
general elections, the use of state resources for the benefit of the ruling party was one of the 
grounds the pertitioners used to challenge the presidential election results. According to the 
evidence submitted, the then President Chiluba in an effort to ensure his chosen succesor's 
election victory, used state resources for campaigns to buy over 100 vehicles, used 
government vehicles and personnel and allowed ministers to draw government allowances 
(Simuntanyi, 2010). The Supreme Court, admitted, among the many electoral process flaws, 
"the use of the national intelligence service in a partisan way, the unlawful use of public 
resources by the incumbent party, and the abuse of resources from para-statal companies" 
(Kaaba, 2015, p. 348). The governing party, the MMD, despite a High Court ruling also used 
District Administrators, who are civil servants, using public resources to campaign and 
organise voters for the party (Burnell, 2002). 
 
The recently held 2016 general elections in Zambia were no different. According to the report 
of the Carter Centre (2016) the 2016 general elections were not conducted on a level playing 
ground because of the malpractices such as public media bias, the harassment of private 
media, the abuse of state resources by the ruling party, the denial of flight clearance for the 
opposition, the use of the Public Order Act against the opposition party the UPND, and the 
abuse of office by government ministers. The 2016 Zambian elections report by the European 
Observer Mission (2016) equally cited the systematic bias of public media coverage in favour 
of the ruling party and the subsequent clampdown on the private media outlet, The Post, as 
an infringement of freedom of expression that crippled the opposition’s reach to the voters 
during the campaign period.  
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The recently held 2016 elections were also mared by allegations of the abuse of state 
resources by the governing party, the PF. The independent election observers/ monitors (local 
and international)38raised concern over the lack of a level playing field during the elections 
caused by such factors as the use of state resources for the benefit of the party in power, 
contrary to the constitution (Carter Centre, 2016; SACCORD, 2016; EU-EOM, 2016).  
 
The 2016 general elections also witnessed a new form of abuse of state resources through the 
unconstitutional continued holding of office by the ministers after the dissolution of 
parliament39(Carter Centre, 2016). This prompted the opposition and the Law Assosciation 
of Zambia to petition the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court in a landmark ruling 
stated that the Ministers' continued stay in office after the dissolution of parliament was 
unconstitutional; ordered them to vacate office and to pay back to the treasury all the money 
they had acrued over the period (Steven Katuka and LAZ v. Attorney General and others, 
2016). 
 
The  abuse of state/public resources by the ruling party also led some losing opposition party 
candidates to petition the election of some Members of Parliament from the ruling party. Two 
of the petitioned elected MPs from the governing party who were illegally serving as 
Ministers after the dissolution of parliament, according to the Contititutional Court ruling, 
were declared not dully elected by the High Court of Zambia, for among factors such as the 
                                               
38 The Carter Centre, the Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
(SACCORD) and the European Union Elections Observer Mission (EU-EOM) are some of the 
independent monitors that expressed concern over lack of a level playing field (Carter Centre, 2016; 
SACCORD, 2016; EU-EOM, 2016) 
39 President Edgar Lungu dissolved Parliament on 25th May, 2016, pursuant to Section 81 (1) (3), at 
the end of the 5 year term of Parliament and 90 days before the holding of general elections. But he 
did not terminate the positions of Ministers and Deputy Ministers, despite their loss of status as MPs 
with the dissolution of Parliament, a pre-condition upon which one is appointed into cabinet. 
Consequently, they continued to enjoy all the executive privileges and emoluments that come with 
the office (Steven Katuka and Law Association of Zambia v The Attorney General and 63 others, 
2016). 
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abuse of state resources - government vehicles, drivers, fuel and facilities during the 
campaigns (Charlotte Scott v. Margaret Mwanakatwe, 2016). 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter on peer-reviewed literature explored themes of democracy and peace that touch 
on the subject of floor-crossing and by-elections. The literature shows that the factors that 
motivate the inducement of floor-crossing and by-election are not based on the desire for 
democratic consolidation but rather on the selfish interest of politicians. 
 
The consolidation of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and Zambia, in particular, is under 
threat as a consequence of many factors. The lack of strong independent state institutions, 
weak constitutional frameworks and the inducement of floor-crossing (and by-elections) as 
the reviewed literature show are some of the factors that undermine democratic consolidation. 
2.6  Gap in literature 
 
The literature also shows that the lack of democratic consolidation has a negative impact on 
peace. This is evidenced by the conflicts that arise out of the lack of impartial electoral 
process management; and application of law and order; and the electoral violence that 
characterize elections and by-elections. The gap missing in the peer-reviewed literature is the 
part that the inducement of floor-crossing (and by-elections) play in creating an adversarial 
and hostile political environment that is breeding grounds for conflict and violence. In the 
next chapter, the theoretical framework shall be discussed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the three theories that the study used: (1) the theory of Patron-
Clientelism describes the nature of the relationship MPs from the opposition enter into with 
the President (and the ruling party) when they cross the floor. (2) The theory of Rational 
Choice gives the rationality that feeds and drives the phenomenon, and (3) the theory of 
Conflict Transformation both shows how this phenomenon creates conflict and provides a 
pathway towards transformation. These theories are used as a framework to guide the study, 
understand why the phenomenon of inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-
elections persists despite its unpopularity and resistance from citizens in general and civil 
society, and possible transformation of the conflict that arise thereof.  
3.1  The Theory of Patron-Clientelism 
Patron-clientelism is a relationship first and foremost between two unequal people or parties. 
The patron is the one with higher status, power, influence and resources to grant access and 
privileges. The client on the other end is of lower status who is granted access and privileges 
by the patron in return for loyalty, submission and support as deemed fit by the patron. The 
relationship is premised on a sense of mutual, reciprocal obligations the two unequal people 
involved have towards each other (Eisenstadt & Roniger ,1984; Piattoni, 2004). One partner 
involved grants a favour to the other with a reciprocal expectation (Blau 1964). 
The theory of patron-client relations or patronage has gained prominence from being 
marginal in Political science, Sociology and Anthropology – captivating scholars in these 
fields (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980). Scott (1974: p. 92) succinctly defines patron-clientelism 
as: 
an exchange relationship between roles – may be defined as a special case of dyadic 
(two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual 
of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to 
provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for 
his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal 
services, to the patron. 
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Despite the prominence it gained, patron-clientelism was not without its critics. Bentham 
(1996) challenged the moral and philosophical underpinning of patron-client practices. He 
rejected all patron-clientelism as a system that benefits a few at the expense of the many and 
one not based on merit; lacking openness and competitiveness. 
Patron-clientelism in the modern era ‘tends to flourish in insecure political and economic 
environments, both rural and urban, and is integral to the “politics of survival” for both 
patrons and clients’ (Migdal 1988 cited by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002: p. 2). Zambia 
is one of the countries in the world and in sub-Sahara Africa with political and economic 
insecurity the kind of conditions were patron-clientelism tends to flourish. Despite some 
stabilisation in the economy, the decline of the Zambian economy is among the worst in Sub-
Sahara Africa with high levels of poverty presenting one of the major problems in Zambia 
(Saasa & Carlsson, 2002). Consequently, many Zambians lack access to basic necessities, 
sufficient health and social services, and suffer from weak purchasing power and 
unemployment (Saasa & Carlsson, 2002). To survive in such harsh economic realities, 
patron-client relationships become tempting tools through which some politicians seek 
survival. They are susceptible to engage in the politics of survival or indeed politics of the 
belly (Bayart, 2009). 
In a country like Zambia with an economy that is unstable, with high levels of poverty, the 
temptation by opposition MPs to abandon the electorate’s mandate and the party that 
sponsored them, at the offer of a position in the executive branch granting them status, access, 
privileges and resources not available to mere MPs, is high.  
The President of the Republic of Zambia under Section 116 of the 2016 Amended 
Constitution of Zambia has the absolute power to appoint any person who is an MP into 
cabinet. These appointments are not subject to cabinet, parliamentary or party (ruling party) 
debates, consideration, consultation and approval. There is no parliamentary or party 
selection committees for public office of cabinet minister appointment. This does not mean 
that the Republican President cannot consult or seek the advice of some senior party members 
but that he is not obligated to do so.  
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A person appointed into the cabinet is elevated to an executive position in the government of 
the Republic of Zambia that confers status, power, privileges and financial security that is 
beyond what ordinary MPs get. Given the exclusive and enormous power the Republican 
Presidents hold in cabinet appointments, the floor-crossing MPs see the Republican President 
(Patron) as the only person who can guarantee the economic status they desire in exchange 
for their loyalty and service (as clients/ recipients). Diagram 3 shows the nature of the 
relationship between the Republican President (patron) and the opposition MPs (clients) 
based on mutual exchange and obligations: 
 
 
Diagram 3: Illustration of a Patron-Client relationship 
Precisely because the phenomenon of the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections 
involves, on one hand, MPs from the opposition parties (clients) and on the other hand, 
Republican Presidents and the ruling parties (patrons), the two unequal partners, entering into 
an instrumental relationship that enables each to attain goals or get what they want from it 
(the relationship).  It is an instrumental relationship in the sense that it is not value-led or 
ideologically based, but a tool or a means to an end which, most often, if not always, is 
PATRON 
(Republican President)
Access
Resources
Position
Power
Protection
CLIENT
(Opposition MP)
Loyalty
Appreciation
Gratitude
Allegiance
Support
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perceived to be beneficial to the two individuals concerned. The President in this relationship 
is the patron as he wields the executive power to appoint MPs from the opposition into the 
cabinet, the executive branch of government that grants those privileges, access and resources 
that ordinary MPs don’t enjoy. In return, the opposition MPs as clients who floor-cross upon 
appointment as cabinet ministers, show their appreciation and gratitude by pledging their 
loyalty, allegiance and support to the Republican President (patron) through the votes they 
cast in Parliament in support of the Republican President (patron) and his party’s agenda. 
They are no longer loyal to the party and people that made it possible for them to be MPs. In 
this relationship, unequal as it may be, the Republican President (patron) and the MPs 
(clients) both benefit from it. For the Republican President (patron) it is an instrument that 
allows him and his party to have control of the legislature. For the floor-crossing MPs, it is 
an instrument that opens the door to power, executive privileges, comfort and financial 
security.  
3.2  The Theory of Rational Choice 
 
The second theory that this study used is the theory of rational choice (Hindmor, 2010; 
Oppenheimer, 2008; Riker, 1995; Roskin, 2016). The origins of the theory of rational choice 
are somewhat unclear although the age of reason is the stem of its modern roots, particularly 
in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1651) whose fundamental explanation was that political 
institutions function through the choices of individuals (Oppenheimer, 2008). William 
Ricker, has been identified as the founder of the theory of rational choice applying economic 
and mathematical reasons explaining why and how politicians form alliances (Roskin, 2016).   
There are a number of reasons that motivate politicians to form coalitions. One such 
motivation according to Riker (1962) is office-seeking. The assumption here is that political 
party coalitions are motivated by the desire to enter into office; share a certain number of 
seats according to the value they bring to the government based on the votes each party got. 
The second motivation for the formation of coalitions by political parties is policy 
preferences. Political parties choose to join in a coalition government with a party or parties 
that are more aligned with their own policy preferences for the coalition to work (De Swaan, 
1973; Kirchsteiger & Puppe, 1997). The third motivation for coalition formation by political 
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parties is vote-seeking (Downs 1957). This is based on the assumption that political parties 
form coalitions in order to increase the chance of getting the most votes in an election. 
Rational choice theory was the dominant school of thought in political science in the late 20th 
century. Rather than focusing on trying to understand political behavior it was more relevant 
according to rational choice theorists to know ‘the actors’ interests and to assume that they 
pursue them rationally’ (Roskin, 2016). 
Human behaviour is in part informed by purposeful choices made by individuals based on 
the preferences they have. Thomas Hobbes reasoned that the choices made by individuals are 
based on "appetites" that push them towards the desired ends and "aversions" that push them 
away from undesirable ends (Oppenheimer, 2008). This determination is one that was 
continued by many other thinkers such as Adam Smith, known as the father of modern 
capitalism, who memorably opined that: ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest’ 
(Smith, 1777). The rational choice theory has deep roots in economics. It has also gained 
influence, over the years, in social sciences and related disciplines such as political science 
and political philosophy (Oppenheimer, 2008; Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997). 
The theory of rational choice, among others, makes two central assumptions, that people act 
or make choices based on rationality and self-interest (Hindmor, 2010: p. 49). According to 
this theory, people can, therefore, be ‘relied upon to act in ways which best secure their goals 
and that these goals reflect their self-interest’ (Hindmor, 2010: p. 42). 
This theory also underscores that politicians are endlessly opportunistic in pursuit of 
opportunities available to them, as structured by political institutions under which their 
actions should be explained (Roskin, 2017). Actions and decisions made by politicians form 
a behaviour whether contrary or in line with the expectations of voters in a democracy that is 
based on the end they want to achieve (perceived as good to them) and in avoidance of (what 
they perceive to be bad) the undesirable.  
In the context of this study, rational choice theory in broad terms invites us to understand the 
actions of these individuals (opposition MPs and Republican Presidents) in successive 
administrations of Zambia’s Third Republic, that induce floor-crossing and by-elections as 
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most likely acting and interacting in such a manner they reckon to be in their best self-interest, 
considering their circumstances as they see them and the goals they wish to achieve. The 
elected opposition MPs and Republican Presidents in Zambia's Third Republic concerned are 
rational individuals who are aware of options before them and know why they choose to 
engage in the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections anyway. They are not blind to 
how the voters and the general public, generally speaking, are opposed to their actions, 
neither are they blind to how detrimental their actions are on the health and growth of 
democracy in the country and the impact their actions have on peace. They make choices or 
act, having weighed the advantages and disadvantages, based on what is best for them given 
the political-economic opportunities available to them.  
Whether their actions and choices are in the best interest of the country or their constituents 
is another matter. This theory helps provide a lens of understanding that the opposition MPs 
who cross the floor and Republican Presidents from the ruling parties that entice them are not 
engaged in a blind, irrational and powerless fate. 
3.3  The theory of Conflict Transformation  
 
The third theory this study employed to help understand the conflict around induced floor-
crossing and by-elections, and most importantly, help in the transformation of the conflict 
theory of conflict transformation (Lederach, 1995; Galtung, 2009; Diamond, 1994; 
Kriesberg, 1997; Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999). Conflict transformation is a 
complex process that seeks to change relationships, attitudes, behaviours, discourses and 
interests by addressing underlying structural, cultural and institutional conditions that 
encourage and make violence possible, from political and social conflicts (Austin, Giessmann 
and Jäger, 2012).  
Conflict transformation also requires a good comprehension of the concepts of peace and 
violence. In the 1960s, Galtung’s inclusion of indirect or structural violence expanded the 
concepts of peace and violence. In so doing, he bridged the divide between negative and 
positive peace that existed in peace research with a focus on direct violence. Of negative 
peace, he opined, ‘is the absence of violence, war’, and of positive peace as ‘the integration 
of human society’ (1964, p.2). Galtung further broadened the definition of violence as being 
63 
 
more than just physical or direct violence but that it also includes structural violence. In other 
words, peace is not just the absence of direct violence (negative peace) but is the absence of 
structural violence (positive peace) as well (1969).  
 
In the context of this study, the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections does not 
instantly result in direct or physical violence. The perception of injustice generates anger and 
creates an acrimonious and adversarial relationship that though no direct violence occurs 
cannot but be described as negative peace. Indeed, the periods before and after elections in 
the aftermath of occasioned floor-crossing inducement are typical examples of periods of 
negative peace. 
 
Conflict transformation goes beyond the resolution and management of conflicts. Conflict 
resolution as an approach focuses on resolving root causes of conflict and rebuilding 
relationships between conflicting parties with the help of international, national and local 
NGOs using dialogue projects, conflict resolution training and workshops (Paffenholz, 2009). 
It is about helping conflicting parties move from destructive zero-sum patterns of conflict to 
constructive positive-sum outcomes that are acceptable to the parties in a conflict (Azar and 
Burton, 1986). The conflict resolution approach has been criticized for assuming that the 
improvement and building of relationships between the parties to the conflict necessarily lead 
to the end of conflicts (Bercovitch, 1984; Miall, 2004; Paffenholz, 2009). 
 
The conflict management approach focuses on ending conflicts by bringing to the negotiation 
table leaders of the conflicting parties with the power and resources, aimed at bringing short-
term management to the conflict. It focuses on containing, controlling, and handling, 
mitigating and limiting a conflict from damaging escalation (Paffenholz, 2009; Austin, 
Giessmann, and Jäger, 2012). The conflict management approach has been criticized for 
overlooking the root causes of conflicts; and for its sole concentration on the top leadership 
while ignoring the facilitation of different internal and external actors in the negotiation 
process (Hoffman, 1995; Miall, 2004; Paffenholz, 2009). 
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While embracing and valuing conflict resolution and conflict management in the short and 
medium term, conflict transformation seeks to change relationships for the possibility of long 
term, sustainable peace. The study used this theory to seek an understanding of the dynamics 
of the political conflicts under study and how they can be transformed. The concept of conflict 
transformation is broadly understood to include the ‘transformation of individuals, 
transformation of relationships, and transformation of social systems large and small’ (Dukes, 
1999, p. 48).  
The two foundations of transformational perspective are the positive envisioning of conflict 
as a natural phenomenon with the potential for constructive growth, and a response that 
maximises the potential for positive change (Lederach, 2006). Conflicts have features that 
are life-affirming as well as life-destroying (Galtung). Violence is not inevitable in any 
conflict but is a result of a negative response. All conflicts are a natural phenomenon that 
should be responded to in a constructive manner for them to result in a transformation that 
leads to lasting peace.  
The assumption inherent in the concept of conflict transformation is that conflicts are a 
consequence of ‘some identifiable asymmetry, inequality, inequity, or injustice within a given 
social, cultural, or economic context or framework’ (Sheehan, 2014: p. 121). Transformation 
of the conflict, therefore, cannot take place without transforming the identified asymmetry, 
injustice, inequity, and inequality in whatever environment they occur, be they economic, 
social, political or cultural. Conflict transformation affirms the need to promote the people 
involved in the conflict as the main agents of transformation and not to see them as a problem. 
While outsiders may play an important role, theirs is a supportive or complementary one. 
Conflict transformation, according to Lederach (1995, p. 212),  
must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural 
resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which 
we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the people in it as the ‘problem’ and the 
outsider as the ‘answer’. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation 
as validating and building on people and resources within the setting. 
 
Dialogue is one of the tools utilized in conflict transformation. The dialogue between 
conflicting parties is an essential component towards finding peace and justice at an 
interpersonal and structural level (Lederach, 2015). It is a much-needed tool to help parties 
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to the conflict chart a path towards transforming the conflict for a better peaceful non-violent 
future they deserve for themselves and the people they serve. Dialogue between hostile 
parties to be successful, may require mediation. A neutral, non-partisan, independent 
mediation in conflict transformation dialogue is important as it speaks to credibility and 
respect (Stigant and Murray, 2015). For dialogue to be meaning through mediation, there has 
to be trust and respect without bias and conflict of interest. The dialogue that has to take place 
should not be a debate about contradictions or about what/who is wrong or right but should 
be about a future the parties to the conflict desire for themselves and their people (Galtung, 
2004). Dialogue involves face-to-face communication between the affected parties to address 
conflict in ways that reduce violence and injustice resulting in constructive change (Lederach 
and Maiese, 2015). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic has been a 
source of conflict, fraying relationships between political parties and their members. This 
conflict has been ongoing for much of the Third Republic, across different administrations: 
under former Presidents of the Republic, Chiluba (MMD), Mwanawasa (MMD), Rupiah 
Banda (MMD), Michael Sata (PF), and Edgar Lungu (PF). The fact that this conflict has 
persisted this long, and continues to affect relations between political parties and ordinary 
citizens, shows that it has not been resolved and needs transformation. 
This conflict is acutely experienced and felt by the ruling parties and the opposition parties. 
It pits the ruling party against the opposition parties; floor-crossing (defecting) MPs against 
their (former) parties (opposition parties). This conflict does not only affect members of the 
concerned political parties but also affects ordinary citizens who do not belong to any political 
party but want to exercise their right to participate in elections and the governance of their 
country. The occasional physical and verbal electoral violence that engulfs politics especially 
during elections, and the animosity and antagonism that characterize relations between 
electoral cycles, speaks to the absence of constructive growth of the conflict40.  
                                               
40 Every conflict has potential for destructive or constructive growth. Constructive growth of 
conflict is when it (conflict) becomes a driver for social change with parties to the conflict 
coming to a place where they acknowledge legitimate concerns and needs of each other; 
resolve conflict through peaceful means; address root causes of conflict; and thereby 
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The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections can not solely be blamed for all the 
electoral violence that takes place. Nonetheless, it starts off anger, resentment and animosity 
between political parties and their members that in return cultivate an antagonistic, 
adversarial, confrontational and hostile relationship between the concerned parties. It creates 
breeding grounds for actual violence and hostilities that are compounded by the lack of firm 
and fair law enforcement that further worsens the situation. The perceived partiality and 
selective application of the law by state organs such as the Zambia Police and Electoral 
Commission of Zambia that are supposed to ensure safe, free and fair elections emboldens 
elements from the ruling party to engage in violent and disruptive activities while making 
those from the opposition feel suppressed as they are heavy-handedly dealt with. This hostile 
and “toxic” environment makes participation in the electoral process challenging.  
The fact that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections and the related conflict and 
occasional violence resulting thereof persists, calls for understanding and addressing of the 
conflict not just with short term solutions but long term solutions that require an approach 
that theorists and practitioners of conflict transformation espouse (Lederach, 1995). Conflict 
transformation theory is better suited for this study as it precisely seeks to address underlying 
conditions (causes) as its approach for the possibility of long term peace. Short of addressing 
underlying causes, the conflict can only get worse and solutions can never lead to sustainable 
peace. 
Transformation of this conflict would thus require a change in the individuals and political 
parties; change in relations between politicians (political parties); and the transformation of 
the social system (Dukes, 1999).  
3.4 Summary 
 
The theoretical framework chapter presented and discussed the three theories underpinning 
the study, namely: the patron-clientelism theory; the rational choice theory; and the conflict 
transformation theory. The patron-client theoretical framework is used to show the nature of 
                                               
enhancing and sustaining peace through non-violent means (Lederach & Maiese, 2009; 
Austin, Giessmann & Jäger, 2012). 
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the relationship between the Republican Presidents and elected opposition MPs that despite 
opposition to the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections draw them together. It is 
based on an unequal but mutually beneficial relationship between the Republican Presidents 
(patrons) and the elected opposition MPs (clients). 
 
The rational choice theoretical framework is used to understand why the Republican 
Presidents and the elected opposition MPs in Zambia’s Third Republic despite the detriment 
their choice of actions have on liberal democracy and peace, engage in floor-crossing and by-
elections inducement. That they are not engaged in a powerless and inevitable fate they have 
no control over. Neither are they blind to the detriment their choice of actions have on 
democratic consolidation and peace. Rather, their choice of actions are rational and based on 
what they consider to be in their best self-interest. The conflict transformation theoretical 
framework, is used to understand the conflict provoked by the inducement of floor-crossing 
and by-elections and how it can be transformed from being destructive to being constructive.   
 
The next chapter will examine the factors that motivate and enable the inducement of floor 
crossing and by-elections by the Republican Presidents and opposition MPs in Zambia’s 
Third Republic despite the near universal opposition and negative impact on liberal 
democracy and peace. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INDUCEMENT OF FLOOR-CROSSING AND BY-ELECTIONS BY 
ZAMBIA’S ELECTED OPPOSITION MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections has been a source of 
conflict in Zambia’s Third Republic. It has attracted a near-universal concern, condemnation, 
and opposition by numerous Zambian observers such as civil society organisations, faith-
based organisations and opposition parties (Geloo, 2013; Kabemba and Eiseman, 2004). This 
chapter presents and discusses the data from my fieldwork on the conditions that facilitate 
the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections by elected Members of Parliament in the 
Third Republic of Zambia.  
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections has been opposed and needs to be curbed 
because of the destabilisation it brings to liberal democracy as it undermines plural politics. 
Further, as this study shows, it creates an adversarial environment between political parties 
that leads to conflict and violence. 
 
This Chapter also seeks to answer the following questions: a) why do opposition MPs cross 
the floor despite strong opposition; (b) what leads successive Presidents since the inception 
of the Third Republic to induce floor-crossing and by-elections; and c) what role does the 
constitution play as a deterrent or as an enabler of the inducement of floor crossing and by-
elections. According to the analysis of data collected from participants in this study, there are 
three causes of induced floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic. These 
are a) a permissive or porous constitution, b) Opposition MPs’ desire for power and better 
pecuniary remuneration and opportunities, and c) the desire for power consolidation by the 
Presidents. These identified causes are rooted in a much deeper cultural, historical, political 
and economic context that makes the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections possible 
and enduring, such as the one-party dictatorship, patriarchy, and the current poor economic 
circumstances. These create an environment that makes neopatrimonialism possible which is 
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a combination of strong presidents, clientelism and political legitimation through the use of 
state resources (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). 
 
4.2 Constitution 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia does not criminalise nor forbid the inducement 
of floor-crossing and by-elections. According to Article 116 (1) of Act No. 2 of 2016 in the 
Constitution of Zambia (as amended), the President of the Republic of Zambia has the legal 
authority to “…appoint a prescribed number of Members of Parliament as Ministers”. The 
President of the Republic of Zambia faces no restrictions about who he or she appoints as a 
cabinet minister irrespective of the party they hail from. The appointment of opposition MPs 
into cabinet even if done without the approval of the party they hail from or done under the 
motivation of dividing and weakening the opposition is still constitutionally legal. 
 
The study found that the President is within his legal authority to appoint any MP regardless 
of their party affiliation, party approval or disapproval the views of civil society and other 
interested parties. Legally speaking, he or she can appoint any MP as a Minister irrespective 
of the effect of this appointment on the opposition, on the ruling party and on liberal 
democracy and peace in the country. Many participants in this study cited the constitution as 
one of the reasons floor-crossing happens in the first place. It is the one common reason that 
those who are opposed to floor-crossing and those who are supportive of floor-crossing agree 
on. The following quotations by participants in this study highlight this finding that the 
Constitution enables the President to draw Ministers from the opposition, as a key reason 
why the inducement of floor-crossing persists in Zambia’s Third Republic. 
 
Our constitution allows the sitting president to select from among the existing 
Members of Parliament, people that he can use as Ministers. As a result, it becomes 
so easy for him to just poach MPs from the opposition and give them some positions 
in government (E8, 2016).  
 
our constitution allows the president to appoint anybody. But what is bad is that the 
president should not appoint anybody without consulting. For example, if they are 
getting from the opposition there needs to be consultation despite that the constitution 
allows the president to do so (E2, 2016). 
70 
 
One of the biggest problems in terms of floor crossing has been a weak constitution, 
our constitution (CSO7, 2016). 
 
What they are doing is totally legal there is nothing illegal… that it is allowed by the 
constitution (CSO5, 2016). 
 
The Constitution of Zambia (as amended), Act No 2 of 2016, has some important provisions 
that make floor-crossing and by-elections a little bit more difficult. An MP who crosses the 
floor to another party by resigning from the party that sponsored them to the National 
Assembly now faces penalties. This MP would lose his or her seat in Parliament, not be 
allowed to re-contest the seat in the by-election, and is not appointable for any government 
position for the duration of the life of the current parliament. According to the Constitution 
of Zambia (as amended) Act 2 of 2016 in Article 72 (2) the seat of an elected MP shall be 
vacant if he/she, “resigns from the political party which sponsored the member for election 
to the National Assembly… [or]… is expelled from the political party which sponsored the 
member for election to the National Assembly.” 
 
Article 72 (2) of the Constitution of Zambia (Amended) Act 2 of 2016 is a somewhat 
welcome deterrence to the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections, but it doesn’t go 
far enough. It narrowly describes floor-crossing as the resignation of an elected MP from the 
party that sponsored him or her for election to the National Assembly to join another that 
would trigger by-elections. The 2016 Constitution of Zambia (Amended) provides a 
deterrence against MPs intending to resign from their parties to join others as they would not 
just lose their seats but would not be legible to recontest their seats in the ensuing by-elections 
and would not be appointable for any government position.  
 
Accepting a cabinet appointment by the President (who is also the leader of the ruling party), 
without consultation or approval from the party that sponsored them for election to the 
National Assembly is not considered floor-crossing under the law.  The actions of the MP 
who associates and votes with the ruling party after the appointment into cabinet does not 
constitute a violation of the law as it is not considered as crossing the floor. The 2016 
Zambian Constitution (Amended) is still not tight enough to deter an MP from crossing the 
floor or even causing a by-election for that matter. 
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Therefore, an MP who has for all practical purposes crossed the floor to the ruling party 
through a Cabinet appointment without resigning from his or her party, whom associates and 
votes in the National Assembly with the ruling party, is still not in violation of the 
constitution. This was the interpretation made by the High Court of Zambia in the Kuchunga 
Edwin Simusamba v Attorney General, Greyford Monde, Richwell Siamunene, and Poniso 
Njeulu – 2012/HP/1561 case.  The Petitioner, in this case, had argued that the opposition 
UPND MPs who had accepted ministerial positions in the Government led by the ruling party 
the PF had crossed the floor. The High Court of Zambia Judge, Hon Mr Justice C.F.R. 
Mchenga made the following interpretation of the meaning of Article 71 of the 1996 
Constitution of Zambia which is now Article 72 in the 2016 Constitution of Zambia 
(Amended) as follows:  
My understanding of Article 71 of the Constitution is that a Member of Parliament will 
be considered to have crossed the Floor when he leaves his political party or joins a 
political party.  Can a Member of Parliament who takes up a ministerial position be 
considered to have crossed the floor? The answer is no.  A shift in allegiance by taking 
a ministerial appointment or constantly siding or voting with the ruling party does not 
amount to crossing the Floor under the provision.  Whether or not that is desirable is 
not a matter of interpretation, but legislation. Had that been the intention of the 
legislators, they would have indicated it in precise terms... (Kuchunga Edwin 
Simusamba v Attorney General, Greyford Monde, Richwell Siamunene, and Poniso 
Njeulu – 2012/HP/1561 (unreported): 2012, p. 16). 
 
The above interpretation of Article 72 implies that legally speaking, for elected MPs to be 
considered to have crossed the floor, there has to be irrefutable evidence that they have now 
become members of another party. This might be through holding a membership card, 
becoming registered as belonging to another party and/or being an office bearer for another 
party. In making this interpretation and ruling, Hon Mr Justice C.F.R. Mchenga also noted 
that this was a matter of legislation, not interpretation on the desirability or not of floor-
crossing. 
 
Further, expulsion from the party on the grounds that the person has crossed the floor doesn’t 
render the MP’s seat vacant as the MP would retain his or her seat unless the court as provided 
for in Article 72 (7) determines the expulsion as justified. It is highly unlikely that any court 
under the current constitution would nullify an MP’s seat who has crossed the floor without 
resignation from his/her party or without formally joining the ruling party on the basis that 
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their expulsion is justified as any appointment of an MP irrespective of party affiliation is 
legal. 
 
The 2016 Zambian Constitution (Amended) therefore only deters opposition MPs from 
formally crossing the floor to the ruling party. As long as an MP doesn’t officially resign 
from their original party and join another, then legally speaking, they have not broken the 
law. As such, therefore, much as there are important amendments contained in the 2016 
Constitution of Zambia (Amended) meant to deter the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections, it does not go far enough to deter the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections. 
An opposition MP can still formally resign from their party to join the ruling party and cause 
a by-election although that MP would not be allowed to contest the ensuing by-election. And 
it is still perfectly legal for an opposition MP to cross the floor by accepting a cabinet 
appointment, shift loyalty to the ruling party and vote with the ruling party all the time in 
parliament. 
 
4.3  The opposition MPs: the desire for power and better pecuniary remuneration 
and privileges.  
 
The overwhelming majority of the participants cited greed by Members of Parliament as one 
of the key reasons that make opposition MPs to cross the floor. This is because opposition 
MPs that cross the floor through the change of allegiance, voting, and association with the 
ruling party only do so after a cabinet appointment. Prior to any cabinet appointment, these 
opposition MPs are loyal members of their parties and make good on their oversight 
responsibility in parliament, holding the government of the day accountable through their 
debates and votes (Kiiza, 2005).  
 
Far from being motivated to change their party affiliation through floor-crossing or by-
elections because they believe in the policies of the ruling party and therefore desire to 
support and help their implementation, they are driven by self-interest. Their choice to change 
party affiliation through a change of loyalty, association, and votes (floor-crossing) or 
formally resign from their party (by-elections) is one born of rationality and self-interest 
(Hindmor, 2010). The rationality and self-interest are that the cabinet appointment offers 
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better remuneration, gives them executive power and status; and many other privileges that 
come with the office. They figure out that they (opposition MPs) cannot be considered for 
appointment into the cabinet without crossing the floor.  
 
The same was also true, prior to the enactment of the 2016 Zambian Constitution (Amended), 
that opposition MPs only resigned from their parties to recontest their seats in by-elections 
after their appointment into the cabinet. This is because cabinet ministers earn more money, 
have more power as executives in control of government ministries and have a lot of 
privileges that ordinary MPs do not have. The privilege of appointing MPs as ministers lies 
in the President elected by eligible citizens of Zambia. The desire by opposition MPs who 
have no chance of becoming ministers, to earn more money, power and have access to other 
privileges that come with a cabinet post makes them cross the floor. The quotes below express 
that perception from the two interviewees cited:  
 
We have seen our politicians cross floors from one party to another mainly to serve 
their personal interests; and this process takes place first of all behind the scenes 
where a member of parliament is cajoled, persuaded by a carrot dangled and a good 
life promised before they abandon their original political party. A lot of benefits are 
promised such as money, things such as families being given opportunities to study 
abroad, ministerial positions and just positions of influence (CSO6, 2016). 
they would want to be enticed or accept to be invited by the ruling class because they 
feel that there is more honey on the other side as opposed to, you know, being in the 
opposition and give checks and balances. I think there is a lot of personal 
aggrandisement for lack of a better term.  If you like, eh, people would want to be 
selfish as opposed to being selfless. So they want that which will benefit them quickly 
as opposed to what will benefit the masses and people that voted for them (CSO4, 
2016).  
 
Further, participants argued that regardless of what MPs say, they are motivated by greed and 
selfishness because floor-crossing doesn’t benefit the country, but rather the individual MP 
who decides to cross after a ministerial offer is made to them. The following selected quotes 
from participants underscore greed as a compelling floor-crossing motif on the part of MPs 
without which they would not otherwise do so: 
is greed – a lot of money is obviously offered to Members of Parliament who cross 
the line. So far there is no evidence of objectivity or reasons or national benefits for 
crossing the line. The benefits go to the individual. So its greed... (E14, 2016). 
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the reasons being given are that they do it for the love of the nation, they do it for the 
love of the people but we know that behind those words are selfish interests. They are 
looking at their own pockets rather than the plight of the people, rather than the people 
they are supposed to save. So, they will give good holy reasons rather but at the end 
of the day, we know they do it in order to save their own interests (SCO8, 2016). 
The majority of people who participated in the study singled out greed or selfishness as the 
overriding reason that drives opposition MPs to cross the floor or cause by-elections 
especially prior to the 2016 Constitution of Zambia (Amended). Floor-crossing or by-
elections are a form of political migration. Just as migrants are prompted by the push and pull 
factors, “some pull factors include the prospects for improved conditions and access to power 
that are perceived to prevail in the new party” (Matlosa & Shale, 2007, p.3) 
 
In a country like Zambia with one of the worst economies in sub-Sahara Africa, ladden with 
high and rising poverty levels41, patron-cliental relationships entered into by two unequal 
parties, the patron (President) and the client (oppositions MPs) has become all too common.  
The patron (President) provides a cabinet position which confers power, status and financial 
benefits to the client (opposition MP) who in return pledges loyalty, support and votes (Scott, 
1974). The inducement offloor-crossing and by-elections in some cases, especially before the 
2016 Zambian Constitution (Amended) that offer opposition MPs executive power with all 
the privileges and access that come with the position are hard to resist (CSO6, 2016; Saasa 
& Carlsson, 2002).  
In such harsh economic conditions politicians (MPs) engage in the “politics of survival” or 
“politics of the belly” by which they seek to enhance their power and self-enrichment (CSO2, 
2016; Migdal 1988 cited by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). The entitlements of a cabinet 
positioninclude a salary three to four times higher than that of an MP, access to free 
government accommodation, the provision of house servants, telephone/ mobile phone talk-
time, cars, and fuel. This makes floor-crossing and by-elections very attractive even though 
MPs who are not cabinet ministers are also entitled to privileges such As… to enable them to 
travel and conduct the peoples business in their respective constituencies. What attracts them 
                                               
41 According to the World Bank Africa Poverty Database for individual countries in Africa, the 
surveys for Zambia conducted between 1998 and 2006, recorded the highest poverty increase of 2.3% 
of the countries surveyed in Africa. (Beegle, Christiaensen, Dabalen, and Gaddis, 2016, p. 61) 
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to abandon the opposition parties they were elected on even as unpopular as that may be is 
that cabinet ministers are entitled to two types of privileges: entitlements due to all MPs as 
they are also MPs; and entitlements due to cabinet ministers that are even many times higher 
than the ones for MPs. (E2, 2016; E11, 2016; CSO5, 2016; Hobbes, 2013).  
There is little national benefit for the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections but 
personal or private gain motivated by greed because they are a source of intra and inter party 
discontentment and destabilisation; weaken parliamentary oversight; and are costly – a waste 
of the much needed scarce resources (E14, 2016; Patel, 2008). That is not to say that there 
are no highly talented, qualified and skilled opposition MPs who could contribute to the well-
being of the country through appointment into the cabinet. But that the acrimony, 
polarization, weakening of parliamentary oversight and waste of resources does more harm 
than any good that might be intended. The promise of good life, benefits, opportunities, 
influence, and access to national resources is what makes MPs cross the floor from the 
opposition to the ruling party or cause by-elections (CSO6, 2016). The unflattering terms 
often used to describe opposition MPs who engage in induced floor-crossing or by-elections 
speak to self-interest (greed). Opposition MPs who abandon their parties to join or change 
loyalty through by-elections or floor-crossing upon offer of cabinet appointment are 
considered as practicing politics of the belly, being greedy, selfish, full of lust for acquisition 
of wealth, searching for greener pastures, “crosstitutes”, etc. (Bayart, 1993; E14, 2016; E2, 
2016; Tembo, 2013; Zulu, 2013).   
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections has been roundly condemned in Zambia 
by a broad section of Zambians including the Church, civil society organisations, the 
opposition parties, academics and ordinary citizens (Zulu, 2013). Despite the near-universal 
condemnation, some opposition MPs when offered a Cabinet position find it difficult to resist. 
Their behaviour to choose can in part be explained by what Thomas Hobbes articulated, that 
choices made by individuals are founded on “appetites” that push them towards some 
preferred end and “aversions” that push them away from the unwanted end (Oppenheimer, 
2008). Though MPs are well remunerated and live a fairly comfortable life compared to 
ordinary citizens, the appetite for a life, by way of a cabinet appointment, that offers more 
wealth, comfort, power and security pushes them to cross the floor or cause by-elections.   
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Some opposition MPs are businessmen as well or have relatives who are in business. So, 
apart from wanting a bigger income, they will be receiving as ministers and other allowances, 
they are also motivated, according to the study, by their business interests and that of their 
relatives and friends. Their motivation is to enhance their business opportunities and protect 
their business. Their businesses and those of their relatives and friends stand a better chance 
of winning government contracts and tenders. According to Participant (E14, 2016), people 
have been offered contracts - we have seen contracts offered to such Members of Parliament.” 
 
There is a widely reported and held perception in Zambia that, those in government (ruling 
parties) often use government tenders and contracts to enrich themselves acting as 
gatekeepers allowing or denying access. Through their gatekeeping role in government in 
charge of government departments, they (ministers) can deny businesses owned by members 
and supporters of the opposition access to government tenders and contracts while allowing 
their own, those of their supporters and those who can pay kickbacks (Szeftel, 2000; Moonga, 
2018; Habasonda, 2018). Public office such as minister is used as a means to access state 
resources for personal gain (Momba, 2007). As such, therefore, opposition MPs who are also 
businessmen and interested in enhancing their business opportunities would be inclined to 
accept to join the government / ruling party through floor-crossing or by-elections.  
 
Opposition owned businesses or businesses owned by individuals that are critical to the ruling 
party do not just get sidelined as explained above, they are also subjected to selective strict 
scrutiny by government agencies. Government agencies such as the Zambia Revenue 
Authority (ZRA) and Police are often used to harass, frustrate and in some cases close down 
their businesses for non-compliance to some regulations or failure to pay their taxes to the 
fullest extent (MISA Zambia, 2016a). Opposition MPs who are businessmen might be 
inclined, under such circumstances, to accept joining the ruling party so as to protect their 
businesses from being unfairly targeted by government agencies. So joining the ruling party 
either through floor-crossing or by-elections in order to protect their business is based on self-
interest and a choice made out of rationality (Hindmor, 2010).   It is about protecting their 
businesses as well as improving their business prospects, “some people would like to protect 
their businesses; to do business with the government” (MP9, 2016).  
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The key thing is that the ruling party tends to buy by either promising the crossing 
parliamentarian with ministerial position or even just some monetary value in terms of 
even giving their relatives contracts or other businesses (E3, 2016). 
The opposition MPs who engage in the inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections often 
claim to be doing so out of love for the country, a desire to work with the government of the 
day to bring development in the country, a desire to work with the Republican President 
because he is good or because of the good policies being pursued by the party in power 
(SCO8, 2016; MP7, 2016). Contrary to these assertions made by floor-crossing MPs the study 
argues that, rather, they do it out of regard for their own self-interest (SCO8, 2016; Smith, 
1777). The fact that the only time opposition MPs cross the floor or resign and go for by-
elections is when they are offered a cabinet portfolio is indicative of a love for self-benefit 
rather than that of the country or the people they represent. 
4.4 Presidents’ (Ruling parties) desire for power consolidation  
 
Presidents also happen to be the leaders of the ruling parties. They play a pre-eminent role in 
the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections. The inducement of 
parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections would almost be impossible without the 
agency of the President. The President is the only person with the legal authority as mandated 
by the constitution to appoint members of the executive branch of government, from among 
the Members of Parliament. According to Article 116 (1) of Act No. 2 of 2016 of the 
Constitution of Zambia (Amended), “The President shall appoint a prescribed number of 
Members of Parliament as Ministers.”  
 
Opposition Members of Parliament only cross the floor once an offer of cabinet appointment 
by the President has been made to them. The President induces floor-crossing or a by-election 
when he appoints MPs who belong to opposition parties into his/ her cabinet. Almost all cases 
of floor-crossing and by-elections involve the appointment of an opposition MP into the 
cabinet as either a minister or a deputy minister. As one participant put it, “most of the time, 
we don’t have people crossing for the simple reason of crossing, normally when they cross 
they are offered a position” (MP2, 2016).  
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The findings from this study show that Presidents in Zambia’s 3rd Republic do not just induce 
parliamentary floor-crossing or by-elections for benign national considerations only as they 
claim. While it might be for some benign national considerations sometimes, ruling parties, 
in some rare moments of truth have been quite open about doing it for the purpose crippling 
the opposition even if that would mean that there would be no opposition MPs left at all 
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2014). 
 
They often claim that they are aimed at having an inclusive government that brings into the 
cabinet, the people’s representatives (MPs) from regions their parties (governing) never won 
any seats so as to attain national unity. Or that they do it to tap talent and skills from the 
opposition for the sake of development for the country. Their claims are premised on national 
unity and development (CSO7, 2016; E1, 2016).  
 
There is some truth to the claims such as the tapping of skills and talent from some brilliant 
minds from opposition MPs and that it broadens inclusivity in the cabinet. While that might 
be true in some cases, it is not the whole truth. Because given that Presidents are allowed 
under the 2016 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (Amended) in Article 68 (2) (b) to 
nominate eight Members of Parliament, they would have been using that provision to 
nominate talented and skilled people from regions they never won seats. This way, they 
would both have a cabinet drawn from all regions of the country as well as having some of 
the brightest minds heading government ministries. In fact, Article 69 (1) explicitly says, 
“The President may nominate a person referred to in Article 68 (2) (b) where the President 
considers it necessary to enhance the representation of special interests, skills or gender in 
the National Assembly.” 
 
The appointment of opposition MPs by the President into the cabinet that prompts them to 
cross the floor or cause a by-election generates widespread condemnation and opposition. 
Presidents do it anyway not because they are unaware of the opposition and condemnation it 
generates or the harm it does to democracy and peace. They do it because it accords them 
more power, allowing them to have control over the Legislature and to strengthen their party 
while weakening the opposition. It is also plausible that they do it with a purpose having an 
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inclusive cabinet drawn from all regions of the country while also tapping into the talent and 
skills found among MPs from the opposition. And it would also be possible that the President 
might through this singular act of appointing opposition MPs into cabinet aiming at four goals 
of weakening the opposition (strengthening the ruling party); getting control over the 
Legislature; having an inclusive cabinet, and getting the talent and skills from the opposition. 
 
4.4.1 Control over the Legislature 
 
Past and present Presidents in Zambia’s 3rd Republic do not just induce floor-crossing and 
by-elections out of the goodness of their hearts (for the good of the country) or because they 
are not aware of the opposition it generates or the harm it does to democracy and peace. They 
gain, through the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections, ‘total’ loyalty and support 
from the opposition MPs they offer cabinet positions, through votes, they cast in Parliament. 
These opposition MPs consistently vote in favour of thePresidents agenda, alongside the MPs 
from the governing party, in the National Assembly, in line with the collective responsibility 
principle (Momba, 2007).  
 
Zambia has a first-past-the-post electoral system by which candidates for MP and President 
seek their mandate directly from the electorate. This electoral system is therefore open to the 
possibility that the party whose presidential candidate wins the Presidential contest may not 
end up with the majority of seats in the National Assembly. This does not mean that the only 
remedy open to the President and the ruling party is the inducement of floor-crossing or by-
elections. It is possible for the ruling party to form a coalition government or have an 
agreeable arrangement with an opposition party. The ruling party can also have their bills and 
legislation pass in the house without being in a coalition with the opposition; and through the 
inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections by seeking consensus with the opposition in the 
formulation, refinement and passage stages.  
 
Presidents, according to the participants in the study, induce floor-crossing and by-elections 
because they want their party to have the majority of the MPs in the house so as to have 
control over the Legislature. The more MPs the ruling party has in the National Assembly 
the easier it becomes for the President and the ruling party’s agenda to be implemented. The 
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fewer MPs the ruling party has especially if the outcome of the general elections is a hung 
parliament, the more difficult it gets for the President and the ruling party to pass bills and 
legislation without support from the opposition. And so to go around this perceived problem, 
the President offers cabinet positions to some opposition MPs thereby inducing floor-crossing 
or by-elections so as to boost their numbers. This is how one interviewee put it, 
 
the party in government they want to boost their numbers in parliament. So they will 
approach members of parliament from opposition political parties, usually with the 
promise of a cabinet job; people don’t just cross the floor to the ruling party for no 
reason at all. Usually, it is accompanied by an appointment to cabinet, that’s the other 
thing government wants to raise his numbers (CSO3, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections by the President is meant to allow for the 
control of the house. Without control over the house, the President and the ruling cannot just 
push through any piece of legislation without challenge as it would require consent by some 
members of the opposition. The control of the National Assembly through the inducement of 
floor-crossing or by-elections then allows the President and the ruling party to pass bills in 
the house with little or no challenge and scrutiny. 
 
they want to control the parliament, and when they have controlled Parliament 
whatever bills they want to pass in Parliament they will have the majority votes (E2, 
2016). 
they want the numbers in parliament it’s just an issue of saying we need to have 
numbers to pass bills if they don’t they feel bills will be shot at by the opposition with 
their majority (CSO2, 2016).  
 
The above quotes, one from one of the electorate and the other from one of the civil society 
organisation leaders both cite the President’s quest for increasing the number of MPs under 
his/ her control  for the purpose of legislation as motive for the inducement of floor-crossing 
and by-elections. While the ruling party gets the majority seats in the National Assembly 
from the general elections, there are few times like was the case in when the opposition parties 
and independents had a combined majority. While a hung Parliament is likely to lead to the 
inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections, there are other ways of getting a majority 
support in the National Assembly that does not require the inducement of floor-crossing or 
by-elections. Dialogue and consensus building over certain bills or even entering into 
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coalition government could still give the ruling party the governing majority required for 
passage of bills.   
 
There are various reasons that motivate Presidents to seek control over the Legislature, in the 
face of stiff opposition and popular sentiment, continue the inducement of floor-crossing and 
by-elections. One of them is to simply garner for a simple majority for the sake of governance; 
and the desire to implement the programme of action or manifesto on which they were 
elected. Some other reasons may include, but not limited to, the desire to garner for total 
control over the legislature so as to exercise arbitrary rule without meaningful checks and 
balances, and to weaken or even destroy the opposition parties (E1, 2016; MP1, 2016).  
 
4.4.2   President’s (and ruling party’s) desire for easy passage of their agenda in 
parliament. 
 
Presidents and their political parties run on a particular programme of action or manifesto 
during elections that they want to implement during their tenure in office. Yet, if they do not 
receive a simple majority seats in the house despite winning the presidency and the most seats 
in parliament, they cannot action their plans without the support of opposition MPs whose 
votes are not guaranteed. When the opposition has a combined majority in parliament over 
the ruling party, their scrutiny over government leads to confrontations that can be frustrating 
to the President and the ruling party. The easiest of routes Presidents take to avoid such 
confrontation, scrutiny or the obligations that coalition governance requires is the inducement 
of floor-crossing, to secure support from individual legislators (Lembani, 2007). 
 
Some of the reasons include their desire to have a simple working majority in the National 
Assembly if the outcome of the elections results is a hung parliament (MP1; 2016). This is 
important to the Republican President because the National Assembly as one of the three co-
equal arms of government, is charged with the responsibility of passing bills, and oversees 
the functions of the executive through expenditure appropriation, equitable distribution of 
national resources, public expenditure scrutiny, public debt approval, and international 
agreements and treaties approval (Constitution of Zambia (Amended) Act No. 2 of 2016, 
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Article 23). The government cannot function without legislative authorization, such as 
budgetary approvals, from parliamentarians through the provision of a majority vote.  
 
The desire for power consolidation that allows the President and the ruling party to have 
control over the legislature so that the outcomes of the deliberations in Parliament don’t go 
against his (and his party’s) agenda, is one of the consideration for the inducement of floor-
crossing or by-elections. The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections by the President, 
according to the findings of this study is, among other factors, to allow the President to rule 
without much scrutiny or being held accountable. This allows the agenda of the President, 
irrespective, of its merits or lack of it, to pass with little challenge or without meaningful 
scrutiny. This is not to say that the opposition cannot challenge bad pieces of legislation, 
amendments or try to hold government accountable, but that they cannot stop them if the 
ruling party is so determined as it comes down to numbers in the house that count. Neither is 
it to say that any majority in government (anywhere in the world) means a lack of meaningful 
scrutiny but that a minority government is much more amenable to compromise and 
consensus building as it cannot simply impose its will in the National Assembly as a majority 
one could.   
 
This does not also mean that in all circumstances, MPs in the ruling party and even those who 
happen to be in the cabinet always support the President as was the case in President 
Chiluba’s attempt to change the constitution to allow him to run for a third term (Simutanyi, 
2005). These instances where the MPs from the ruling party and those in the cabinet can 
openly refuse to go along the President’s stated proposal are not common-place. Even in this 
particular incident (desire by the then President Chiluba for a third term constitutional 
amendment) there are other factors such as a massive opposition by the church mother bodies, 
civil society organisations, academics and also the desire by some high ranking ruling party 
members (MPs and cabinet ministers) to vie for the Presidency. Nonetheless, whatever the 
motives and pressure, it shows that ruling party MPs and cabinet ministers can still oppose 
the President on some issues. 
It turns Parliament into a rubber stamp where no meaningful scrutiny of bills and oversite 
over the executive take place as votes are assured for the President. This then allows him/ her 
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and the ruling party to govern, change laws they don’t want, and pass bills and expenditures 
they want in the house without any credible or meaningful oversight.  
 
4.4.3 Weaken the opposition/ strengthen the ruling party 
 
Presidents in Zambia’s Third Republic are also leaders of their political parties. As leaders of 
the governing parties, they are concerned with not just having the necessary votes or control 
over the Legislature, they are also aiming at growing their parties, by increasing party 
membership as they look towards the next elections. Opposition MPs who join the ruling 
party do so alongside their ardent supporters, family members, and some friends. So, whilst 
the inducement of floor-crossing guarantees them votes in Parliament, it also serves them a 
dual purpose of strengthening the ruling party while weakening the opposition parties. 
 
The Presidents in Zambia’s Third Republic care about the strength of their parties as they 
rely upon them for election to the highest office in the country and support for passage of 
bills in the National Assembly. It is in their self-interest to weaken the opposition and 
strengthen the ruling party. One way of strengthening the ruling party is by inducing of floor-
crossing or by-elections through the offer cabinet positions to some of the most important 
MPs the opposition has. While there may be plausible benign reasons for cabinet offers to 
MPs from the opposition, it is also possible that Presidents make the offer because it is in 
their self-interest. They do not make the offer for the goodness of the country but out of regard 
for their own good or self-interest and that of their party (Smith, 1777). 
In order to strengthen the ruling parties that Presidents lead, they induce floor-crossing or by-
elections not for the benign stated purposes but to weaken the opposition or even totally 
destroy them. This is the perception of the interviewees from the following quotes:     
they will say, look, we are a very inclusive government. So as an inclusive 
government we want to reach out to every other sector. We don’t promote tribalism. 
So we want to ensure that even in the areas where we don’t have members of 
parliament we are able to get members of parliament from the opposition to come into 
government. Those are some of the reasons they are going to give. But primarily the 
basic thing why they do that is all about weakening the opposition political party. So 
they will weaken it as much as possible by getting some of its finer brand to come to 
the ruling party (CSO7, 2016).  
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they want to destabilize the opposition. You weaken the opposition, you have a fair 
chance of staying there for a very long time [E16, 2016].   
 
One of the reasons is to weaken the opposition. You know, democracy must have 
elections from time to time, for instance in our country, those elections should take 
place every five years. Now in that five years, you would discover that if the ruling 
party is not performing well, one, it will have to find ways of weakening the 
opposition. So the only way to weaken the opposition is to poach the MPs from the 
opposition parties. So that when those MPs cross over to the ruling party, definitely 
the ruling party will become stronger. Then the opposition parties will remain 
vulnerable (E6, 2016). 
 
There is no doubt in the minds of participants of this study as the cited quotes above show 
and other studies such as the one done by Momba (2007) have shown that the inducement of 
floor-crossing weakens the opposition parties. In some instances (especially under the late 
president, Levy Mwanawasa), the intent to weaken the opposition can be seen in the choice 
of MPs from the opposition who were the most senior and able leaders (Momba, 2007). By 
luring the most senior and able MPs to the ruling party through cabinet appointments, division 
and confusion ensue in the opposition. In some instances, it has led to the total destruction of 
some opposition parties as was the case with the Heritage Party (HP) whose MPs were co-
opted into the then ruling party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) through 
cabinet appointments, and weakening of the United Party for National Development (UPND) 
(Goeke and Hartmann, 2011).  
 
It also negatively affects voters and supporters who normally, in the case of Zambia, vote for 
candidates based on the political party they support. Political parties have strongholds in 
different regions of the country where their candidates are almost guaranteed to win because 
of the popularity of the party on whose ticket they stand for election (Erdmann, 2007). The 
map in figure 4, the 2016 presidential contest results between the two major parties in Zambia, 
the ruling PF, and the opposition UPND illustrating the regional party strongholds that 
influence the voting pattern in Zambia. 
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Figure 4: 2016 Presidential Election Results in Zambia 
Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia (2016). 
 
The regions in blue are the ruling party PF’s stronghold where the ruling party’s presidential 
candidate won the most votes while the regions in red are the opposition UPND’s stronghold 
where its presidential candidate won (ECZ, 2016). Likewise, these two political parties won 
the overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats from the same regions, blue for the PF and 
red for the UPND. 
 
The thought that an MP they supported and voted for, based in part, on the party affiliation 
of their choice, can arbitrary cross to the ruling party without their consent makes voters 
cynical and apathetic about participating in the electoral process (Swart, 2007;  ). The low 
voter turnout in the by-elections that ensue following a cabinet offer to opposition MPs that 
lead to their expulsion or resignation is a testament to the cynicism and apathy that affect the 
electorate (Swart, 2007).  
 
The support for the opposition suffers, as evidenced by the losses they suffer when by-
elections are held over opposition MPs who after being appointed into the cabinet without 
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approval from their party are expelled by their respective parties or opt to join the ruling party 
formally (Moomba, 2007). The Patriotic Front, in the 2011 general elections got 60 
parliamentary seats out of the 150 seats and through among others, the inducement of by-
elections had increased the number to 79 seats by the year 2016 (ECZ, 2011; National 
Assembly, 2016). This is to say nothing about those who were appointed to serve as deputy 
minister, 13 of them by 2013 (Geloo, 2013). This is largely due to the huge advantage the 
ruling party brings to bear in the subsequent by-elections through the use of state resources 
among others.  
 
But also, the idea that the people’s choice of a candidate for MP, in part, based on the party 
ticket of their choice can choose to join the ruling party though not formally (through crossing 
the floor) or formally after (expulsion or resignation) makes them question the wisdom of 
voting for another opposition candidate in the ensuing by-election. They might, after all, do 
the same if offered a position by the President and join the ruling party by de-facto (floor-
crossing) or formally if they resign or are expelled (by-election).  
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter presented and discussed data on the perceived reasons/drivers of the inducement 
of floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic. While there may be other 
drivers, the study identified three main drivers namely, the weak constitution; the desire by 
opposition MPs for power and better pecuniary remuneration; and the President’s quest for 
power consolidation. 
 
The constitution of Zambia despite some amendments over the years still has some loopholes 
that make the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections possible. The Constitution does 
not constrain the President and opposition MPs from engaging in patron-client relationship 
through an informal change of allegiance after the offer of a cabinet position that results in 
floor-crossing. It also does not do away with by-elections that can be caused by an MP who 
decides to join the ruling party even if they are ineligible to re-contest. 
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The opposition MPs desire for power and better pecuniary remuneration and privileges that 
are far more than what ordinary MPs get or are entitled to as one of the underlying drivers 
that attract them to accept cabinet appointments without approval from their parties. While 
the study does not rule out other considerations opposition MPs may have, it deems this as 
one of the factors if not thee major factor. The President is the only person in the Republic of 
Zambia with the constitutional power to appoint members of the cabinet from among MPs 
appoints opposition MPs in a way that helps him consolidate power and strengthen his party. 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections helps the President to have control over the 
Legislature, weaken the opposition while strengthening his party. 
 
The findings from this study on what the real reasons that make the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections even possible despite the fierce opposition from the majority 
Zambians, stand in sharp contrast with those advanced by the proponents. The proponents of 
this phenomenon cite benign reasons such as having a bipartisan and inclusive cabinet with 
members from regions the ruling party never won parliamentary seats; desire to serve the 
country and bring development.  
 
The study does not preclude some of the aforementioned benign reasons as drivers for the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections. But that a weak porous constitution;  desire 
for power and better pecuniary remuneration and privileges by opposition MPs who are 
driven by self-interest; and the desire for power consolidation by the Republican Presidents 
intent on strengthening the ruling partyand having control over the legislature, are major 
factors if not thee major drivers. The opposition MPs and the President engage in a patron-
client relationship despite strong opposition and condemnation because they make a rational 
choice that it is in their best self-interest to do so and that it is beneficial to both parties, the 
patron (President) and the client (opposition MPs) (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Piattoni, 
2004; Hindmor, 2010; Roskin, 2017).  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
THE IMPACT OF THE INDUCEMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY FLOOR-
CROSSING AND BY-ELECTIONS ON DEMOCRACY 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections has become a common feature in 
Zambia’s Third Republic. It has been a source of controversy, debate and conflict. It is seen 
by its many critiques as an affront to multiparty politics that undermines liberal democracy. 
It creates a de facto one-party state by weakening the opposition and parliament that play an 
important part of the basis of separation of powers and a system of checks and balances liberal 
democracy is anchored on. 
 
This chapter presents and discusses data that was collected on the participants’ responses and 
thoughts on the impact of the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections 
on democracy in Zambia. It shows explores ways in which the basis for plural politics and 
liberal democracy is undermined. According to the analysis of data collected from 
participants, this dissertation identifies four ways in which liberal democracy is impacted 
upon. These are namely a) the weakening of the opposition parties; b) the strengthening of 
the ruling parties; c) the voter apathy and cynicism; d) and the weakening of Parliament. 
 
5.2   Weakened Opposition parties  
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections, according to the participants, has a 
negative effect on democracy. One of the common observations made by most of the 
participants in the study is that it weakens democracy by weakening the opposition political 
parties who play a vital role in its health. The study has identified two ways in which the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections has a negative effect on democracy: the 
weakening of the opposition’s oversight role in parliament and; the weakening of the 
opposition’s viability. 
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5.2.1   Weakens opposition’s oversight role in parliament 
 
Liberal democracy is premised on political liberties by which people are allowed to 
participate or form a political party; and democratic rule by which people are entitled directly 
or through representatives and in which the government is accountable to people (Bollen, 
1993). Political parties (opposition and ruling) play a vital role in a functioning liberal 
democracy. The opposition’s main function revolves around ensuring that government is held 
accountable so that it (government) is responsive to the public and is serving their interests 
(Lawson, 2010; Blair, 2000). An effective opposition, therefore, is one that enforces 
accountability; provides oversight; serves as a watchdog; guards against the abuse of power 
and state resources, corruption, breaches of human rights, nepotism; and ensures that 
government does not conduct its business outside the confines of the law (Blair, 2000; 
Lawson, 2010; Lekalake, 2017).  
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections reduces the number of MPs the opposition 
parties receive after general elections. The reduction in the number of opposition MPs 
weakens the opposition’s ability to meaningfully play their oversight role in the legislature. 
The weakening of the opposition, as participants are aware, through the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections, robs the country of the much-needed checks and balances so 
critical in a liberal democracy’s health.  Here are a few selected quotes from participants that 
underscore that view:  
It weakens the opposition parties… they have depleted the numbers of the opposition 
to provide the checks and balances. So when you go into parliament they have actually 
bought enough members on their side. So any voting becomes just an academic 
exercise. So we have lost our voting powers (MP1, 2016). 
 
it really weakens the opposition and it robs the nation of the much-needed checks and 
balances too. We need a stronger and vibrant opposition who provides those checks 
and balances. So, over time if the thing is left unchecked you could end up with a very 
weak opposition and that allows the government of the day to do whatever they want 
(CSO3, 2016). 
 
it is weakening our democracy. Uhm and that’s why if you read the pastoral letters of 
the church mother bodies, in particular, the Zambian Episcopal Conference we have 
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been emphatic in terms of saying we must go beyond saying we are practising 
democracy. We must live by the values of democracy (CSO8, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections weakens the opposition by reducing the 
number of seats they hold in parliament. The opposition’s loss of seats means that their power 
to provide oversight is further eroded and any bill or legislation brought by government, good 
or bad, is all but guaranteed to pass. This is so because the opposition’s ability to provide 
meaningful oversight in parliament ultimately lies in the number of seats they hold. A 
weakened opposition cannot meaningfully challenge and stop bills or laws that do not serve 
the common good as they are all but guaranteed to pass. Neither can the opposition compel 
the government to improve, change or withdrawal bad bills. 
The lack of a strong and vibrant opposition deprives the country of the checks and balances 
necessary to rein in arbitrary rule and excesses by those in government. The separation of 
powers necessary for an accountable government in a vibrant democracy is compromised 
when the control of the executive and the legislature is in the same hands (Lawson, 2010; 
Blair, 2000). The government of the day will feel unrestrained from using power and be prone 
to abusing it (power) and government resources in pursuit of selfish party and personal 
interests without watchful oversight by parliament (Blair, 2000; Lawson, 2010; Lekalake, 
2017). 
The opposition Members of Parliament form a force that checks the party in government from 
the excesses and abuse of state power and resources. Through their Members of Parliament, 
they offer alternative ideas through debates in the house and can stop abuse by voting against 
bills that do not serve the common good. As good as debates are in the house, in the end, it 
comes down to the votes cast that counts. The loss of opposition MPs through the inducement 
of floor-crossing or by-elections to the ruling party weakens their voice and renders them 
powerless as they can’t, through votes, stop legislation that do not serve the common good 
and cannot stop abuse of power by those in the executive. This renders them (opposition 
parties) ineffective as they are prevented from playing, through parliament, their role of 
exposing corruption, and of holding government accountable and responsive to the public 
interest (Lawson, 2010). 
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5.2.2   Weakens the opposition’s viability 
 
The effectiveness of the opposition in the legislature, in a party-based system, depends on the 
strength of the number of loyal MPs they have. Apart from the loss of effectiveness in the 
house, the viability of the opposition parties also suffers as a consequence of the inducement 
of floor-crossing and by-elections. The loss of an MP is more than just one member lost in 
terms of numbers. Each MP comes with the support of their family members, relatives and 
strong supporters (cadres) some of whom are likely to follow them to the ruling party they 
now owe their loyalty and support.  Therefore, the inducement of floor-crossing or by-
elections doesn’t just weaken the opposition’s effectiveness in the house but it is also a threat 
to their viability. Every political party draws its strength from its membership. So, the loss of 
loyal members from a political party is also a loss of potential votes during elections.  (CSO3, 
2016; E14, 2016; MP1, 2016).  
Political parties in Zambia do not receive any funding from the government. An attempt 
through legislation was made is 2003 to provide funding to all political parties but did not 
succeed as the then President Mwanawasa rejected it citing Zambia’s lack of finances to make 
that possible (Transparency International 2004; Simutanyi 2005, Kabemba & Eiseman 2005, 
15). Political parties rely on the generosity of their supporters (members), well-wishers and 
levies on their Members of Parliament, for those that have MPs (E14, 2016; Kabemba & 
Eiseman, 2005; Momba 2005). A political party with MPs has a fair and steady source of 
funding coming from the levies on its MPs. The MPs, therefore, apart from the role they play 
in the house add value to their parties through the financial contributions they make. The loss 
of an MP through floor-crossing or by-election inducement robs the opposition party of the 
financial resources that makes the running or sustainability of the party difficult. This 
consequently impacts on opposition’s ability to effectively compete against the ruling party 
during elections. 
The loss of funding, members and morale the opposition suffer from the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections does not just affect the opposition’s ability to win elections. It also 
affects its sustainability and even its existence. If unchecked, it can lead to a de facto one-
party state. Opposition parties whose MPs’ loyalty shifts due to floor-crossing or by-elections 
to the ruling party can, and in some cases have, led to their party’s demise. A number of 
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participants cited among others, the demise of a once vibrant and promising opposition party, 
the Heritage Party (HP) as a result of the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections after 
the 2001 general elections to underscore its lethality to the opposition and liberal democracy 
in Zambia’s 3rd Republic. Here are a few selected quotes from the participants: 
 
Of Course they lose members, they lose membership… if you recall in the 2001 
elections, we had a political party called the Heritage Party (HP) which had, I think, 
five MPs, and (President) Levy Mwanawasa appointed all of them into government, 
and that was the end of that political party in terms of being effective on the ground. 
So, he poached all the Heritage Party members and Brigadier General Godfrey 
Miyanda (Heritage Party president) remained without a member of parliament. And 
henceforth he has never produced a member. So, they weakened that party which had 
life---if those members of parliament had remained in parliament and continued to 
advance the policies and the programs of the Heritage Party (SCO2, 2016). 
 
The Heritage Party (HP), a new opposition party which participated in the first elections (the 
2001 general elections) after its formation managed to win four (4) seats in the National 
Assembly.  But lost the four seats to the ruling party, the MMD, two due to floor-crossing by 
way of appointment as deputy ministers and the other two through by-elections (Momba, 
2007; Simutanyi, 2005). This loss left the HP without any MP and 2001 was as it turned out 
to be, the only time it ever won seats in Parliament. The loss of the MPs through floor-
crossing and by-elections to the ruling party that could have helped in giving the party a voice 
and seat on the national stage through debates and votes in the National Assembly led to the 
destruction of the Heritage Party. To date, the Heritage Party has never won a single seat 
since the 2001 general elections and is a far cry from 8% share of the national vote to the 
0.2% share in the 2011 general elections (ECZ, 2001; ECZ, 2011). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections leads to the weakening and in some cases 
destruction of the opposition political parties. The study also asserts that the inducement of 
floor-crossing and by-elections by the ruling parties leads to making Zambia a de facto one-
party-state contrary to what she is by Legislation, a multi-party state. 
   
The ruling party begins to create a pseudo-one-party state. And they can actually use 
this floor-crossing by enticing these MPs to finish them. There are some political 
parties which were actually completely annihilated in this country. For example the 
Heritage Party they had 4 MPs in 2001. Before the next elections, they had no MPs. 
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They were all enticed by the ruling party, and that was the end of the political party. 
From that time they have never won a seat, not even a councillor. A political party 
that was promising was completely destroyed (MP2, 2016). 
 
Zambia reverted to a multi-party state in 1990 after being a one-party state from 1972 (Baylies 
& Szeftel, 1992). The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections by ruling parties 
weakens and destroys the ideals of multi-partyism where the opposition’s strength is vital 
and plays a critical role especially in the National Assembly. It leads to the creation of a de-
facto one-party state without legislation as the opposition is weakened to the extent that they 
cannot hold the government of the day accountable.   
 
The creation of a de-facto one party state through the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections as this participant argues leads to the weakening of the opposition, renders them 
meaningless as they cannot perform their function in a democracy, 
 
The effect of floor-crossing on the opposition is that some opposition political parties 
go into extinct, meaning that they will cease to exist. And that becomes a threat to 
democracy, because democracy cannot survive without the opposition. So other than 
those opposition parties going into extinct, the opposition parties become meaningless 
because they will not be able to perform their functions in a democracy (E6, 2016). 
 
A vibrant liberal democracy requires among others, a vibrant opposition for the purpose of a 
system of government where there are checks and balances. A weak opposition that comes 
about from the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections makes that task by the 
opposition not possible, and makes abuse of power and state resources by the government of 
the day possible without oversight in parliament by the opposition. The inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections is a threat to liberal democracy. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing weakens the opposition parties’ ability to exercise its 
oversight role in parliament. It also negatively affects its viability by denying it a steady 
source of funding through which to operate effectively, diminishes its chances of winning 
elections and threatens its demise, as has been the case with some opposition parties in 
Zambia’s 3rd Republic. 
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5.3   A Strengthened Ruling party  
 
Many participants in the study were of the view that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections is a zero-sum-game that benefits the ruling party at the expense of the opposition. 
The study has shown above, how it weakens the opposition. This section seeks to show how 
it strengthens the ruling party. The study findings show that the ruling party increases the 
pool of the number of MPs under its control in parliament and that, further, it increases its 
party membership support base. 
 
5.3.1   Increase in number of MPs – Control of the Legislature 
 
Parliament plays a vital and critical role in a liberal democracy such as being a watchdog over 
the executive branch, the passing of bills and the authorizing of government expenditure 
(Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2008; Diefenbaker, 1949; Blair, 2000; Lawson, 2010; 
Lekalake, 2017). The more Members of Parliament a political party has, the more power and 
control it has over parliament and the decision and bills that get to pass. Hence, every political 
party that participates in parliamentary elections desires to have as many Members of 
Parliament as possible.  
 
In Zambia, all political parties that manage to win seats in the National Assembly after the 
general elections are determined to ensure that their party policies and instructions are 
followed and supported by their MPs (Simutanyi, 2005). The ruling party whose presidential 
candidate wins the presidential contest during the general elections, likewise, seeks to have 
control over parliament by having as many MPs as possible. The ruling party through its 
leader, the President of the Republic, would not induce floor-crossing if that were to result in 
the weakening of his own party he relies upon to be in power. He induces floor-crossing 
through the offer of cabinet positions so as to add more MPs on top of the MPs his party 
already has. This gives the ruling party numerical superiority in the number of MPs the 
President and the party (ruling) can rely upon to drive any agenda they want that requires a 
parliamentary stamp of approval. The study found, as the selected quotes, hereunder speak 
to, that the ruling parties induce floor-crossing to increase the number of MPs for control over 
the Legislature. 
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It gets numbers in parliament it strengthens their capacity to influence laws that are 
passed and not passed (CSO3, 2016). 
 
The ruling parties in Zambia’s Third Republic induce floor-crossing and by-elections so as 
to have the numbers in the National Assembly necessary for passage of bills based on the 
policies of their party.  
 
Political parties strive hard to have as many MPs as possible during elections. This is so 
because the party that wins the most seats during elections has a bigger say in influencing or 
shaping legislation. The President induces floor-crossing or by-elections in part to strengthen 
the ruling party’s capacity to determine what gets to pass or not in the National Assembly. 
 
the government acquires all the numbers like you have seen now, the government has 
managed to pass the constitution against, by and large, and the opposition political 
parties that were against partial amendments. They wanted the whole constitution to 
go through because those provisions were from the people. I can tell you, in the last 
4 years, the ruling party has propped up the numbers by poaching these chaps who 
are crossing the floor (MP1, 2016). 
 
The more numbers ruling a party amasses through inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections the easier it becomes for it to have the power to even change the constitution. For 
example, the Patriotic Front led government did not pass all the amendments presented by 
the Technical Committee Drafting the Zambian Constitution (TCDZC) in 2016. Using the 
numbers it had in the National Assembly including those from the opposition serving in the 
cabinet, the PF rejected a few but popular constitutional recommendations widely favoured 
by a cross-section of society. These include the rejection of appointment of cabinet ministers 
from outside Parliament; a system of devolved governance; and a mixed member 
representation system (Munalula, 2016). The recommendations left would have strengthened 
democratic governance as the MPs both in the ruling party and opposition would concentrate 
on doing the jobs they were elected to do without aspiring to be ministers.  
 
The rejection of the popular recommendations by the ruling party ensured that the 
concentration of power would remain in the hands of the President who is leader of the ruling 
party to the benefit of the party he/she is head of. This allows the status quo where the 
96 
 
President uses the power to appoint ministers from Parliament as a way of making the MPs 
appointed into cabinet indebted to him/her. It also makes ordinary MPs (both in the 
opposition and ruling party) seeking to please the President for possible appointment 
consideration into cabinet instead of providing oversight to the executive in the National 
Assembly. So, while the rejection of the popular recommendations is beneficial to the 
President and the ruling party, it “leaves the desire by Zambian people for a democratic 
constitution unfulfilled” (Ndulo, 2016, p. 18). 
  
The need to get opposition MPs becomes an acutely felt need if the outcome of the general 
elections doesn’t give the victorious party (ruling) the simple majority of votes in the house 
that are needed for the passage of bills and majority governance. The added number of MPs 
the ruling party gains through the inducement of floor-crossing allows it to pass bills and 
govern easily without challenge and scrutiny. It also allows it, sometimes, to obtain a two-
thirds majority that would give the ruling party the legal basis for changing some parts of the 
constitution that requires more than just a simple majority vote. 
 
The strength of the ruling party is enhanced, whether driven just by the desire to get a simple 
working majority or aiming at getting a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Theoretically, the 
strength it gets can be used to operationalise their programme of action (manifesto) upon 
which they were elected. This then would allow the ruling party to fulfil the promises they 
made to the people who elected them into power. The fulfilment of campaign promises 
generates trust and respect from the electorate; makes the party popular and makes them more 
likely than not to give the ruling party another mandate in the next elections.  
 
The study found that the change in the balance of power brought about by the inducement of 
floor-crossing leads to the concentration of power in the same hands (governing party) 
controlling the Executive and the Legislature, making the system of checks and balances 
anchored on the principle of separation of power in a liberal democracy wanting. It 
incapacitates the Legislature from being a place of independent debate and expression; where 
bills and decisions are critically examined, challenged and improved; where abuse of state 
resources and power is kept in check; and where ultimately the government is held 
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accountable (Blair, 2000; Diefenbaker, 1949; Lekalake, 2017; Lawson, 2010; Simutanyi, 
2005). This allows the party in power to pass any agenda they want as parliament simply 
becomes a rubber stamp approving any bills and decisions made by the Executive. Hereunder 
are some quotes underscoring parliament’s lost status and relevance:  
 
I don’t think our parliament is relevant we are just wasting our resources to sustain an 
institution that does not represent the interests of the people. It’s just a club and a 
ritual that we continue to support and it doesn’t really make sense to anybody because 
what goes on at parliament could be done by cabinet alone without coming to 
parliament. Because what they do in parliament is simply a formality (CSO6, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections turns Parliament into a rubberstamp for 
the executive. And if Parliament becomes a rubberstamp which can not hold those in the 
executive accountable, the maintainance and sustainance of such an expensive arm of 
government is a waste of the taxpayers money.  
 
Parliament exists as one of the three co-equal arms of government that among others is 
supposed to check or hold government accountable for the common good of the people (the 
electorate) on whose behalf, the MPs hold power. The maintenance and sustenance of 
Parliament as an institution among which among others require payment of salaries and 
allowances for MPs and various office bearers comes at a very high cost on taxpayers. 
Therefore, if Parliament fails or is unable to perform its due functions such as representing 
the interests of the population then, it is a waste of resources as people do not get value for 
their money.  
 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections allows the ruling party to amass numbers 
that allows them pass bills without any meaningful challenge by way of debate and vote: 
 
The effect is that at the end of the day they amass the necessary numbers to do what 
they want to do. In 2011 if you check through the numbers it was almost a balanced 
house so much so that there was a lot of enthusiasm, a lot of ummmm,  from 
independent observers including myself that brought real interesting debates to the 
house, that no bill could easily pass through without being ironed and argued out, that 
the government could not easily get away with some of these decisions which are 
sometimes rushed through parliament simply because the government of the day or 
the ruling party has a majority of the numbers (SCO8, 2016). 
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Part of what is lost due to the inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections according this 
participant is the importance of quality debate that leads to improved legislation. When there 
are very few voices challenging bills on the floor of the house so that they are improved or 
even removed if they do not serve the common good is that such bills will just be rushed 
through. Whereas, if there is robust debate and many voices challenging or calling for 
improvements to bills, then the government listens as it would need votes from those MPs. 
Quality debates in the house also has the potential of light on abuse and deficiencies in the 
bills that can sway government to root out abuse and amend bills.  
 
Further, as the participant in the following quote notes, a government that amasses all the 
numbers needed for passage of any legislation cares only to bring bills that favour their 
agenda:  
 
if it is not addressed, then we will find situations where you have a government that 
will not be respecting anything because they will come to the house, and with no 
opposition, pass bills, pass legislation that will just favour them. So this is an issue 
that needs to be looked at (MP9, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections, according to this participant begets lack of 
oversight that goes beyond that of just legislation. Thus inducement begins a long-term 
demise towards corruption and dictatorial rule as government only cares to advance 
legislation in its favour as there is no push back or credible opposition to challenge, check or 
reign in government overreach and abuse of power. 
 
The ruling party’s control of the Legislature made possible by the inducement of floor-
crossing has a negative effect on liberal democracy.  It takes away the oversight role the 
Legislature is supposed to play over the Executive and allows the passage of bills desirable 
to the governing party without substantial parliamentary debate and irrespective of the harm 
it may cause to democracy and to the economic development of the country. The ability to 
change the constitution also has long-term implications that can lead to the further 
centralization of power, thus impacting on liberal democracy into the future. 
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5.3.2   Increased party membership/ support   
 
The inducement of floor-crossing further benefits the ruling parties in that it increases party 
membership. Part of the calculation on the part of the ruling parties is to have control over 
the Legislature; and gain membership and popularity from the floor-crossing opposition’s 
base. After all, political power to govern and executive power is conferred on the basis of the 
number of votes in an election or referendum that a political party or candidates receive. 
‘Politics is about numbers’, the more members and supporters a party gains the better the 
chances it stands to win elections and the right to form government (Rose, 1991).  
 
Every successful candidate contesting the elections to become a Member of Parliament has 
their family, relatives, friends and personal ardent, the die-hard supporters behind them who 
follow and support them irrespective of which party they belong. These are the people a floor-
crossing opposition MP brings to the governing party. Among the reasons that make some 
members of the opposition to follow their MP to the ruling party lies in part due to a political 
culture of belonging, reciprocal networks and communities (Chabal, 2016; Berenschot, 
Nordholt, & Bakker, 2016).  
 
Sometimes the number is significant especially when those targeted happen to be popular and 
influential opposition MPs in their parties and constituencies. Regardless of how significant 
or insignificant their followers are, they are still an addition to a pool of supporters and 
potential voters for the ruling party that increases their chance of victory in elections. 
Hereunder are some quotes from the study that underscore the gain in numbers and 
implications for potential electoral success for the ruling party: 
 
the ruling party benefits because the person leaving the opposition is getting to their 
side. The first thing is that their numbers are bulging, their numbers are getting bigger 
and bigger. At the same time they bring a type of MPs from the opposition with 
qualities they don’t have in the file and rank of their political party (CSO4, 2016). 
 
Opposition MPs have family members, relatives and friends who are close to them that leave 
with them to the ruling party they join through floor-crossing or by-elections: 
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When an MP crosses from the opposition to the ruling party he goes along with his 
family, close friends; that adds numbers to the ruling party. It means on the ruling 
party side they benefit. They are giving themselves more chance of winning even in 
the next elections (E17, 2016).  
 
The opposition Members of Parliament who join the ruling party go with some family 
members, relatives and friends who do out of  is a sense of belonging that, while not 
guaranteed, binds their fates with that of the MP from which their support is based. An MP 
has relationships within a community, that include a core of supporters (family, relatives, 
friends and die-hard supporters) who are connected or bound to him/her through reciprocal 
clientelistic network norms and solidarity (Berenschot, Nordholt, & Bakker, 2016; Chabal,  
2016). The MP and his/her supporters who join the ruling party increase the number of 
members of the ruling party increasing the ruling party’s chances of winning elections.  
 
The ruling party’s chances of winning the next elections as this participant suggests also lies 
in the popularity of the MP, saying: 
 
I think it provides with an advantage in the next election because it can be the case 
that a particular individual might be popular… So, the party in government are 
increasing their numbers but also if they look to the next election then they know that 
the chances of winning are very high because that person is perceived to be popular 
in those areas and it is true in majority of cases (CSO3, 2016). 
 
Opposition MPs who join the ruling party through floor-crossing or by-elections add numbers 
to the ruling party of those who follow them. But, popular opposition MPs who join the ruling 
party bring another level of support on top of the support from their core supporters (family, 
relatives, friends and die-hard supporters) because of the place they hold in the community 
(Chabal, 2016). Popular opposition MPs with whom people identify themselves with and 
have a sense of belonging makes it more likely to vote for them which is a vote for the ruling 
party they may not actually like. 
  
The ruling parties in Zambia’s Third Republic have been inducing floor-crossing and by-
elections in part because it strengthens their parties at the expense of the opposition. The 
strengthening of the ruling party and weakening of the opposition also has a negative impact 
on Parliament – it is weakened. 
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5.4.1 Weakens Parliament 
 
Parliament, the Legislature is one of the three co-equal arms of government.  It is the National 
Assembly where the elected people’s representatives, Members of Parliament, from all the 
constituencies of the Republic of Zambia and those nominated by the President, meet to make 
decisions of national importance after careful examination, scrutiny and debate. Parliament 
legislates by passing bills and oversees the executive branch’s functions such as, ensuring 
equitable national resources, appropriating funds, scrutinising expenditures, and approving 
public debt and international agreements and treaties (Zambia Constitution (Amended) Act 
No. 2 of 2016, Article 63). The government cannot function without the necessary 
authorisation for legislation and resources by Parliament. 
5.4.2 Checks and balances 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections alters the composition of parliament that 
was decided by the electorate during a general election. As already pointed out by some 
interviewees who were participants, in the 2011 general elections, the party that won the 
elections, the Patriotic Front (PF) had almost an equal number of MPs with opposition parties 
but has since increased their numbers as a result of the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections [SCO8, 2016; MP1, 2016].  
 
The candidate who wins the presidential contest during the general elections or presidential 
by-elections becomes the Head of State and Government. He/she has the constitutional 
authority to appoint members of the executive branch he is head of. In order to govern, he 
needs Parliament’s authorization for bills and expenditures. Presidents in Zambia’s Third 
Republic understand the power that the National Assembly holds for, without it, they 
wouldn’t be able to govern. Most of the bills require a simple majority vote by MPs in 
Parliament and a Presidential assent. It is for this reason that, according to this study’s 
findings, successive Presidents in Zambia’s Third Republic, have repeatedly engaged in the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections to have control over the legislature for among 
others, to secure or guarantee passage of whatever bills and decisions they want that require 
parliamentary approval with little or no scrutiny, challenge and accountability. Hereunder, 
are a few selected quotes from the study highlighting the perceptions of participants that this 
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motive is one of the reasons for inducement to join the ruling party: 
First and foremost, they want to control the parliament; when they have controlled 
Parliament whatever bills they want to pass in Parliament they will have the majority 
votes. (E2, 2016).  
According to this participant, one of the reasons that compels the President to induce floor-
crossing or by-elections is to have control of Parliament allowing for passage of any bill the 
government wants. This would not be possible without having the majority vote made 
possible by the majority MPs in the National Assembly. 
 
The ruling party, through the President, induces floor-crossing or by-elections in order to 
have a majority of Members of Parliament. According to these two participants: 
 
the party that is in power always wants to have the majority of MPs and one of them 
is to entice MPs from the opposition to come and join them. Usually, the party that 
wins elections sometimes does not necessarily have the majority of MPs because of 
the number of political parties that we have. So you find that immediately they get 
there they would like also to have the majority after having been voted by the majority 
they would want to also have the majority members of parliament. So they will do 
everything possible to make sure that they entice Members of Parliament from the 
opposition (E11, 2016). 
  
the electoral system we have in Zambia works on the simple majority vote. So when 
the party in government is faced with a crisis on the numbers of MPs they have in the 
house then they decide to induce floor-crossing and by-elections because they want 
to have the majority in the house, so that it becomes very easy for them to pass bills. 
Their main objective is to make sure that they have the majority in Parliament (E6, 
2016). 
 
The lack of winning a majority of seats by the ruling party in the general elections is one of 
the driving force that leads to the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections. Thus, the 
ruling party’s desire to be able to govern effectively without a coalition government is a 
driving motive. 
 
The strength and credibility of parliament in a liberal democracy lie in, but is not limited to, 
its independence from the executive branch of government. The accumulation of all executive 
and legislative powers in an individual (i.e., the President), a group of people or organization 
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(i.e., party) regardless of how it is obtained, even if it is obtained through elections is a path 
to abuse, and undemocratic rule (Madison, 1788). Parliament forms part of a system of checks 
and balances in a liberal democracy aimed at separation of power to guard against arbitrary 
rule, abuse of state power and resources by those to whom the power to govern has been 
given them by the people (Kiiza, 2005; Madison, 1788) 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections, as this study has already established, 
further alters the balance of power in the Parliament in favour of the governing party which 
already controls the executive branch of government. By co-opting opposition Members of 
Parliament into the Executive branch through the offer of cabinet positions that lure them into 
floor-crossing in the first place, the Republican President and the governing party now have 
control over the Executive and Legislative branches of government. This weakens and 
strengthens the opposition and ruling party respectively; allows the executive branch of 
government to have control over the legislature. The control of the legislature by the very 
hands that control the executive undermines one of the fundamental principles that underpin 
liberal democracy, separation of powers that ensures a system of checks and balances 
(Madison, 1877). A weak parliament that is controlled by the executive cannot offer 
meaningful oversight over the branch it is supposed to supervise. Parliament’s supervisory 
role over the executive is seriously hamstrung, thereby undermining the system of checks and 
balances. As noted by one interviewee in the study: 
we have spoken very clearly and we have been against floor crossing in Zambia for a 
very simple reason that one, it is very costly but also two, it weakens our democracy. 
When you want to understand the doctrine of separation of powers and because of the 
floor crossing we have seen the separation of powers become so weakened in the 
country so much that some people have questioned whether parliament is effective 
and if it actually keeps the necessary checks and balances on the executive aspect and 
proper functioning of democracy (SCO5, 2016). 
 
 
5.4.3 Control of Parliament by the executive (governing party)  
 
Parliament has an important supervisory responsibility of representing the people’s views 
and interests and, on their behalf, holding government, the executive, accountable; 
scrutinizing expenditure so as to expose and prevent waste, abuse and misuse of power and 
national resources (Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2008; Diefenbaker, 1949). It is the 
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people’s house where their representatives (MPs) regardless of which political party they hail 
from are supposed to make decisions through the votes they cast in support of, or in 
opposition to, motions moved in the house, in the best interests of the people they represent 
(their constituencies) and the country at large. 
While MPs are expected to consider and be guided by the views, interests and wellbeing of 
the people they represent in their deliberations and voting, they also take into consideration 
the views and positions of the political parties they come from. The MPs from the party in 
power almost always support all the decisions of the executive. They are driven by loyalty to 
their party and the desire to implement programs based on the manifesto they campaigned on 
during the run up to the elections. But they are also motivated by the desire for appointment 
as Minister or Deputy Minister, positions that offer executive power, access, privileges, 
allowances and better pay (Hobbes, 2013). They want to be in good standing with the 
President so as to stand a chance of future appointment into the cabinet or maintain their 
positions if they are already serving in cabinet. Likewise, the opposition MPs are almost 
always critical of the ruling party in parliament; engage in robust debates and scrutiny of bills 
presented by the ruling party in parliament. But the moment the once vocal opposition MPs 
cross the floor and take up a cabinet position they cease being critical and turn into 
unconditional supporters of whatever bills the ruling party proposes.  
In a healthy, strong and independent parliament, bills are supposed to be scrutinised, 
challenged and made better for the benefit and good of the people and the country at large. 
On the other hand a weak parliament compromised by the control of the executive through 
the inducement of floor-crossing becomes nothing more than a rubberstamp, part of or an 
extension of the executive. The co-opted opposition MPs together with the governing party 
MPs turn parliament into a rubberstamp that robs Parliament of its oversight role, as their 
loyalty as ‘clients’ lies with the President as ‘patron’ to maintain positions; and for ordinary 
MPs, the possibility of being appointed in the future (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984).  
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections turns Parliament into nothing more than a 
rubberstamp. According to this participant,   
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floor crossing diminishes accountability; it also allows for making laws in such a way 
that they do not take into account the divergence within parliament. So in a way, floor 
crossing has maintained the culture of one dominating party thereby making 
parliament a rubber stamp (SCO6, 2016). 
 
Parliament is supposed to be a place where bills presented either by the ruling party or 
opposition are subjected to debate and scrutiny. This process is designed to ensure that bills 
that get to pass speak to or serve the majority and not just narrow interests of a few. The 
inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections on the other hand ensures that Parliament does 
not get to play its right role of oversight but one where bills moved by the executive are all 
but guaranteed to pass. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections makes Parliament irrelevant and a waste of 
resources because it does not perform its real function. Here is what one interviewee said to 
that,  
  
I don’t think our parliament is relevant we are just wasting our resource to sustain an 
institution that does not represent the interests of the people. It’s just a club and a 
ritual that we continue to support and it doesn’t really make sense to anybody because 
what goes on at parliament could be done by cabinet alone without coming to 
parliament. Because even if they do it what they do to parliament simply is a 
formality. There is nowhere in the history of the records I have read where I have 
found that our Zambian parliament has rejected a law or better more budget from the 
executive all the years they always pass what the government or the executive want 
no matter how bad it is. That’s what tells you that we are actually misplacing our 
resources on the people's parliament (SCO6, 2016). 
 
The true worth of any institution such as Parliament has to be measured by whether it lives 
up to its core functions. One of the core functions of Parliament is to, on behalf of the people 
they represent, legislate or make laws. The failure of Parliament to make good laws or 
legislate against bad conduct such as corruption is double huge loss to the country. This is so 
because, tax payers’ money used to run Parliament as an institution that fails to carry out its 
core functions is in itself a waste of state resources as people (tax payers) do not get value for 
their money.  
 
The failure by Parliament to pass legislation such as was the case with the rejection of the 
popular recommendations for appointment of cabinet ministers outside Parliament; and the 
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mixed member proportional representation (Munalula, 2016), adds a second layer of cost or 
loss for tax payers. These two popular amendments would have done away with the costly 
and unnecessary by-elections caused by the appointment of ministers from among MPs or 
death of a serving MP costing approximately US$1.4 million per parliamentary by-election 
(Motsamai & Chipenzi, 2013). And freed from any desire of serving as Ministers because of 
the would-have-been constitutional barrier for appointment of MPs as Ministers, MPs, from 
the opposition and the ruling party would perhaps be motivated to do their only job they were 
elected for. In so doing, they would hold members of the executive branch of government, 
thereby saving tax payers money that would have been lost through corruption and abuse of 
state resources by those who hold high public office. 
 
The lack of oversight over the executive by Parliament allows some in government to engage 
in corruption that makes the country even lose more money on top the expenditures on the 
National Assembly itself. According to the Financial Intelligence Centre (2018) the 
Government of the Republic of Zambia lost ZMW 4.9 Billion through among others public 
procurement corruption by holders of public office. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections, according to one participant, also 
deprives the country of critical objective thinking, analysis and evaluation that makes public 
institutions moribund. The participant states that,   
   
because of the crossing of the floor there is a lack of critical thinking, lack of critical 
analysis, there is a lack of objective evaluation or performance of public institutions 
including the government itself. So you will end up with institutions which are 
supposed to critique singing praises (laughs) of the powers that be. To some extent 
people have argued we have moribund institutions moribund powers, moribund 
judicial powers that may be taken … (laughs) it’s because of the weakened democracy 
(CSO8, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections results in a weak Parliament. The 
consequences of a weak Parliament renders decisions that are proposed by those in the 
executive simply pass through the house for approval without being meaningfully challenged 
and scrutinized. The bad decisions and lack of accountability and critical thinking associated 
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with easy passage and lack of checks and balances has a domino effect on other important 
state institutions citizens rely on.  
 
Institutions such as the judiciary upon which people rely on for settling of disputes; the 
Zambia Police Service upon which people rely on for equal application of the law and 
protection; and the Electoral Commission of Zambia upon which people rely on for a fair and 
even playing field in the management of the electoral process are compromised. The ability 
to discharge their responsibilities fairly and impartially to citizens according to the dictates 
of the law are impaired due to the political interference brought about by the concentration 
of government power of supposedly co-equal branches of government in the same hands of 
people. For example, four Zambia Police officers were fired or “retired in the national 
interest” by the Police Service Commission acting on behalf of the President of the Republic 
of Zambia, in the aftermath of the electoral violence in a Parliamentary by-election in 
Sesheke, Zambia. These four Police officers were relieved of their duties for allegedly beating 
up machete-armed ruling party cadres (Chisenga & Mbulo, 2019). This in return makes the 
Zambia Police Service moribund as individual police officers fear to arrest members of the 
ruling party for fear of losing their jobs. This makes true what Madison (1787) said, that 
tyranny, results from such.  
 
It affects good governance, public institutions, and democracy. It leads to loss of trust and 
cynicism by citizens in the institution of parliament that is supposed to be a place where their 
voices and interests are heard, defended and upheld. Citizens question the wisdom of 
spending huge sums of money in maintaining a branch of government that is in practice part 
of the executive as its loyalty lies with the President (executive). 
 
5.5.1 Electorates 
 
Elections are one of the defining features of a healthy democracy. They are a process through 
which the people, exercising their sovereignty, either as candidates contest for power as 
people’s representatives or as voters choose their own representatives to form a government. 
“A government of the people, by the people and for the people” (Lincoln, 1863), is not even 
possible without elections. The people (electorate) are at the centre of any democratic 
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governance, and those who are elected to hold power do so as the people’s representatives; 
holding power on their behalf.  The people, are the ones that confer power on an individual/s 
or party, to form a government through free and fair elections.  
Every five years, Zambia holds tripartite/ general elections (Zambia Constitution (Amended) 
Act No. 2 of 2016 Article 56) during which the people as sovereigns vote for their Members 
of Parliament from different political parties and independent candidates too. The outcome 
of free and fair elections in a democracy should be respected precisely because it is an 
expression of the will of the people. 
5.5.2 Violation of the people’s sovereignty 
 
The findings in this dissertation indicate that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections is a violation of the will and sovereignty of the people as expressed in the outcome 
of a free and fair election. Save for the fact that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections is orchestrated without regard to the electorate, it changes the expressed will of the 
people who voted for a particular candidate or party, in no less measure based on the party 
ticket or platform on which they contested the elections.  
The voting pattern in Zambia indicates that while personal qualities of candidates are no less 
important in influencing the people’s decision making, the electorate tends to consider more 
than not to vote for candidates based on the party they support or identify with (Erdmann, 
2007). And ballot papers do not only show the names and photos of candidates contesting 
parliamentary elections but they also clearly show the names and symbols of political parties 
candidates stand on for election to Parliament. For some voters, when they have the ballot 
paper in the voting booth, the only the only thing they are looking for is the symbol of the 
party and not the name or photo of the candidate  they want to vote for. Figure 5 is a picture 
of a ballot showing the party names and symbols as well as the photos and names of 
candidates that help to guide voters in choosing who to vote for. 
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Figure 5: 2014 National Assembly By-Election Ballot Paper 
Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia, in Phiri (2016, April 22) 
The study found that self-interest is at the centre of the consideration by the MPs crossing the 
floor, and at the expense of the needs of the people, the voters. The regard for their own self-
interest is what drives the MPs to cross the floor and not the good of the people who made it 
possible for them to be MPs through their support and votes (Matlosa and Shale, 2007; Patel, 
2008; Smith, 1777). This arbitrary disregard for the electorates’ choice and interests by the 
MPs who cross the floor or cause by-elections makes the voters angry and frustrated. There 
is a sense that once a candidate has been voted into power as an MP, the electorate is then 
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treated as mere spectators as an MP can makes decisions such as crossing the floor or causing 
a by-election for his/ her own benefit without any regard for them.  
Politicians are seen not only as interested in their personal self-enrichment and not there to 
serve the interests of those that sent them to parliament but also as abusing the trust placed in 
them. This, according to the findings of this dissertation, makes the electorate angry and 
frustrated. Some of the interviewees expressed this perception clearly. One said,  
 
It violates their mandate because these MPs were elected on a particular party ticket, 
and usually when crossing, they don’t even conduct any form of consultation with the 
electorates. They just cross at will without consulting; and so it has ended up violating 
the trust and actually abused the voters’ trust… (E15, 2016). 
 
The inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections alters the outcome of 
general elections held every five years. This being primarily a result of a patron-client 
relationship entered into between the President and the MPs for their own benefit leaves out 
(ignores) the voters on whose mandate they (MPs) were elected to the National Assembly 
(Scott, 1974). The electorate do not just lose trust in politics but also feel abused as MPs once 
elected on a party platform of their choice feel free to abandon it in pursuit of power and 
opportunities that come with cabinet appointments. 
 
Apart from the loss of trust, the study found that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections leads to frustration and loss of representation for the electorate, saying: 
 
Yes they are spectators but they also play a role in that they become frustrated and 
also they lose representation because now instead of speaking on behalf of the people 
on the promise of what you are elected for, you begin to defend the ruling party. So 
actually that MP loses legitimacy. He begins to abandon the aspirations of the people 
that put him in that office. So that’s why they become angry and disgruntled. And 
also begin to stop trusting politicians. One of the problems is that it has led to a lot of 
mistrust for politicians. Most of the voters now think that politicians have no 
principles, they have no integrity; they are corrupt. So, it has actually dented the image 
of politicians and MPs (MP1, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections by their elected MPs for whom they voted 
in part due to the party affiliation leads to frustration because of loss of representation. The 
electorate view politicians as being without principles and just opportunistic self-interested 
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people with little regard for the wellbeing of the electorate who elevated them to the office 
of Member of Parliament.  
The concerned MPs gain executive power, access and privileges in the bargain for loyalty to 
the President, while the people lose a voice and power vested in the person (MP) they elected 
as their representative to speak on their behalf and hold government accountable to them 
(Lekalake, 2017). The MPs shift/transfer their loyalty and support from the people and party 
upon whose platform and support they were elected into Parliament as the people’s 
representatives in their respective constituencies to the President to whom they now become 
accountable. Whereas the people use votes to earn loyalty from the person they elect as their 
representative, tax payers’ money, the people’s money in the form of a salary, allowances 
and entitlements, are used to buy off their representative’s loyalty to the President (CSO6, 
2016). This leads to frustration, anger, cynism and voter aparthy.  
5.5.3 Voter cynicism and apathy 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing leads the electorate to resentment, anger and loss of trust 
that leaves them cynical and apathetic about politics and participation. The perception that 
politicians will say anything to earn their votes on the pretext that they seek to champion and 
work for the good of their people is nothing but a stepping stone to achieve their own selfish 
ambitions. This affects their desire for participation in the political processes such as 
elections. It leads to voter apathy as people see no need of voting for people that cannot be 
trusted and have no respect for the sacrifices they make to have them elected. As one 
interviewee claimed, 
    
the moment you cross floor you are dampening the morale of your supporters… So, 
that creates voter apathy that creates mistrust towards elected leaders by the 
electorates who feel like these people want to use us so that they get money from the 
government (CSO2, 2016). 
 
This phenomenon of floor-crossing and by-elections inducement makes these elected MPs, 
the people’s reprentatives, become perceieved as more interested in securing their own 
economic comfort and enrichment without regard to the mandate for which they were elected. 
They become viewed as opportunists who dupe them into voting for them thinking their 
loyalty would be to them. Contrary to what MPs are supposed to be, being responsive and 
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accountable to the people, the electorate, they become responsive and answerable to the 
appointing authority, the President. As opposed to being servants of the people, they now 
become servants of the president at whose mercy and pleasure they now serve in the cabinet 
in exchange for financial/ economic security.  
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections makes the electorate to lose interest in the 
elections and perceive participation as waste of time. According to one interviewee, 
 
 People begin to shun participating in elections. They think going to vote for these 
guys is a waste of time; they will stay away. And you had experiences where for 
example one thousand people had voted in the next time that elections are held, maybe 
one hundred people or even less than the initial people that had voted or cast their 
votes. So this has negatively impacted on the interest of the voters to be able to vote 
for these candidates (E15, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections makes the electorate become cynical 
about politics. They lose trust in politicians and the political process, making them question 
the importance of their participation because they have seen that once politicians have been 
voted into parliament, people don’t seem to matter any more as MPs can decide arbitrarily, 
in pursuit of power, financial/ economic gains and security. This loss of trust leads to a loss 
of interest in the electoral process ultimately leading to voter apathy. 
Voter apathy diminishes one of the foundations of democracy, majoritarian rule. It allows the 
minority who participate in the elections to make decisions for the majority as opposed to 
having a majority-based rule and decision making (Bannon, 2003). This undermines trust in 
the political institutions that are supposed to regulate and process conflict, and raises the 
possibility that politics might start to take place outside of the formal institutions. 
 
5.6   Summary 
 
This chapter discussed presented and discussed four ways in which the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections undermines multi-party politics and liberal democracy in Zambia’s 
Third Republic. That it weakens and in some cases can lead to the destruction of the 
opposition viability and ability to check the party in power through oversight in the National 
Assembly. On the other hand it strengthens the ruling party to the extent that it has no need 
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for consensus building and thereby creating a quasi-one-party state by de facto. The 
consequences of the weakening of the opposition and strengthening of the ruling party 
weakens Parliament as an independent co-equal branch of government that can provide 
checks and balances to the Executive. Further, the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections is a violation of the electorates as sovereigns on whose behalf MPs hold power that 
makes them cynical and apathetic in voting. 
 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections negatively impacts on liberal democracy 
as it leads to the  arbitrary change of the balance of power in the Legislature without the 
consent of the party and the electorate under whose support and votes MPs were elected to 
the National Assembly. It weakens, and in some cases destroys, opposition parties rendering 
them incapable of challenging the incumbent and providing horizontal accountability in its 
provision of checks and balances in the Legislature. The system of checks and balances 
anchored on the principle of separation of powers in democratic governance is undermined 
by putting the control of the Legislature, which is supposed to be independent, in the hands 
of the same people and party controlling the Executive branch of government. It undermines 
the people’s trust in politics and government leading to cynicism and apathy among the 
electorate making possible the rule of the minority over the majority which is antithetical to 
democracy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE EFFECTS OF THE INDUCEMENT OF FLOOR-CROSSING AND BY-
ELECTIONS ON PEACE 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and discusses data on the impact of the inducement of parliamentary 
floor-crossing and by-elections on peace in Zambia’s Third Republic. The analysis of data 
collected in the study shows that the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-
elections is a source of anger, division, antagonism and hostility within political parties, 
between political parties and between the electorate and politicians that leads to conflict. 
 
As defined by transformation theorists, a conflict is the clash of mutually incompatible ideas, 
interests or goals being pursued by people, groups or states (Galtung, 2009; Austin, 
Giessmann, & Jäger, 2012). According to the concept of conflict transformation, conflict 
arises from some identifiable injustice, inequity, asymmetry, mistrust and unfairness within 
a given social, cultural, political or economic context or framework (Martinelli and Almeida 
1998; Sheehan 2014). 
 
This chapter presents and discusses how this conflict is experienced by the electorate the 
opposition parties and the ruling parties; and how it has a bearing on political conflicts and 
electoral violence that have come to characterise politics and elections in Zambia’s Third 
Republic.  
 
6.2.1   Electorate: Loss of trust/faith  
 
As the previous chapter has shown, the inducement of floor-crossing has a negative impact 
on democracy and affects the electorate in ways that lead them to be cynical and apathetic 
about politics and participation. This is a result of the loss of trust and faith in politics as 
representatives seem to be more interested in self-enrichment, entitlements and power once 
elected as MPs.  Elections in a liberal democracy are about trust being put into the hands of 
individuals to exercise it on their behalf. Members of Parliament likewise are entrusted with 
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power from the people as lawmakers as well as to provide checks and balances in the 
Legislature on their behalf so that government doesn’t abuse power (Duncan, 2017).  
 
Candidates who get elected to Parliament during the general elections are a product of a proud 
hard-won effort, support and sacrifice of their parties and the electorate, some of which are 
party members while others are not. Regardless of party affiliation, all candidates seeking the 
people’s mandate to be their representative make a promise or pledge to be loyal and at the 
service of the people. They pledge to represent the electorate in the National Assembly; to 
champion their causes. The electorate, therefore, have an expectation that their MPs will be 
responsive and answerable to them and keep their campaign promises they were voted into 
office.  
 
The inducement of floor-crossing on the other hand, as this study has already established, 
runs counter to that expectation that leads to loss of trust in those MPs entrusted with the 
power they hold on the electorate’s behalf. This leads the electorate to more than just being 
cynical and apathetic. It makes them angry, resentful and discontented at being (ab)used and 
cheated by the floor-crossing MPs who are supposed to be servants of those on whose behalf 
they hold power. Hereunder are a selected few quotes expressing the anger, frustration and 
discontent at the abuse felt by the electorate.  
 
The electorate become angry and discontented at their Members of Parliament in the 
inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections. One of the interviewees described the anger 
and discontent, saying: 
there is a lot of anger and discontent that is created by the voters. Here are the voters 
who put in so much to make sure this particular Member of Parliament is voted on 
this political party and soon or later he crosses without consultation. And so there is 
anger that builds up and usually, violence has erupted and some of these MPs have 
actually been threatened with beatings if they ever went back to constituencies where 
they came from. So it is mainly being a source of conflict (E16, 2016).  
 
The anger and discontent felt by the electorate emanates from the perceived betrayal of trust 
and lack respect by the elected MPs who choose to induce floor-crossing or by-election. 
Parliamentary candidates who seek the people’s mandate in an election on a given political 
party platform are in part, elected as MPs based on their party affiliation. A change of party 
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affiliation or loyalty through floor-crossing or by-elections before end of the five year term 
generates anger and discontent among the electorate which is a source of conflict.   
 
Further, the findings from the study indicate that the electorate lose trust in the concerned MP 
who cross the floor or induce a by-election; they also become frustrated by the perceived loss 
of representation. The following quote from one interviewee highlights the perceived loss of 
trust and representation and the ensuing frustration by the electorate, saying, 
they become frustrated and also they lose representation because now instead of 
speaking on behalf of the people on the premise of what you are elected for, you begin 
to defend the ruling party. So actually that MP loses legitimacy. He begins to abandon 
the aspirations of the people that put him in that office. So that’s why they become 
angry and disgruntled. And also begin to stop trusting politicians. One of the problems 
is that it has led to a lot of mistrust for politicians. Most of the voters now think that 
politicians have no principles, they have no integrity; they are corrupt. So, it has 
actually dented the image of politicians and MPs (MP1, 2016). 
 
The perceived loss of representation by the electorate thay had voted for themselves, based 
on what they perceive to be out of selfish and corrupt motives leads to frustration and anger. 
The realisation that an MP they voted into office can change allegiance from the opposition 
party they were elected on to the ruling party based on a high paying cabinet position fuels 
the anger and frustration among the electorate. The interest the electorate have in having their 
area MP representing their interests in the National Assembly is lost as their MP now becomes 
a defender and supporter of the government of the day as opposed to holding government 
accountable on their behalf. This puts the interests of the the electorate and those of their MP 
at variance resulting in a conflict. 
 
Another important finding from the study concerning the inducement of floor-crossing or by-
elections by MPs as peceived by the electorate is that it does not do justice or honour the 
sacrifices born by them (electorate) to get them (MPs) elected to the National Assembly. The 
decision to cross the floor or cause a by-election by an MP is personal, often without due 
regard for the electorate and their sacrifices:   
 
So the electorate is disappointed because I make an individual decision for myself at 
the expense of the electorate. The electorates are punished heavily. During the 
campaign time, they are told a lot of lies, a lot of promises are made which are not 
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fulfilled. Secondly, the environment in which our elections take place is very pathetic. 
The electorate walk long distances abandon their fields, they abandon their animals, 
they abandon their ordinary work…business comes to a standstill. So why should 
somebody make such a personal decision (E14, 2016)? 
 
In a country like Zambia where people are subjected to high levels of poverty and economic 
hardships, political campaigns during the general elections and induced by-elections come at 
a very high cost to them. The electorate during campaigns invest their scarce precious time 
and resources, putting their own needs and lives on hold believing the candidates they are 
supporting and voting for, based on their promises will honour their pledge. In part, 
candidates get the people’s votes on the basis or hope that they are trustworthy and would 
deliver on their campaign promises once elected. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is perceived as an abuse and betrayal of 
the trust and faith that people place in those they have elected as their representatives. During 
the general elections, candidates seek the mandate to be the people’s representatives on a 
given political party platform/s or as independents and also on a set of promises; and the 
understanding that they seek power for the benefit, service and good of the electorate.  
 
Once elected, however, MPs through the inducement of floor-crossing, arbitrarily change the 
will of the people as expressed in the outcome of the general election. This is done in pursuit 
of opportunities that come with an appointment in the cabinet. This disregard and lack of 
respect for the people’s will in pursuit of power and self-interest by their elected 
representatives make people apathetic and cynical about politics and democracy as it goes 
against the very definition of democracy which is rule by the people (Dahl, 2017; Ober, 2008; 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011). It further makes them angry as they feel abused by 
politicians who seek their votes ostensibly as servants, clients and representatives of the 
people to whom they should be subordinated.    
 
The perceived abuse created by this phenomenon leads to a conflict between the electorate 
and their representatives. This conflict is generated by the anger over being cheated and used 
by the people they voted for. There is a sense of injustice, cheating and being duped by 
politicians who claim to be what they are not and think that once elected as MPs, the people 
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who elected them become irrelevant for the duration of their term. The arbitrary disregard 
and shift in loyalty and allegiance from the electorate and the party on whose platform and 
support they were elected as MPs to the new patron, the President and governing party leads 
to a conflict as it makes the electorate feel angry over what they consider to be unfair and an 
injustice (Martinelli and Almeida 1998). It makes people angry, as they feel abused and 
cheated by politicians for whom they would have endured and sacrificed so much to get them 
elected; and then having been abandoned in pursuit of trappings of power, comfort, better 
remuneration, benefits and opportunities that cabinet positions offer (Blau, 1964; Eisenstadt 
and Roniger 1984; Hobbes, 2013; Piattoni, 2004).   
 
During general elections, political parties, apart from independents, put forward their 
preferred candidates to compete for parliamentary seats on their party platform. The parties, 
their members and supporters invest their time, and scarce resources to ensure that their 
preferred party’s candidate wins. Though candidates’ personal attributes matter, seats are 
won in large measure; sometimes in all measure due to the popularity of the party that 
sponsored them in addition to the human, financial and material support received. In Zambia, 
voters tend to vote for candidates based on their party affiliation and not just on the strength 
or quality of a candidate. 
 
6.2.2   Electorate: Abuse and waste of resources 
 
The Zambian economy, in Sub-Sahara Africa, is among the worst with high levels of poverty 
at 58% of Zambia’s 16.6 million (2015) population earning less than $1.90 per day below the 
international poverty line compared to 41% across Sub-Saharan Africa (The World Bank, 
2019). The majority of the Zambian population is subjected to insufficient health and social 
services, lack of access to basic necessities of life and employment (Saasa and Carlsson, 
2002). The administration of elections in a country like Zambia, a highly indebted, least 
developed and poor country (Burnell, 2000) is very expensive, costing the country around 
US$1.4 million per parliamentary by-election (Motsamai and Chipenzi 2013).  
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In a poor country like Zambia, the idea of inducement of floor-crossing and unnecessary by-
elections that follow costs the country so much in the aftermath of the expensive general 
elections doesn’t sit well with the people.  
 
According to this study’s findings, the lack of appreciation for the waste of resources by the 
governing party that induces floor-crossing and by-elections; and the opposition MPs that 
accept to be co-opted is a source of conflict in the country that negatively affects peace. One 
of the primary reasons why the electorate become angry and resentful over these politicians 
is the fact that it is an abuse and waste of their resources all for the selfish benefit of politicians 
as by-elections don’t come cheap and are not for their well-being. Resources that should be 
used for economic development to make a difference in their lives is wasted for the sake of 
personal ambitions, power, control and wealth for politicians.   
 
One of the overriding perceptions expressed by the interviewees was the indignation felt by 
the electorate over the waste of limited resources on by-elections instead of deploying them 
to remedy the high levels of poverty afflicting citizens. According to these two interviewees, 
 
It’s a waste of resources… one by-election is closer to about seven million Kwachas 
and in the old currency we are talking of seven billion Kwacha. So the question is 
why should we be wasting resources over a by-election? So resources are being 
wasted and also we have seen that the campaigns themselves cost a lot of money… 
and that also becomes a conflict now with the people because they feel that money is 
being wasted when it is supposed to be used for education, for health, for other 
developmental projects in the community (SCO1, 2016). 
 
It’s not good. I am talking of tax payer’s money that goes to by-elections; that money 
should have gone to build hospitals, to buy medicine in hospitals, to sponsor people 
that may not have a sound financial background within the country (E17, 2016). 
 
The two interviewees express the frustration felt by citizens questioning the wisdom of 
spending scarce resources on unnecessary by-elections when there are no resources for the 
real needs of people in a poor country like Zambia. Tax payers’ money should not be used 
for such self-serving and unnecessary causes when there is no money for services such as in 
health and education. 
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The inducement of by-elections is a drain on the national resources. The scarce resources, tax 
payer’s money which should be used for national development programmes such as health 
and education in the country is instead used to run expensive by-elections for the benefit of 
the very people (politicians) who are privileged. This is considered as unjust and a source of 
anger that is cause of conflict between the electorate and the politicians. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is therefore, perceived as a perpetuation 
of poverty as it takes away national resources from the needy for the benefit of the privileged 
few (politicians). As one interviewee put it:   
The consequences of floor crossing in terms of conflict has been that they have created 
more poverty for people in the sense that money that is not intended for by-elections 
has been taken for by-elections (SCO6, 2016). 
 
The conflict emanating from the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is that it is 
unjust and unfair. It takes away the resources that are supposed to alleviate poverty among 
the majority poor thereby perpetuating rather than reducing it. 
 
The most worrying thing about these induced floor-crossings and by-elections is that 
these people do not care about how much it will cost the treasury, as long as one side 
wins (E10, 2016). 
 
The anger and frustration felt by the people are that despite the full knowledge of how costly 
these induced by-elections are on the country, and how hard life is for citizens because of the 
poor economic status of the country, politicians don’t seem to care. The immediate singular 
most important thing for the ruling party driving them in the inducement of floor-crossing 
and by-elections is control over the Legislature, and for the opposition MPs who are co-opted 
is the cabinet positions and all the executive privileges and entitlements that come with it.  
 
The study found that the use of tax payer’s money, the people’s money, in non-productive 
and wasteful activities such as the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is about the 
management of the scarce resources available in the Zambian economy. One of the 
fundamental environments that breeds conflict is competition over scarce resources 
Ramsbotham, 2010).  
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The fact that politicians have no qualms and hesitation to spend the people’s money 
(taxpayers’) in order gain more political power (ruling parties) and secure more access and 
privileges (opposition floor-crossing MPs) while the government has no money to meet the 
people’s needs and access basic necessities of life makes the electorate angry. The powerful 
feelings of anger, unfairness, injustice and mistrust lead to conflict (Martinelli and Almeida 
1998). Politicians’ quest for power consolidation and access to privileges at the expense of 
ordinary citizens’ quest for a better life leads to conflict.  
 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections by opposition Members of Parliament leads 
to a conflict between the electorate and politicians. This conflict is driven by the feeling of 
injustice, anger and mistrust born of the perceived abandonment of the mandate for which 
and on which the MPs were elected on; and abuse or waste of resources used to conduct 
unnecessary by-elections for the benefit of politicians (Martinelli and Almeida 1998; 
Sheehan, 2014). The electorate expect their MPs to be faithful to the mandate on which they 
were sent to the National Assembly, namely being their representatives, holding government 
accountable so that it (government) serves the people’s interests and protects their rights. 
When opposition MPs cross the floor through the offer of cabinet positions, they are 
perceived as pursuing contradictory and incompatible goals with those of the electorate, on 
which they were elected as they now become defenders of government they are meant to hold 
accountable on their behalf and for their benefit (Galtung, 2009; Austin, Giessmann, & Jäger, 
2012). 
 
6.3 Intra-party Conflicts 
 
The findings of the study show that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is a 
source of intra-party conflicts. Members of the affected parties especially those in the 
opposition experience discontent, divisions, mistrust and fights. In the opposition parties, 
they feel betrayed and abused by the floor-crossing MPs, while in the ruling party, they 
consider them opportunists who take away what loyal members deserve.  
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6.3.2 Opposition Perceptions: Betrayal of trust, sacrifice and support  
 
In Zambia’s Third Republic, the voting patterns indicate that candidates who contest elections 
in areas or regions where their party is popular are more likely than not to win as compared 
to those who contest in areas where their party is not popular. The popularity of a party in a 
given constituency (area or region), subject to other considerations, often determines the 
winner. A Member of Parliament wins a seat, in no small measure, due to the party platform 
and support (Erdmann, 2007).  
 
The expectation on the part of political parties in return for placing their MPs on the party 
platform in the elections is that they will be loyal to their party and the people who laboured, 
endured and sacrificed to make it possible for them to win the seat. The party selects a 
candidate through a party process, pours in resources, mobilises its membership and 
supporters, and drums up support for the candidate. They do all that with the expectation that 
if they win the seat, they will be loyal and represent the party and the people who sent them 
to parliament.  
 
Political parties, members and their supporters have a self-interest in wanting their MP to be 
supportive of their ideas, ideals and views in Parliament, and to contribute towards the 
wellbeing of the party and the people they represent (Hindmor, 2010). All that is lost when 
MPs cross the floor to another party as they now change their loyalty to another. The MPs 
that cross the floor become trapped in a different patron-client relationship by which they are 
required to shift their loyalty and support to the President and his party (the ruling party) in 
return for the power and privileges that come with cabinet position appointment (Eisenstadt 
and Roniger, 1984; Piattoni, 2004; Blau, 1964). 
 
The seats (MPs) mean so much to opposition political parties as they are a product born of 
endurance, sacrifice and hard work. So they don’t take the loss of their seats (MPs) lightly 
and kindly especially through induced floor-crossing and by-elections. They react with anger 
towards the concerned MPs for betrayal. The MPs that cross the floor or cause by-elections 
are considered as traitors and opportunists who are in some cases not only insulted and called 
names but threatened with lynching by disappointed party members and supporters who voted 
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for them owing to among others, their party affiliation. It creates an atmosphere of tension, 
mistrust, division and sometimes even violence towards the MPs and their supporters within 
the opposition in their constituency that undermines peace.  
 
The following quote from one interviewee underscores the sense of betrayal and anger felt 
by the party that loses MPs due to floor-crossing or by-elections and the division and conflict 
it precipitates within the opposition that at times results in violence: 
 
on the opposition we see also a lot of the antagonism. The ones that have crossed the 
floor now become a problem – yah, you find that now the one that has crossed the 
floor, now becomes a rebel member of parliament. It means that he cannot now go 
and mingle with the people he is claiming to represent. You will find that within the 
constituency there is division and clashes between those that are opposed with him 
and those that have remained with him (CSO1).  
 
Political parties and their supporters and members vote for candidates selected by their party 
for Member of Parliament with the assumption that they would be loyal to the electorate and 
the party on whose support and platform they were sent to the National Assembly. The sudden 
change of party and allegiance from the party they were elected on triggers feelings of 
resentment and betrayal by some party members. This leads to intra-party division and 
conflict in the opposition in the constituency the MP hails from between some party members 
and those party members such as family, relatives, close friends and die-hard supporters of 
the MP. 
 
An MP who crosses the floor changes party allegiance and loyalty and so do those within the 
opposition who choose to endorse or support him/her.  On one hand, those angered by their 
area MP will direct their anger and hostility towards their MP and those defending him/her 
from within the opposition. The opposition party members who during the general elections 
and aftermath were united in support of their MP are now divided into two camps pursuing 
goals that are not compatible (Galtung, 2009; Austin, Giessmann, & Jäger, 2012). The goal 
pursued by one group is to oppose the MP while the other group’s goal will be to defend and 
support the MP. The antagonism and hostility that ensue from this conflict sometimes lead to 
violent clashes between the two groups within the opposition that further destabilises and 
weakens it (opposition party).  
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The crossing of the opposition Members of Parliament to the ruling party through 
appointment into cabinet without consent from their party starts off a conflict between the 
opposition and the ruling party. According to one interviewee, 
 
usually these quarrels we see in the political parties are basically created by bitterness 
started by political parties whose members have been poached. So the political system 
becomes unstable; instability starts and this is why even those who have been 
appointed they start in disparaging their political parties on whose tickets they are 
serving. So that is the cause of confusion, that is the cause of conflict and that 
threatens the stability of the political system and the peace of the country because 
when this person goes somewhere or maybe in his consistency members would want 
to even lynch them for betraying them (CSO2, 2016). 
 
The crossing of the floor by opposition MPs to the ruling party ultimately leads to instability 
in the political system that required a strong and vibrant opposition. It equally affects peace 
in their respective parties and in the country as opposing camps both within the parties and 
between them. 
  
6.3.3    Threat to the opposition’s viability and existence   
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is perceived as a threat to the opposition 
parties’ viability and existence. It reduces the human capital and capacity of the opposition 
by targeting some of their most high-raking and capable leaders that does not just reduce the 
numbers in the opposition but also leaves a leadership vacuum. It also leaves a trail of 
confusion, mistrust, tension and instability in the opposition as a rift or divide ensues between 
those supporting the floor-crossing MP and those opposed to it; and in some cases leads to 
splits in the party (Momba, 2007; Simutanyi, 2005). This division demoralizes the rank and 
file of the party who question the value of voting for politicians who can switch their loyalty 
without rank and file consent once they become MPs.  
 
In some cases it has led to permanent divisions in some opposition parties and in others has 
led to their complete demise. Opposition political parties from whom MPs have crossed to 
the ruling party have become plagued by divisions that have made them weak. In some cases, 
as the following two interviewees illustrate, the inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections 
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does not just lead to the loss of membership but can also lead to the destruction of the affected 
opposition political parties. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is a threat to the viability and existence of 
the opposition. This two interviewees make an example of the Heritage Party about how it 
was destroyed through floor-crossing and by-elections, saying:   
 
Of Course they lose members, they lose membership… if you recall in the 2001 
elections, we had a political party called the Heritage Party (HP) which had, I think, 
five MPs, and (President) Levy Mwanawasa appointed all of them into government, 
and that was the end of that political party in terms of being effective on the ground. 
So, he poached all the Heritage Party members and Brigadier General Godfrey 
Miyanda (Heritage Party president) remained without a member of parliament. And 
henceforth he has never produced a member. So, they weakened that party which had 
life---if those members of parliament had remained in parliament and continued to 
advance the policies and the programs of the Heritage Party (SCO2, 2016). 
 
And they can actually use this floor-crossing by enticing these MPs to finish them. 
There are some political parties which were actually completely annihilated in this 
country. For example, the Heritage Party. They had 4 MPs in 2001. Before the next 
elections, they had no MPs. They were all enticed by the ruling party, and that was 
the end of the political party. From that time, they have never won a seat, not even a 
councillor. A political party that was promising was completely destroyed (MP2, 
2016). 
 
The once new and vibrant party, HP, now exists in name only. It was destroyed due to the 
loss of their MPs through floor-crossing to the ruling party. The HP was now left without its 
most influential members, the MPs who could have been the face of the party inspiring others 
to want to join it.  
 
The destruction of the opposition parties through inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections does not just negatively affect the opposition.  According to tone interviewee, 
 
The effect of floor-crossing on the opposition is that some opposition political parties 
go into extinct, meaning that they will cease to exist. And that becomes a threat to 
democracy because democracy cannot survive without the opposition. So other than 
those opposition parties going into extinct, the opposition parties become meaningless 
because they will not be able to perform their functions in a democracy (E6, 2016). 
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Liberal democracy suffers the most when the opposition is destroyed. The opposition play a 
vital role, that of checking the party in power so that it does not abuse power or resources. 
Without a vibrant opposition, no meaningful oversight by the legislature is to be expected. 
 
The loss makes the opposition party, its members and followers become hostile and 
antagonistic towards the concerned MPs and the ruling party. One example of hostility 
opposition MPs experience from members of the party they were elected after crossing the 
floor is that of Hon. Greyford Monde, the then opposition UPND MP for Itezhi-Tezhi 
constituency who was appointed as Deputy Minister under the PF led government without 
approval from his party. As quoted in the media, he said that for working with government, 
“UPND is being hostile to me, they were looking for me so that they can even kill me. Even 
if you see for example the way we operate, as I am working with government… (UPND 
should get rid of HH. (2014, August 25). 
 
Another case involves a UPND opposition MP, Hon. Richwell Siamunene, who had crossed 
to the ruling party the PF and was appointed as Minister of Defense without consent, 
consultation or approval from his party (UPND). He contested the seat in the 2016 general 
elections under the ruling PF party and lost to a UPND candidate. He petitioned the electoral 
outcome on among other grounds that his campaign faced instances of intimidation and 
violence. Though the court did not overturn the electoral outcome, it did however confirm 
based on evidence that, “There is overwhelming evidence that on nomination day, the UPND 
supporters attacked and assaulted PF members who had accompanied the Petitioner to file in 
his nomination” (Richwell Siamunene Vs Gift Sialubalo, 2016, p.65). 
 
This antagonism and hostility impacts inter-party relationships on issues of common ground. 
The MPs who cross the floor or induce by-elections receive a hostile reception and become 
recipients of threats such as beating and verbal abuse in their constituencies. This antagonism 
and hostility within and between political parties are what sets the ground for intra and inter-
party conflicts made manifest in the political and electoral violence that has become all too 
common during the electoral process. 
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6.4. Ruling Party Perceptions: Loss of deserved opportunities  
 
The study found that although the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections benefits the 
ruling party by increasing the number of MPs and weakening the opposition, it comes at the 
cost of internal party cohesion. This is more so among the senior high-ranking members of 
the party such as MPs who are not ministers and their close followers, who feel a sense of 
loss of opportunities that they deserve or have earned.  
 
The senior members of the ruling party, like other human beings and politicians, have goals 
and ambitions for being loyal to the party. Votes, office and policies make them join and be 
loyal to a political party (Desposato, 2006; Heller and Mershon, 2005; Reed and Scheiner, 
2003). These members, especially those that get elected as MPs during the general elections 
are loyal to the party and work as hard as they possibly can to ensure their personal and party 
victory and expect in return to be rewarded by a grateful party and eventually fulfil one of 
their highest aspirations, to gain the position of minister.  
 
The idea of seeing their party reward the very same opposition MPs who during the general 
elections did their very best to ridicule, discredit and destroy their party and members with 
the highest positions in government, is something they find reprehensible. Here are a few 
selected quotes from the study that show the conflict and discontentment that ensue in the 
ranks of the ruling party.   
 
There is a perception by older members that the new members that join the ruling party 
through floor-crossing and by-elections are coming to take positions that should be theirs. 
Two interviewees express this perception saying, 
 
there is a conflict because the founder members of the ruling party believe that people 
that have come are taking their own privileges; again, they resent these people who 
have crossed the floor (SCO6, 2016). 
 
there is no full acceptance of a person coming from another party…like they have 
come to take their positions (MP6, 2016). 
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While the ruling party through the President may bring in new members through cabinet 
appointment from the opposition for the “good” of the party, some older members are filled 
with resentment and anger. Their being passed-by for appointment into cabinet by the 
President makes view the new comers as taking away opportunities that rightly belong to 
them. 
 
This creates discontent among some members of the ruling party who feel that their loyalty 
and support to the party is not appreciated or recognized in preference for strangers. 
According to this interviewee,  
 
There is a lot of discontent…the members who are there feel their space is being 
occupied by the so-called strangers…and that has brought a lot of discontent amongst 
Members of Parliament from the ruling party (E15, 2016). 
 
Discontent among some ruling party Members of Parliament ensue. This is due to their 
expectation that they deserve to be rewarded with such positions by a grateful party for their 
loyalty, service and support to their party.  
 
The new members who come to the ruling party through floor-crossing and by-elections are 
not completely welcome but instead stir resentment and anger that creates infighting within 
the ruling party. One interviewee explained the in-fighting that ensue saying, 
Here is a person who was our enemy and is today our boss. They are not welcome. 
We have seen pronouncements, in-fighting within the ruling party about these new 
entrants, these strangers in the house. They have not been welcomed but they have 
been tolerated because it is the Head of State prerogative and then if I talk too much, 
I will be disciplined (E14, 2016). 
 
This leads to in-fighting within the ruling party. Some members though opt to conceal their 
anger afraid of being punished by the president. Their anger and frustration are rooted in the 
feeling that loyalty and sacrifice to the party, and not opportunism, should be appreciated and 
rewarded through promotion by way of appointment into the cabinet.  
 
Though many senior MPs would be reluctant to voice their anger publicly and show 
disapproval of the President’s actions for fear of being blacklisted or even risking expulsion, 
129 
 
some have been brave enough to vent their frustration and or even resign from the ruling 
party. Even those not brave enough cannot wholeheartedly commit themselves to help grow 
that party as they feel the party doesn't honour their loyalty and sacrifice. It leads some 
members to quietly undermine the party. 
 
The opposition MPs co-opted into the ruling party through the inducement of floor-crossing 
while being seen and called ‘traitors’ by the parties they hail from are seen as and called 
‘opportunists’ by some members of the ruling party. They are regarded as opportunists who 
have no regard and loyalty to the ruling party.. These MPs may be tolerated due to fear of 
backlash from the president but are hated by some members in the ruling party who see them 
as opportunists who only come to “reap where they did not sew” (MP6: 2016; E14, 2016).  
 
6.5.1 Inter-party Conflicts 
 
The study also found that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections undercuts the 
peaceful co-existence and healthy contestation of power in a liberal democracy among 
political parties as it inevitably creates a particular form of conflict that is not ideological or 
policy oriented. The opposition is driven by the view that it is an injustice to the investment 
and sacrifices they made and endured respectively and a threat to their viability and existence. 
The ruling party, on the other hand, consider it perfectly legal as it is not at variance with the 
Zambian constitution. 
 
6.5.2   ‘Theft’ of their seats by the ruling party 
 
Opposition parties view the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections, according to the 
study findings, as a form of theft of their hard-won seats. The common term often used to 
refer to this phenomenon as ‘poaching’ and ‘stealing’. There is a notion that a seat belonging 
to a party after a hard-won contest in the general elections is being taken by another without 
consultation, dialogue, permission or authorization from the owners. This ‘stealing’ or 
‘poaching’ is a source of anger emanating from the perceived ‘unfair’ or ‘unjust’ loss of the 
seat in the form of the MP; and is perceived to be an injustice that starts off a conflict 
(Sheehan, 2014). 
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The loss of a seat (MP) through the inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections brings much 
anger, resentment and frustration to the opposition parties, their members and supporters. 
They feel angry and become agitated in part because, unlike the ruling party that uses state 
resources for campaigns (Baylies and Szeftel, 1997; Burnell, 2001; Rakner and Svasand, 
2004). This is contrary to the electoral code of conduct in Section 107 (3) (1) (b) of the  
Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 which empowers the Electoral Commission to prohibit 
political parties from using “state resources to campaign for the benefit of any political party 
or candidate.” The opposition make heavy investment of their personal hard-earned scares 
resources, to provide transport, food, campaign materials, and reach voters through rallies, 
door-to-door campaigns, radio, newspaper, television and social media to ensure their party 
candidate wins the seat.  
 
Despite the Constitution of Zambia requiring public media: electronic, print, television and 
radio to equally allocate public air time to all political parties’ political broadcasts (Section 
107 (8) (1) of the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016) opposition parties are often denied 
access to public media and have to rely on their own resources (Burnell, 2002; Carter Centre, 
2002; COG, 2011; EU-EOM, 2009; MISA Zambia, 2016). Even for paid for political adverts, 
the public media, Zambia National Broadcasting (ZNBC) refuses to cover the opposition and 
sometimes has to be ordered by the court to do so. In the 2016 general elections, ZNBC had 
to be compelled through a Lusaka High Court order to air a UPND political documentary 
after initially refusing to do so (Court orders ZNBC, 2016).  
 
They endure the hardships that characterize campaigns such as a hostile campaign 
environment including violence in the form of intimidation, threats, beatings, disruptions and 
insults. Opposition parties are often than not on the receiving end of the electoral violence 
aimed at intimidation (Mehler, 2007). They endure many hardships and abuse to ensure that 
their party candidate wins the seat in their respective constituency as their representative in 
Parliament. They do this knowing that without seats in parliament, they risk becoming 
irrelevant if not extinct as they cannot influence decisions, laws, and exercise checks on the 
power of the government.  
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The opposition parties whose Members of Parliament cross the floor to the ruling party or are 
‘poached’ by the ruling party are incensed. Hereunder are a few selected quotes that show 
anger, resentment and hostility the opposition parties feel over the inducement of floor-
crossing and the tension between political parties that ensue. There is tension between the 
opposition parties and the ruling party. The opposition parties that lose MPs resent the ruling 
party as they do not just lose an MP but also the investment they made to win the seat.   
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-election have heightened tension between political 
parties. According to one interviewee, 
 
it has heightened the tension between political parties. Because these are human 
beings who have invested to end up having MPs in the house. I believe that no real 
leader in the political parties would be happy to see his or her MPs crossing the floor, 
no one will celebrate that except those who are receiving (laughs)! So because of that, 
we see the increased tension between some political parties especially those who have 
lost members to the ruling party (CSO8, 2016). 
 
The opposition through their individual members and collectively as a party make critical 
investment in their candidates to ensure they secure as many parliamentary seats as possible. 
They spend their hard earned money, resources, time and energy to garner support for their 
candidates. The loss of an MP through inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections means 
that the opposition lose not only a seat but also all the investment, effort and sacrifices they 
would have made. This is the source of resentment and anger they have towards the ruling 
party. This generates a conflict between the opposition and the ruling party because the 
opposition consider it as an injustice or unfair that the ruling party can take away what they 
got through investment their money, other resources, time and hard work. They actually 
consider it as theft (Sheehan, 2014).   
 
They also lose support from some of its members that follow the MPs and lose a source of 
steady funding the party would have been getting from the levy they have on their MPs 
(Kabemba & Eiseman, 2005; Momba 2005). They also have to contend with the divisions 
and mistrust among their members creating an atmosphere of apathy and cynicism that makes 
their chances of winning future elections much harder. All told, this puts the standing of the 
opposition in a weak and precarious position.   
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The ruling parties induce floor-crossing and by-elections sometimes for the purpose of 
sowing chaos and division or weakening the opposition. It is also the case that inducements 
to cross the floor are driven by lack of sufficient numbers in Parliament from the general 
elections to be able to govern without fear of the opposition making it hard for the ruling 
party to govern the country. Besides, Article 116 of Act No. 2 of 2016 of the Constitution of 
Zambia (Amendment) does not forbid the appointment of opposition MPs with or without 
the consultation, permission or blessing of the party they belong. Regardless of whether they 
just seek sufficient numbers for easy governance or in a desire to weaken the opposition, the 
consequences for the opposition and their perception of the threat and reaction is the same. 
 
6.5.3 Adversarial and antagonistic relationships 
 
In a liberal democracy, political conflicts arising from irreconcilable disagreements based on 
different party interests, objectives and ideologies do not preclude a harmonious existence 
and interaction between political parties (Pondy, 1967; Schmidt and Kochan, 1972; Gurr, 
1980; Bush and Folger, 1994; Skoog, 2015). Indeed such conflicts are healthy in a vibrant 
liberal democracy as parties explore and present different approaches to challenges and socio-
economic problems in society. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections, as the findings of this study suggest, 
engenders a negative political conflict that is destructive. The ruling party’s confrontational 
behaviour of seeking to advance its own interests and objectives that denies the opposition 
from achieving their own objectives produces a destructive political conflict that leads to 
antagonism between political parties (Mack and Snyder, 1957; Fink, 1968; Deutsch, 1973; 
Skoog, 2015).  The opposition responds with indignation to the inducement of floor-crossing 
and by-elections by the ruling party setting off an adversarial and antagonistic relationship 
between the opposition and the ruling party. Harmonious co-existence and contestation for 
power suffer as a result of the perceived injustice (Sheehan, 2014). Political parties who in a 
healthy liberal democracy should be competitors now see each other as enemies.  
 
The common terms, most participants in the study used to describe the nature of the 
relationship that ensues as a result of the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections 
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between the ruling party and the opposition parties are, confrontational, antagonistic, sour, 
adversarial, acrimonious, and enmity. Hereunder are a few selected quotes from the study 
that highlights the nature of the relationship that emerges from the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections far from promoting harmonious and 
peaceful co-existence between political parties, according to this interviewee, it leads to 
acrimonious and antagonistic relationship: 
 
I think that it has brought about a certain sense of antagonism and acrimony, 
accusations and counter-accusations. It has certainly not promoted harmonious 
relations between parties, and it’s a shame really. I think it has worsened relations 
between political parties (CSO3, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections is a source of conflict between political 
parties that goes beyond normal contestation and competition inherent in a liberal democracy. 
The opposition view the inducement of floor-crossing, while not illegal under the 
constitution, but, as an unjust and unfair way of getting seats that sets of a conflict between 
the opposition and the ruling party (Sheehan, 2014). 
 
The conflict that ensue sets a confrontational relationship between the opposition and the 
ruling party. As noted hereunder by one interviewee:  
 
These parties become confrontational, those in the opposition and the ruling. When 
someone gets what you treasure, you begin to hate that person. And if you begin to 
hate that person, at one time given an opportunity, when the opportunity presents itself 
there would be a lot of antagonisms, there would be even a fight. So it has created a 
lot of tension between the two blocks: the party in power and those in the opposition 
(E11, 2016). 
 
The opposition as the aggrieved party, that perceives the ruling party to have stolen their 
prized possession, MPs, become angry and resentful towards the ruling party. The ruling 
party on the hand determined to get as many MPs as possible past general elections argues 
that the President of the Republic is within his/her constitutional authority to appoint any MP 
irrespective of party affiliation. The opposition and the ruling party hold incompatible goals, 
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ideas and views that bring them into a conflict. For the opposition, MPs that stood under their 
party platform and on whose support got into Parliament must for the 5 year period of their 
tenure must remain loyal to the electorate and their party. The ruling party on the other hand 
insist that for as long as it is not illegal under the constitution of the Republic, the President 
can appoint any MP regardless of party affiliation, approval or effect on the opposition. The 
pursuit of mutually irreconcilable and incompatible ideas and goals inevitably result in a 
conflict between the opposition and the ruling party (Galtung, 2009; Austin, Giessmann, & 
Jäger, 2012).   
 
This conflict leads to enmity and strained relations between political parties making it 
extremely hard, according to one interviewee, to agree on anything:  
So the relationship is always strained, such that it’s very difficult to agree on anything 
even on progressive ideas that may come across because of that enmity (E10, 2016). 
 
The conflict between the ruling party and the opposition parties that lose MPs makes the 
possibility of parties peacefully co-existing and working together even on issues where they 
agree on very hard. Political parties develop antagonistic, adversarial and confrontational 
relationships that impacts negatively on their interactions in and outside parliament. The 
enmity between the opposition and the ruling party comes to full manifestation during 
elections and by-elections as they compete against each other for the right to govern. The 
next section on electoral conflicts and violence highlights the nature of conflicts around 
elections the inducement of floor-crossing or by-elections precipitate. 
 
6.6.1   Electoral Conflicts and Violence 
 
The study findings reveal that conflicts and violence have become some of the most alarming 
common features of elections in Zambia’s Third Republic. The cause of electoral conflicts 
and violence in Zambia’s Third Republic cannot be ascribed to one source or one party. The 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-election is but one of the contributing factors that 
provides a foundation for violence.  Lack of professionalism, independence and impartiality 
in the management of the electoral process by the Electoral Commission of Zambia and law 
enforcement by the Zambia Police Service also play a part.  
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6.6.2   Lack of impartiality in the electoral process management  
The Constitution of Zambia in Act No. 2 of 2016, Section 42 (2) calls for an electoral process 
and administration that ensures elections are free and fair; free from violence, intimidation 
and corruption; independent, accountable and efficient. The responsibility to direct, supervise 
and regulate the process in a fair and impartial way is entrusted to the Electoral Commission 
of Zambia under Section 4 (Electoral Commission of Zambia, Act No 25 of 2016). 
 
Further, to ensure impartiality and fairness in the electoral process which is key to credible 
elections upon which lies one of the foundations of liberal democracy and peace, the 
Constitution of Zambia provides an electoral code of conduct meant to guide the electoral 
process. Among others the enforcement of the code of conduct by the Electoral Commission 
of Zambia is supposed to ensure that the Zambia Police Service enforce law and order 
professionally and impartially; ensure media television, radio, print and electronic allocate 
equal air time to all political parties and candidates for political broadcasting; ensure no 
political party or candidate uses state resources for campaigns; etc (Electoral Process Act, 
No. 35 of 2016). 
 
The study findings suggest that far from providing free, fair, secure and impartial credible 
electoral process in line with the dictates and spirit of the constitution, Section 4 (1) of the 
Electoral Commission of Zambia Act No. 25 of 2016), the Electoral Commission of Zambia 
(ECZ) fails the test. As a consequence of impartial electoral process management, electoral 
conflicts and violence have found an enabling environment. The conduct of elections in an 
environment that is not perceived to be fair or inclusive to all parties and unresponsive to 
corruption as a result of weak democratic institutions as exhibited by ECZ and the police 
motivates the aggrieved to sometimes use violence as a way of seeking or demanding fairness 
(Timmer, 2012; Ndulo and Lulo, 2010; Fischer, 2002). It also encourages the ruling party to 
engage in violence with impunity in the absence of consequences and costs.   
 
The Electoral Commission of Zambia, according to the study findings cannot ensure 
professional and impartial law and order enforcement by the Zambia Police Service; cannot 
ensure equal and fair access to public media by all political parties and candidates, and cannot 
ensure that political parties or candidate do not use state resources for campaigns. Here are a 
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few selected quotes from the study that highlight failure or inability of the electoral 
management body to ensure enforcement of the electoral code of conduct professionally and 
impartially. As noted by one interviewee, the Electoral Commission of Zambia has been a 
failure at impartial elections process management, saying: 
 
I think you have heard our local Electoral Commission of Zambia has been 
condemned as toothless. It cannot implement the electoral code of conduct during the 
campaign period and at the poll and even before. It is biased towards a particular party 
and in this case the incumbent ruling party (E14, 2016). 
 
The Electoral Commission of Zambia which has the overall supervision of the electoral 
process under whose supervision even the Zambia Police operates has failed to ensure a level 
playing field during elections. As a result of the failure, biased and selective enforcement of 
the code there has been abuse of state resources and impunity by cadres in the ruling party. 
The ruling party takes full advantage of the electoral commission’s failure or refusal to 
manage the electoral process in an impartial manner. One interviewee, describes the abuse of 
state resources that ensue, saying, 
 
And you would also find that during elections, when the date for elections has been 
announced, the party in power, you’ll find that they are using government vehicles 
and government resources - you talk of the vehicles, you talk of the fuel and other 
state machinery would move in siding with the party that is in power. So the organ 
that conducts elections for me does not take a keen interest in such matters (E11, 
2016). 
 
The failure by ECZ to manage the electoral process impartially makes it possible for the 
ruling party to not only use violence to harass and intimidate the opposition but further abuses 
state resources. This makes the electoral contestation very difficult and unfair for the 
opposition provoking more anger and resentment over the perceived injustice. 
 
The above-cited quotes from the study point to serious problems with the management of the 
electoral process by the institutions that are supposed to ensure independence, impartiality 
and professionalism; free, fair and secure elections which are a hallmark of liberal democracy 
and peace (Baylies and Szeftel, 1997; Carter Centre, 2001; Carter Centre, 2016). The public 
media – state owned media - contrary to the Electoral Code of Conduct (Electoral Process 
Act, 2016 Section 29 (2)) rarely and negatively give coverage to the opposition while giving 
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full and positive coverage to the ruling party (Burnell, 2002; Carter Centre, 2002; COG, 2011; 
EU-EOM, 2016; MISA Zambia, 2016). The Zambian Police Service, contrary to the electoral 
code of conduct, does not only partially and unprofessionally (Electoral Process Act, 2016, 
Section 3 (1) h) and selectively apply the Public Order Act (Public Order Act, 1955) but allow 
or ignore acts of intimidation or violence by the cadres from the ruling party while being 
heavy handed on the opposition (Moomba, 2005; SACCORD, 2016; CCMG, 2017; Carter 
Centre, 2016; EU EOM, 2016). 
 
The inability and failure of adherence to the main virtues of the electoral process such as 
transparency, accountability, participation and adherence to electoral laws can cause electoral 
violence while adherence leads to peacebuilding (Laakso, 2007; Omotola, 2010). The failure 
or inability of the ECZ to enforce the electoral code of conduct in an independent, impartial 
and professional manner emboldens the cadres from the ruling party to use violence towards 
the opposition as an intimidation tool because there are no consequences. The high ranking 
members of the ruling party and the cadres they send or incite to engage in electoral 
malpractices such as intimidation and electoral violence do so because there is no disincentive 
to perpetrators (from the ruling party)  and don’t expect any form of punishment to be 
incurred for their actions (Dutton and Alleblas, 2017).  
 
The study findings show that the Zambia Police Service which is supposed to ensure law and 
order, protect people’s rights to freedom of assembly, speech, and association is selective in 
its discharge of that responsibility. Far from being professional, independent and impartial, 
the police tends to be biased in favour of the ruling parties against the opposition. The police 
according to the study is swift and heavy-handed in dealing with opposition members 
violating the electoral code of conduct, but is restrained at best and does nothing at worst in 
dealing with violations by the members of the ruling party.  
 
The Zambia Police Service’s failure to be professional and impartial is among others, due to 
political interference. The Inspector General of Police in Zambia, who is Chief of the Police 
in Zambia is appointed by the Republican President who is a leader of the ruling party. The 
Inspector General of Police, other senior police officers and the rank and file are afraid of 
dealing firmly with members of the ruling party such as cadres if they break the law for fear 
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of demotions, being overlooked for promotion or being fired (retired in national interest). A 
good example of why police fear to enforce the electoral code of conduct is that of the firing 
or retiring of three most senior police officers in Sesheke district who allegedly beat up the 
ruling PF party cadres, allegedly “…armed with machetes and other offensive weapons on 
voting day who, according to reports, had been taunting them to step aside so that they do 
their work because the officers had allegedly failed to carry out their duties” (Chisenga, 
2019). This incident happened in Sesheke, Zambia, on 12th February, 2019 during the 
campaigns for a parliamentary by-election. As the dismissal order in figure 6, indicate, they 
were retired in the name of the President of the Republic of Zambia allegedly in the national 
interest.  
 
 
Figure 6:  Zambia Police Service dismissal order 
Source: Zambia Watchdog (2019, February 16) 
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In fact, the police is perceived to be afraid of apprehending ruling party cadres involved in 
electoral violence and other intimidation activities aimed at the opposition as highlighted in 
these quotes from the study. 
 
According to this interviewee quoted below, the police swiftly take action against opposition 
cadres who break the law but are afraid of taking on law breaking cadres from the ruling party 
for fear of losing their jobs: 
the application of the law has been very stiff on the opposition as compared to the 
ruling party. The moment it has been heard that it is the opposition party that has been 
involved in violence, the police will take swift action and probably prosecute those 
cadres. But on the ruling party, even the police or the law enforcement agencies, they 
will be afraid because the cadres will publicly tell the law enforcement agencies that 
‘we belong to the ruling party and who are you to detain us?’ ‘If you don’t want to 
lose your job or to be transferred or to be demoted it’s better to leave us’ (E6, 2016).  
 
Police officers in Zambia face the same problems ordinary Zambians do, that of lack of jobs 
due to high levels of unemployment in the country. Therefore, if their impartial and 
professional conduct in the line of duty as police officers threatens their jobs from which they 
earn a living, then they will act in a way that they believe is in their best self-interest and 
away from undesirable ends (Smith, 1777; Oppenheimer, 2008). In so doing cadres from the 
ruling party feel emboldened and can act with impunity.  
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections enables the ruling party to amass more 
power that enables the cadres of the ruling party impunity as their party becomes more 
powerful. This power is intimidating to the police and ECZ. According to the two 
interviewees,  
Unfortunately, because of the crossing of the floor, we see that one political party, for 
example, gained more and more power and that they can even unleash carders to insult 
the police to insult anybody. And they can do anything in full view of our security 
officers and the security officers sometimes feel incapable of disciplining those 
people, the carders. So ECZ, for example, is not able to discipline the perpetrators of 
electoral malpractices (CSO8, 2016). 
following this Public Order Act we see that a ruling party is free to do whatever they 
want…the police will feel intimidated by the political cadres belonging to the ruling 
party. (CSO8, 2016). 
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The inducement of floor-crossing enables the ruling party to have the kind of majority in 
Parliament that gives it (ruling party) control over the Legislature. With the Legislature and 
the Executive branches of government under the control of the same hands of the ruling party, 
it becomes much harder for one Legislature to provide oversight on government such as abuse 
of power even in government agencies such as the police. The supposedly independent state 
institutions or agents such as the Electoral Commission of Zambia or the Zambia Police 
Service cannot operate in a manner that is independent, impartial and professional as they are 
vulnerable to abuse to those who hold the most power in the country.   
 
The failure by police from being impartial and professional in enforcement of law and order 
during elections allows cadres in the ruling party to act with impunity. One interviewee 
narrates an incident that happened during the 2016 general elections campaign in the Eastern 
Province of Zambia to illustrate how cadres behave when police fail to act: 
We have come from the eastern province and what has happened in the Eastern 
Province is a disaster, where PF cadres were going to fish out an opposition leader. 
He had to run away, he had to scamper. They stopped a live paid-for program and the 
police have not done anything up to now. So the police definitely have been very 
unprofessional and because of their lack of professionalism, there has been a lot of 
electoral violence (CSO7, 2016). 
 
The ruling party cadres behave with impunity when there is lack of of professional and 
impartial law enforcement during elections. As a result cadres carry out acts of electoral 
violence and intimidation on opponents of the ruling party as they do not expect consequences 
for their actions. 
 
The result of this inability or failure to conduct elections impartially where all participants 
irrespective of party affiliation are protected and allowed to participate freely leads to 
electoral violence as impunity in the ruling party and frustration in the opposition abounds. 
The opposition becomes frustrated and enraged that they cannot count on equal coverage by 
the public media; see the abuse of state resource for campaigns by the ruling party; and are 
being denied equal protection under the law and are in fact denied the freedom of assembly 
and speech under the selective application of the Public Order Act. This forces the cadres 
from the opposition to sometimes take “self-defensive” measures by retaliating or attacking 
the ruling party in their strongholds or in places and times when the police may not be present.  
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6.6.3   The Inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections leads to electoral violence 
 
The study findings indicate that the adversarial and confrontational relationship cultivated 
from the conflict around the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections leads to a hostile 
campaign environment. The inability and failure by the state institutions tasked with the 
responsibility of managing the electoral process in an impartial manner makes conditions for 
electoral violence more likely than not. The frustration on the part of the opposition from the 
lack of impartiality and protection builds upon the already existing anger, resentment and 
frustration from the conflict generated by the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections.  
The study does not claim that without the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections there 
wouldn’t be electoral violence in Zambia’s Third Republic. What it claims is that the 
environment for electoral conflicts and violence is made more likely as a result of the 
hostilities, adversaries, anger and frustrations that they bring to the campaign field. The study 
asserts that this conflict around the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is one of a 
breeding ground for political and electoral violence in the country. As noted by these selected 
quotes from participants, violence has come to characterize many elections held as a 
consequence of the adversarial relations induced floor-crossing and by-elections have 
engendered.  
 
According to this interviewee, floor-crossing is a factor in the inter-party violence that 
happens during elections: 
This inter-party violence is about floor-crossing. It’s a pattern, one thing leads to 
another.  We call it the domino effect, right? Today you cross the line, tomorrow it’s 
the campaign period, and in a campaign, people have to kill each other and insult each 
other; that’s breaking the peace. Tomorrow there is an election outcome which people 
do not accept because of the suspicion of rigging and so on. Floor-crossing is a factor 
in this election violence (E14, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing starts a conflict between the opposition and ruling parties 
that goes beyond feelings of anger and resentment. It leads to not just exchange of hurtful 
feelings, exchange of insults and lack of civility in interactions but results in actual acts of 
violence. The anger and resentment the parties have for each other coming from the perceived 
injustice provides a hostile environment that easily explodes into violence when they meet 
on the field of campaigns for elections.  
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The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections leads to the use of violence to intimidate 
opponents as both parties are desperate to win to show how popular they are. As observed by 
these two interviewees, 
 
where they are induced there is some expectation that some people want to make 
money out of it and those who have defected want to ensure that they retain their seat 
and in the process they become desperate, and when they become desperate they use 
unorthodox ways of campaigning such as intimidation, vote-buying; therefore you 
find that such ways of intimidation are more violent on the basis of campaigning 
(CSO6, 2016). 
 
as you go to the campaign, you will not have kind words about each other. So the 
exchange of words during the campaigns, the mudslinging will obviously strain the 
relationship between the political parties and indeed between the individuals from the 
two political parties or the political parties. The other part is that it also brings about 
violence because the supporters of the candidates would want to show that they are 
more popular than the others that they are more powerful and in the process, violence 
erupts (MP8, 2016). 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing starts off a conflict between members of the opposing 
parties. For the MPs who cross the floor, they want to show the party they defected from that 
they did not just win the previous election because of the popularity of the party but also 
because they are popular candidates. So their desire to prove that point and with the support 
of the party in power they now belong are desperate to win the seat at any cost. The opposition 
also wants to win the seat at any cost because they equally believe s/he won the seat because 
of the popularity of the opposition party. The two parties with animosity and irreconcilable 
and contradictory ideas and goals end up in a conflict that unfortunately involve violence to 
get their way (Galtung, 2009; Austin, Giessmann, & Jäger, 2012). 
 
The enmity between the political parties and the adversarial and antagonistic relations that 
ensue as a result of the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections come to play out on 
the campaign trails. The hostilities between the opposition and the ruling party are exposed 
as they compete for votes and ultimately power. Both approach the campaigns with a 
determination to win the elections by whatever means possible. 
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The opposition carry with them the anger and frustration from the perceived injustice or 
“poaching” of their MPs by the ruling party, that weakens their party; sows discord, mistrust 
and discontent among its members and robs it of a voice in the house and steady source of 
funding. They approach the campaigns with a strong determination to regain their “stolen” 
seat by whatever means possible. The ruling party also comes with a strong determination to 
get or keep the seat and makes use of public resources such as media, money and transport to 
ensure victory (Rakner & Svåsand, 2005; Simutanyi, 2010; Kaaba, 2015). The ruling parties 
and the opposition are in a non-compromising mood in their search for victory. Both parties 
have irreconcilable and contradictory ideas and goals that result in a violence about who is 
more popular and who should win the electoral contest in a zero-sum-game manner (Galtung, 
2009; Austin, Giessmann, & Jäger, 2012).   
 
6.6.4   Electoral Violence in Zambia’s Third Republic 
 
The study findings have revealed that electoral violence is a common feature in Zambia’s 
Third Republic. It takes place in an environment of heightened tension, polarization and 
hostility between parties so determined to ensure victory that they are willing to stop at 
nothing to achieve it. Electoral violence has become one of the most preferred tools deployed 
mainly by the ruling parties to intimidate, frustrate, disorganize and demoralise the opposition 
in their quest to retain or gain as many parliamentary seats as they possibly can. On the other 
hand, to a lesser degree, the opposition also engages in electoral violence as a way of fighting 
back, revenge, resisting, standing up and “protecting themselves” as police won’t protect 
them and apprehend law breakers from the ruling party. 
 
In 2016, August 8 in the run up to the 2016 general elections, the ruling party PF cadres 
brutally assaulted the opposition UPND supporters on a campaign bus which they stoned and 
damaged in Mtendere. The Zambia Police did nothing to protect the UPND supporters, never 
made any arrest of even one identified suspect. In the Judgement, Mwamba vs Nkandu Luo 
2016/HP/EP/021, the High Court for Zambia in Lusaka in its ruling observed that it became 
apparent that police officers could not protect the opposition UPND supporters who were 
attacked. According to the High Court Judge Hon. Musona, “This was proved when the 
UPND supporters were attacked on their campaign bus. The matter was reported to police 
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and one suspect was identified but no action or arrest was taken by state police officers” 
(p.53).  
 
The 8th August 2016 attack by the ruling PF party cadres on UPND supporters that took place 
in Mtendere within the Munali constituency which was being petitioned by the losing 
opposition UPND parliamentary candidate was followed by another.  Two days later, on 10th 
August 2016, UPND cadres attacked a home of a PF cadre that resulted in the damage to the 
house and vehicles. The High Court Judge Hon. Musona, in the same judgement also noted 
that, “two (2) days after PF cadres attacked the UPND campaign bus, UPND supporters also 
attacked the home of M/Watson Mtonga who was RW4 in this petition on 10th August, 2016” 
(p. 54).  
 
This has resulted in several serious incidents of electoral violence that is characterized by 
attacks on the opposition supporters, candidates and has in some cases resulted in death (EU-
EOM, 2016). Here are a few quotes from the study that highlight the tension, polarization 
and hostility; and the desire to win at any cost that result in electoral violence: 
The inducement of floor-crossing creates an atmosphere of tension, conflict that makes 
violence possible. According to this interviewee, 
 
by the time of the elections, the tensions will be high and there will be conflicts; in 
some instances, we have seen some rampant acts of violence – well-documented 
instances of political or electoral violence in Mufumbwe and Livingstone. I mean 
other places where we have had by-elections with instances where it had led to the 
loss of life (SCO8, 2016).  
 
The high level of tension emanating from the inducement of floor-crossing leads to actual 
violence between political parties. The induced by-elections that ensue from induced floor-
crossing have particularly violent and in some instances leading to the loss of life like in the 
2013, February 23 in Livingstone during the run-up to the by-election that led to the death of 
a cadre of the ruling party, PF. The violence and intimidation between the major contending 
political parties: the ruling party (PF) and the opposition (UPND) led to the postponement of 
the by-elections (U.S. Department of State, 2013; Political parties regret, 2014). 
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The ruling party, particularly is singled out, as the two interviewees suggest, to be the main 
instigators of electoral violence, saying: 
the ruling party wants to win the position (seat) by all means, by any means. So you 
find that they use any means, violence, there is panga (machete like bladed tool) use 
here in Zambia. There is killing of one another during campaigns because the ruling 
party does not want to lose the position even if it was for the opposition. They want 
to take it by whatever means (E8, 2016).  
Particularly the ruling party wants to retain at all cost an election where they have 
induced a by-election. They don’t wish to lose. So there are militants involved; young 
men are hired to ensure that they intimidate, they insult, they beat up, and sometimes 
they maim their opponents (CSO6, 2016). 
 
The ruling party cadres are the ones mainly used to foment violence against the opposition. 
They use weapons such as panga (machete like bladed tool), stones and sometimes guns to 
intimidate, harass and beat-up the opposition. This is meant to disrupt opposition campaigns, 
instil fear in the supporters of the opposition so that they do not turn up for opposition 
campaign activities or at worst fear to go out and vote as they consider it too risk to do so. 
All this violent campaign is meant to achieve a favourable political and electoral outcome for 
the ruling party (Adolfo, et al., 2012). 
 
6.6.5   Party cadres, hired thugs and police 
 
The ruling party uses party cadres, hired thugs and instruments of state power such as the 
police to restrict, intimidate, harass, disorganize and demoralize the opposition from 
meaningfully participating in the electoral process. The intimidation curtails the opposition’s 
freedom of movement, assembly and speech, and hampers their ability to organize, reach and 
be heard by the electorate to win their votes. Special focus has been on disrupting and 
harassing opposition political party electoral campaign rallies and media broadcasting 
(CSO1, 2016). 
 
6.6.6   Violence around campaign rallies 
 
The study found that campaign rallies by the opposition are particularly targeted by the ruling 
parties for disruption. The disruption involves the use of party cadres, hired thugs and the 
police to make it hard and dangerous for the opposition to organize campaign rallies. This is 
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aimed at instilling fear in the opposition, their supporters and electorate. It makes it hard for 
the opposition to be heard and for their supporters and electorate to participate in the electoral 
process without fear (Charlotte Scott Vs Margaret Mwanakatwe, 2016). 
 
Intimidation is used to scare supporters of opponents from participating in the campaigns and 
most importantly from even casting their votes (Adolfo, Kovacs, Nyström, and Utas, 2012). 
There have been reported instances of use of gunfire to intimidate and disrupt political 
gatherings of opponents, instil fear in them and ultimately frighten them from voting. 
Unfortunately, in some instances, human life has been lost as a result (EU-EOM, 2016).   
 
Electoral violence takes many forms. Sometimes it is verbal in the form of abusive language 
and physical in the form of attacks such as beating political opponents, damaging their 
property and disrupting their campaign gatherings. Some public spaces such as markets and 
bus stations have become no-go areas for opposition parties or spaces where they cannot 
openly express their political views or symbols of the party they belong to. Opposition party 
members seen in their party t-shirts are verbally abused and physically beaten by cadres from 
the ruling party. Because of this violence by way of intimidation, few if any opposition 
members would dare to put on their party's t-shirts or dare to campaign in these public spaces 
(Charlotte Scott Vs Margaret Mwanakatwe, 2016).  
 
The electoral violence is mainly instigated by political parties using party cadres, hired thugs 
and unemployed youths. These, according to participants (SCO8, 2016) are intoxicated and 
paid to brutalise, instil fear and disturb opponents. They do so using an assortment of weapons 
such as knives and machetes to attack and intimidate opponents.  Apart from the abusive 
language, physical violence and intimidation of opponents the conflict around inducement of 
floor-crossing and by-elections brings, the action is also taken against their possession and 
property. Party cadres and in some cases hired thugs and youths would attack, damage or 
seek to destroy property belonging to political opponents by dismantling, stoning or setting 
them on fire (Charlotte Scott Vs Margaret Mwanakatwe, 2016). 
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The attacks on the opposition by cadres and thugs involve the use of stones, pangas, machetes 
and sometimes guns (CSO8, 2016; E14, 2016). The use of such weapons in some have 
become all too common. Supporters and sometimes ordinary citizens coming to hear the 
opposition leaders and candidates make their case as to why they should be voted for are 
attacked and sometimes physically beaten and or have their cars smashed with stones 
(Charlotte Scott Vs Margaret Mwanakatwe, 2016).  
 
Candidates are also in some cases attacked or prevented from campaigning. In the Charlotte 
Scott Vs Margaret Mwanakatwe (2016) petition ruling, there was credible evidence that on 
two occasions, in June 2016 in the run up to the general elections, the opposition UPND 
candidate for Lusaka Central, Charlotte Scott’s campaign team had their campaign disrupted 
by the ruling PF regalia clad youths. The High Court in Charlotte Scott Vs Margaret 
Mwanakatwe (2016, p. 41), ruled that, “The Acts of preventing the Petitioner and her 
campaign from conducting their intended campaign programmes in the city centre by PF 
regalia clad persons greatly affected the Petitioner's ability to reach out to potential voters in 
that part of the constituency.”  
 
The following selected quotations highlight how the ruling party cadres and hired thugs using 
stones, pangas, machetes and guns attack and disrupt opposition campaigns and scare the 
electorate and opposition supporters. The two quotes from two interviewees speak to the 
hiring of cadres aimed at attacking opponents during campaigns so as to instil fear in them 
from participating in the electoral process:  
 
We have seen a pattern of violence in Zambia where the cadres seem to have been 
given specific instructions. They have been heavily funded, they have the fuel… 
Where are they getting the guns, the fuel, the pangas; they are leaving in lavish hotels 
just to disturb the peace. And these are the behaviours: political and artificial stage 
managed behaviours during the campaigns, ferrying of party cadres from across the 
country; hired thugs to destabilize peace and order (E14, 2016) 
 
…we have also seen that during the campaigns there are attacks. We see people using 
guns to threaten members of the opposition, and there is no free canvassing. People 
fear to campaign; even those that are supposed to go and vote, there is fear. Even 
electoral commissioners are harassed by the cadres (CSO1, 2016). 
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The electoral violence happening in Zambia’s Third Republic mainly features the use of 
cadres and thugs who are moved from different parts of the country to those areas where they 
are supposed to saw chaos. These cadres are hired, funded and armed to intimidate and 
destabilise campaigns of opponents. Their aim is to instil fear in opponents so that they are 
not as free as they would to campaign thereby decreasing the opponents’ chances of winning 
elections while increasing the perpetrators’ chance of winning. The intimidation is meant to 
make supporters of the opponents fear to not only attend campaigns but also fear to cast votes.  
The reason, according to this interviewee (CSO8, 2016) why there has been an increase in 
the use of violence is the fight for power and control of resources: 
 
 They organise our youth, intoxicate them with drugs and alcohol. So that they can go 
out there and cause havoc. And we have seen an increase in the use of pangas and 
machetes – something that is quite unfortunate and this is because at the end of the 
day there is a struggle for power, battle for control and eventually and essentially a 
struggle for money; and those who have money who are in control of resources will 
do everything to cause people to lose their interest sometimes through violence, 
through acts of intimidation and actual acts of violence (SCO8, 2016).  
 
At the centre of the intimidation and actual acts of electoral violence is the fight for power 
and the control of resources. Those who are in power and in control of the resources do not 
want to lose elections as they fear losing power and control over the resources as well. They 
understand that to lose elections means that they will lose power and ultimately control over 
the resources. In an effort to make sure they do not lose power and control over resources, 
they use means such as violence on opponents and their supporters so as to make them fear, 
lessen their zeal for participation. 
 
As noted by the interviewee below, citing the Livingstone by-elections that took place in June 
2013, violence is used to lower voter turnout as supporters of the opposition feared for their 
safety: 
…scaring people from taking part in voting so that the powerful people, those with 
state machinery may carry the day. Like what happened in Livingstone when there 
was a by-election some people did not come out to vote because they were scared of 
violence. Live gun shooting took place that day. People were shooting in the air and 
you find that…back here in Zambia we don’t know wars. We have never been 
involved in civil wars. A gun in Zambia is very scary to our people. So they decided 
to keep away from voting because of the same violence (E9, 2016). 
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The use violence to intimidate the electorate, like the use of guns to a population in Zambia 
that has no experience of war is so frightening to the people. As fear for their lives grips the 
people especially those for whom it is intended, they, as in the case of the Livingstone by-
election keep away from voting thereby giving the ruling party an edge over the opposition.  
These electoral violence acts are an intimidation tactic meant to send a message to the leaders 
and supporters of the opposition that they will be putting themselves in danger if they 
organize or come to opposition rallies. This makes the opposition’s prospect of getting their 
message to as many people as possible very difficult. The electorate is less likely to support 
and vote for a party or candidates who have not given them a reason why they should. The 
electorate is also less likely to participate in elections if doing so puts their own lives in 
danger. The attacks on the opposition campaign rallies are aimed at preventing the 
opposition’s message from being heard (a reason why they should be voted for) and sending 
a message of fear in their supporters of the risks they might be inviting to themselves through 
their participation or supporting the opposition. 
 
The study also found that the police has been both an enabler of and perpetrator of electoral 
violence whether acting at the behest of the ruling party (or out of fear) in selectively applying 
the Public Order Act. The police under the cover of the POA an instrument meant for the 
security and protection of peaceful and lawful public gathering, uses it to stifle the 
opposition’s ability to campaign by denying it ‘permission’ on frivolous grounds (Eiseman, 
2004). While the ruling party can organize meetings and rallies without informing the police 
as required by the POA, the opposition meetings and rallies are heavy-handedly disrupted 
with the use of force. The police swiftly and heavy-handedly do not only employ battons and 
teargas to disrupt meetings and the campaign rallies but have in some instances used guns 
(SACCORD, 2016). Hereunder are a few quotes that show violence being used by the police 
against the opposition during elections using the POA and bias application of law and order 
that is a source of frustration and anger among the opposition. 
 
The opposition has been complaining about the way in which the Public Order Act is 
administered – it is very, very selective! When the opposition wants to go and hold a 
rally in a particular area they are attacked. In the Eastern province, they had a rally 
there. Just to hold a meeting they were attacked (CSO1, 2016).  
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we see the behaviour of the police favouring the ruling party. Anytime the opposition 
wants to have a meeting they want to teargas them even if it’s an indoor meeting; they 
require a lot of notifications (CSO4, 2016). 
 
following this Public Order Act, we see that a ruling party is free to do whatever they 
want…the police will feel intimidated by the political carders belonging to the ruling 
party. It’s not easy for opposition MPs to campaign because they will be denied 
permits even if you don’t need a permit...at the end of the day because of this selected 
manner in which the Public Order Act is implemented, there are people who are 
getting frustrated (CSO8, 2016). 
 
look at the issue of Sesheke, Mulobezi where some people were shot and the law was 
not applied fairly despite that the police knew the people responsible there were no 
arrests. It may not generate violence at the time or not disturb peace now but this rings 
in the mind of the people and they may take the law in their own hands. And they may 
try to use other means of disadvantaging other people and try to disturb peace within 
their own local community (E2, 2016). 
 
law enforcement agents are being used as tools to frustrate the opposition. The army, 
the intelligence, the Zambia Police – the entire law enforcement establishment,…So 
our security is compromised because instead of our law enforcement agencies 
enforcing peace, they are enforcing discipline on our political parties for standing up 
for what they believe (E14, 2016).   
 
Opposition leaders, candidates and their supporters are sometimes beaten, teargassed and 
arrested for ‘violating’ the POA and yet the ruling party doesn’t get the same treatment for 
the exact ‘violation’ of the POA. In some instances, even when the notice has been given by 
the opposition to the police, they still can and have their campaign rallies disrupted with force 
by the police. The use of force involving live ammunition by the police to disrupt opposition 
rallies has on one occasion resulted in the killing of an opposition supporter (Carter Centre, 
2016; Zambia suspends election campaigning over violence, 2016).  
 
The partiality exhibited by the police and their inability to reign in cadres and thugs attacking 
opposition leaders, candidates, supporters and those perceived to be sympathetic to them is a 
source of frustration that leads them to take matters into their own hands. In an unforgiving 
environment where the police are clearly biased, won’t protect the opposition or bring to book 
the ruling party cadres involved in electoral violence, the opposition’s frustration and anger 
build. The aggrieved opposition cannot turn to the police for justice (Eiseman, 2004).   
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The frustration and anger felt by the opposition over the police’s perceived inability, failure 
or unwillingness to protect them and arrest law breaking ruling party cadres and thugs leads 
to two types reaction from the opposition. The first reaction is a negative one in which they 
equally employ violent means as a way of taking revenge, standing up, countering or as they 
see it protecting themselves and their right to participate lest they give up and lose.  
 
The second reaction is the legal route taken in the aftermath of an electoral process through 
which they petition the electoral outcome characterized by electoral violence. The courts of 
law in Zambia’s Third Republic have annulled a number of parliamentary electoral outcomes 
petitioned by losing candidates based on among other electoral irregularities, violence. In the 
recent general elections, the courts in Zambia have annulled electoral outcomes some which 
were marred by violence, such as Munali Parliamentary seat. The Munali Constituency 
parliamentary electoral outcome in which the ruling PF candidate Nkandu Luo emerged the 
winner was successfully petitioned by the losing opposition UPND candidate Doreen Sefuke 
Mwamba. The High Court Judgement in part cited violence in annulling the electoral 
outcome saying, “There is evidence that the campaigns in Munali Constituency Parliamentary 
elections were marred with violence” (Doreen Sefuke Mwamba Vs Nkandu Luo & 2 Others, 
Nov 2016, p. 52). 
 
6.6.7   Violence around media campaign broadcasting 
 
The study also found that in Zambia’s Third Republic violence is directed at media houses 
giving coverage to the opposition campaigns. The ruling party cadres and hired thugs during 
campaign periods attack (storm) media houses hosting live programming to the opposition 
leaders and candidates. In the same way, they seek to disrupt, intimidate and impair the 
opposition’s ability to hold campaign rallies, attention has also been paid on the opposition’s 
media campaigns especially live radio call-in programmes. 
 
Media houses and journalists covering the opposition and alleged electoral irregularities have 
also been subjected to threats and actual attacks. This violence is meant to intimidate the 
media from covering the opposition and exposing suspected irregularities and electoral 
malpractices being carried out by the ruling party. Hereunder are quotes from the study 
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showing the ruling party’s determination to disrupt and intimidate media programming 
covering the opposition leaders and candidates.  
The ruling party cadres and hired thugs according to the two interviewees cited below seek 
to disrupt live radio programming featuring opposition leaders and candidates during 
campaigns: 
 
The Rainbow Party leader Winter Kabimba when he had a radio programme in 
Chipata he was attacked by cadres there he couldn’t manage to hold that radio 
programme. So there are many other leaders from the opposition including members 
of parliament. When HH (Hakainde Hichilema) went to Kasama he was attacked there 
for him to have a radio programme; he was in Kitwe to address his members at his 
own office he was attacked in Ndola (CSO1, 2016). 
 
We have come from the eastern province and what has happened in the Eastern 
Province is a disaster, where PF cadres were going to fish out an opposition leader. 
He had to run away he had to scamper they stopped a live paid-for-program and the 
police have not done anything up to now (CSO7, 2016). 
 
The quotations reference incidents regarding two opposition leaders Winter Kabimba of the 
Rainbow Party and Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development whose 
live-radio-programming campaigns were stopped after coming under attack by the ruling PF 
party cadres in the run up to the 2016 general elections. The disruption of opposition radio 
programming campaigns is aimed preventing the opposition from taking their campaign 
message through radio in areas they may not be able to reach physically or to those people 
who may not be able for whatever reasons to come to campaign rallies. 
 
Radio stations and journalists who host and cover opposition parties and their dissenting 
views to the public during campaigns also come under attack from the ruling party cadres 
and hired thugs.  The two quotes from the two interviewees highlight attacks on the radio 
stations and journalists giving coverage to opposition campaigns:  
 
the media coverage of certain events has made some of the media houses and 
journalists to be attacked. A journalist, Peter Soko was attacked in Petauke and other 
journalists from the Post were attacked. There was a bullet at the newsroom at The 
Post just because they gave negative coverage to the ruling party; we have even seen 
the harassment at The Post (CSO1, 2016). 
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The police have administered injustice on two young journalists Calvin and Peter 
Soko from Feel Free Radio and from Post Newspapers. They beat them up. These PF 
cadres did this in the eyes of the police. It reached a point where the cadres were 
urinating in the mouth of the journalist and the police were there watching (CSO7, 
2016).  
 
The attacks on private media organisations and journalists is meant to intimidate them from 
covering the opposition campaigns. This is intended at making media houses and journalists 
to think of the consequences of giving coverage to the opposition’s divergent views to the 
electorate to their business and personal security respectively.   
 
Political parties know that the use of media allows them and their candidates to reach and 
seek the people’s vote in many, distant, difficult and different places. The media platform 
therefore has become a battlefield on which campaigns are fought. Despite the constitutional 
requirement for the public media to give equal coverage to all political parties during 
elections, the opposition is not given that kind of coverage, as established by various 
international elections monitoring teams to Zambia and the Media Institute of Southern 
Africa-Zambia (Carter Centre, 2002; COG, 2011; EU-EOM, 2016; MISA Zambia, 2016). 
This therefore, makes the reliance on the private media of vital importance to the opposition. 
 
The fear of losing elections, power and privileges push the ruling parties to deny or make it 
hard for the opposition to reach the electorate through the media, whether it is a public or 
private media house. It is in their self-interest to lessen the opposition’s chances of winning 
elections by not allowing them the freedom to campaign through the media (Oppenheimer, 
2008; Roskin, 2016). The ruling parties intent on denying the opposition a chance of winning 
elections seek to deny them coverage by the private media they have no control over, by 
resorting to intimidation, harassment and sometimes violent means. Party cadres and thugs 
are let loose on the media houses hosting live call-in campaign programming for the 
opposition leaders and candidates. The opposition leaders and candidates are threatened, 
sometimes physically blocked, hounded and or assaulted in the process of trying to access 
private media campaign programs.  
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In 2014, April 12, Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of Zambia’s largest opposition party 
UPND was scheduled to feature on a private radio station, Sun FM to discuss the political 
landscape in Zambia under the then President Micheal Sata. He was forced to stop the radio 
program for criticising the then President Michal Sata and left the Sun FM radio station 
through the roof after the ruling PF cadres armed with guns, pangas and other weapons 
stormed the radio station (HH attacked, 2014, April 14). 
 
The private media, according to the study findings have also not been spared by the ruling 
parties for giving coverage to the opposition. Private media houses giving the opposition 
campaign coverage and exposing alleged electoral malpractices and irregularities have been 
subjected to intimidation, harassment, attacks, assaults on their journalists, threats of closure 
by the government through the ruling parties (Carter Centre, 2001; MISA Zambia, 2016a; 
SACCORD, 2016; Allison, 2016). Some have not just been threatened with closure but have 
actually had their licences revoked by the government on flimsy grounds such as 
unprofessional conduct that is a threat to peace and security. Some independent media houses, 
namely: Muvi TV, Komboni Radio and Itezhi Tezhi Radio were closed down by the PF 
government in the run up to the 2016 general elections for being platforms that gave voice to 
dissenting and critical views and opinions. The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) 
suspended their broadcasting licenses on 22nd August 2016 allegedly for "unprofessional 
conduct posing a risk to national peace and stability" (MISA Zambia, 2016a, p. 5).  
 
The study found that ruling parties in Zambia’s Third Republic don’t allow for equal and fair 
media access to the opposition during elections. In cases where the opposition is given access 
by the private media, the ruling parties use violence through the cadres and thugs to disrupt, 
threaten, intimidate and sometimes assault the opposition and journalists. The ruling party in 
some cases does not shy away from using government to close down some ‘defiant’ media 
houses.  All this is aimed at making it hard for the opposition to have access to the media; 
dissuading the media from giving coverage to the opposition in order to diminish their 
chances of winning elections.   
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6.7.1 Summary 
 
This chapter presented and discussed the effects of the inducement of parliamentary floor-
crossing and by-elections on peace in Zambia’s Third Republic. The study found that contrary 
to enhancing or promoting peace, it undermines it by creating discontent among the 
electorate; starts off intra-party and inter-party conflicts that is compounded by impartiality 
in the electoral process management resulting in electoral violence.  
 
Among the electorate, the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is a source of 
discontent as they resent the idea that politicians would choose to waste their resources to 
fund their power struggles while there is no money for the people’s needs. This leads some 
to be cynical and apathetic about politics and participation in the electoral processes. 
 
The fear of losing power or desire for power consolidation drives the ruling and opposition 
parties engage in a hostile relationship. The opposition resent what they consider to be an 
injustice, “unfair theft” of the product of their hardwork, sacrifice and investment which is a 
source of power and pride. The ruling parties aggressively pursue power consolidation 
irrespective of the impact on democracy, peace or interparty relations. Both sides, the ruling 
parties and the opposition pursue contradictory zero-sum positions that cause a conflict 
between them. The conflict also leads to anger and loss of trust by the electorate over the 
abuse of their trust and waste of resources resulting in apathy and cynicism.  
 
The ruling party’s quest for the consolidation of power and the opposition’s fear of losing it, 
the conflict between political parties results in electoral violence that has come to be a 
common feature of elections in Zambia’s Third Republic. The ruling parties using cadres, 
thugs and sometimes the police sets out to make it difficult for the opposition to campaign 
through acts of violence, intimidation and threats. Violence is experienced at campaign 
rallies, media houses, public spaces such as bus stations and markets where people are 
attacked for being or suspected of being members, supporters or sympathetic to the 
opposition. 
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The failure or inability by the Electoral Commission of Zambia and the Zambia Police 
Service to ensure impartiality in the enforcement of the electoral code of conduct, and law 
and order does nothing to deter electoral violence. The lack of punitive action against 
perpetrators of electoral violence from the ruling parties emboldens them to do so with 
impunity. The opposition respond in some cases with counter violence as a way of standing 
up, pushing back and revenge; and the petitioning of outcomes of elections characterized by 
violence through courts of law. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONFLICT GENERATED BY THE 
INDUCEMENT OF FLOOR-CROSSING AND BY-ELECTIONS FOR A MORE 
DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL ZAMBIA 
 
 Introduction 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic results in 
conflict that affects democracy and peace. It results in antagonistic and adversarial relations 
and hostile political environment that makes violence during elections more likely than not 
when other factors such as lack of impartial electoral process. Conflict transformation 
requires as the theory suggests a change of attitude, behaviour, interests, relationships and 
discourses by addressing underlying causes of conflict (Lederach, 1995; Galtung, 2009; 
Diamond, 1994; Kriesberg, 1997; Miall, et al., 1999). Transformation of the conflict, requires 
transforming economic, social, political or cultural asymmetry, injustice, inequity, and 
inequality (Sheehan, 2014). 
 
This chapter of this study aims to explore and highlight some ideas that could, if adopted, 
constructively deal with issues around the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections in 
Zambia’s Third Republic. The transformation of floor-crossing and by-elections related 
conflicts require a series of interventions as outlined in this chapter. These comprise a) a ban 
on, appointment of opposition MPs into Cabinet without their partys’ consent b) a ban on 
appointment of Cabinet from among MPs, c) a ban on MPs who cross the floor from 
contesting the by-elections they cause and from public office appointments, d) the 
introduction of a proportional representation electoral system, e) impartial electoral process 
management, f) the curtailment of presidential powers, g) formation  of coalition government, 
h) foster ongoing dialogue between leaders of political parties, and, i) ideology (value) based 
politics. 
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7.1 Ban appointment of opposition MPs into cabinet without their party’s consent.  
  
The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia mandates the President to appoint members of 
his cabinet from among Members of Parliament without any qualification, including party 
affiliation. As such, therefore, the inducement of floor-crossing by the ruling party through 
the appointment of opposition MPs into the cabinet (with or without the blessing of the party 
members the MP hails from) is constitutional. This type of floor-crossing, the change of party 
loyalty through cabinet appointment that does not involve the resignation of an MP from the 
party on whose ticket and platform they were elected to Parliament, is legal no matter how 
undesirable it may be to the opposition or its impact on democracy and peace. 
 
The Constitution of Zambia in Article 72 (2) Act No 2 of 2016 Constitution of Zambia 
(Amendment) makes it illegal for MPs to resign from the party which sponsored them for an 
election or for an independent MP joining a political party. In practice, opposition MPs who 
are appointed to cabinet become de facto members of the ruling party as evidenced by their 
association, allegiance, loyalty and voting in parliament after they are appointed. 
 
This dissertation has established in chapters five and six that the conflict around the 
inducement of floor-crossing negatively impacts on democracy and peace. The negative 
impact of floor-crossing on democracy and peace does not make it illegal. As long as the 
opposition MPs appointed into Cabinet do not resign from their party or formally join the 
ruling party they are still legally members of their party. Participants in the study called for 
the amendment of the constitution to explicitly forbid the inducement of floor-crossing 
because without it, regardless of how many sections of the population such as civil society 
organisations, opposition parties, church mother bodies oppose and condemn it (Moomba, 
2007) politicians will continue to use the loophole for their benefit.  
 
The only way to ban the appointment of opposition MPs into Cabinet without consent of their 
parties which triggers floor-crossing requires a people driven constitution making process. 
To make floor-crossing illegal by a ban on appointment of opposition MPs without consent 
of their party can only succeed if the Constitution making process is people-driven. 
According to one interviewee, 
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to make the crossing of the floor illegal.  I will sound like a broken record we need a 
new constitution, a people driven constitution not a constitution which is decided 
upon by politicians whose interest will be to protect their interests anyway (CSO8; 
2016). 
 
This study suggests that the amendments to completely ban floor-crossing and by-elections 
can only succeed if the constitution-making process is a people-driven one. The floor-
crossing MPs and the ruling parties who benefit from it resist having such amendments as 
they go against their self-interest, preventing them from securing their goals (Hindmor, 
2010).  
 
The history of constitution making process in Zambia, including the most recent 2016 one, 
lack “legal instruments that safeguard and protect the content of the draft constitution from 
political interference or manipulation” (Motsamai, 2014, p.2). Because of the Constitution 
making process that allows the Cabinet and Parliament to have a say over what the people 
may have wanted, popular provisions that the people wanted like in the 2016 Amended 
Constitution and in years past such as: Mixed Member Representation electoral system 
(MMR) and appointment of Cabinet from outside Parliament, were rejected by the PF led 
Parliament and opposition MPs in Cabinet (Munalula, 2016).  
 
Here are a few quotes from the study that highlight the call for the explicit constitutional 
amendments that forbids floor-crossing. The first quote from one interviewee recognises the 
Constitution as the starting point for ending the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections, saying:  
First of all, it being a constitutional right, it can only be addressed by the constitution 
and the legal framework (MP8; 2016). 
 
The transformation of the conflict around the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections 
require constitutional amendments such as a ban on Cabinet appointment of opposition MPs 
without consent of their party. 
 
We need a constitution. In the absence of the law, nothing can be done because the 
current constitution gives the president the powers to do so (E2; 2016). 
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The inducement of floor-crossing is a constitutional matter as it involves the President’s 
constitutional right or power to appoint MPs into Cabinet. 
Again in our case, it is the law that needs to be amended. Because once the law has 
been amended…we have seen that the law is very weak… So, once the law prevents 
them from doing that, it would have sealed that hole once and for all (E10; 2016).   
  
A constitutional amendment that bans the appointment of opposition MPs into Cabinet 
without consent of their party would make floor-crossing not necessary as the President 
would not just appoint an opposition MP without their consent setting terms and conditions 
agreeable to them. This would go a long way in the transformation of the conflict around 
floor-crossing as the opposition MP’s appointment into Cabinet would have been something 
agreed to by his/her party without them changing party allegiance and against their party’s 
will.  What triggers a conflict between the opposition and the ruling party over the 
appointment of opposition MPs into Cabinet is that it is done arbitrary without consent of 
their party and the change of allegiance following the appointment.  
 
The opposition would not perceive such an arrangement where their consent is sought as 
unjust or an injustice which according to the theory of conflict transformation is one of the 
causes of conflict (Martinelli and Almeida 1998; Shaheen, 2014). And they (the opposition 
and the ruling party) would not be in pursuit of mutually opposed and contradictory zero-sum 
goals that according to the theory of conflict transformation is a source of conflict (Galtung, 
2009; Austin, Giessmann, & Jäger, 2012). Therefore, an amendment that requires any 
Cabinet appointment of opposition MPs into Cabinet with consent of their party would not 
be perceived as unjust and based on contradictory goals as both parties (the opposition and 
the ruling party) would have to agree on it. 
 
7.2 Appointment of ministers outside parliament  
 
Another possible constitutional change suggested by this study that would help transform the 
conflict brought about by the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections would be the 
appointment of Cabinet from outside Parliament. Currently as the law provides for in the 
Constitution, the President appoints Cabinet from among MPs. The appointment of Cabinet 
from outside parliament would take away the incentive that the Presidents use to entice 
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opposition MPs into floor-crossing and at the same time make MPs (regardless of the party 
that they come from) have only one job of being the people’s representatives.  
 
The appointment of ministers from outside parliament would entail that opposition or 
independent MPs would not cross the floor or cause by-elections knowing that they would 
not qualify for an appointment to the cabinet. This would remove the incentive (the possible 
appointment into the cabinet) that attracts them to cross the floor and concentrate on the work 
they were elected to do such as providing checks and balances to the executive in Parliament. 
This would be good for democracy and peace and would do away with unnecessary, costly 
and contentious by-elections that have been a source of conflict. Induced by-elections are 
unnecessary as they are pursued for the benefit of politicians and not the electorate.  
 
The desire for Cabinet appointment that offers more power, status and pay attracts opposition 
MPs to cross the floor to the ruling party. Members of Parliament do not just see themselves 
as ordinary MPs, explains this interviewee, 
 
I think a lot of people when they are elected as members of parliament don’t really 
see themselves as ordinary members of parliament, they go into with the intention of 
being a minister. And so they believe they can serve better as ministers because then 
they have the power. So it’s this ability of wanting to have more power, and to make 
decisions. Because when you are in government, you can make decisions, you know, 
unlike apart from the legislative decisions collectively in parliament. So you want to 
have that power (MP6, 2016). 
 
A Cabinet appointment is a position of power, status and influence. They have executive 
functions as heads of government ministries. Opposition Members of Parliament who aspire 
to be Cabinet Ministers can only do so if they accept to cross the floor to the ruling party.  
 
One of the solutions that would put a stop to the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections is a constitutional amendment that would ban the appointment of Cabinet from 
among Members of Parliament. One interviewee said the following in this regard, 
 
we are calling for a new constitution which will have people appointed as ministers 
from outside parliament… it’s basically the issue of appointing ministers from 
parliament. If we get rid of that issue very few people will be enticed into floor 
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crossing. If there were no political benefits, people would focus on being legislators 
as opposed to everyone focusing their energies on being appointed deputy ministers 
or full cabinet ministers (CSO5; 2016). 
 
The constitutional ban on the appointment of Cabinet from among Members of Parliament 
would take away the attraction that is one of the central motivating factor for opposition MPs 
who cross the floor to the ruling party. Without the preoccupation on the prospects for the 
executive positions in Cabinet, MPs would concentrate on doing the people’s business in 
Parliament such as holding government accountable on their behalf. 
 
The appointment of Cabinet from outside Parliament would take away the incentive 
opposition MPs have for crossing the floor and would also reduce the number of by-elections. 
According to one interviewee, the only by-elections that would continue are those caused by 
death of MPs, and not the “greed-based” ones, saying:  
 
…once you have that especially ministers from outside parliament you won’t have 
people crossing, automatically. This then enhances democracy, which basically then 
curtails by-elections. Only by resignation or death that we cannot do away with but 
then that is justifiable. But these other by-elections that are caused because of crossing 
are unjustifiable because they are greed-based and they impact negatively on 
democracy they impact negatively on development because they chew into our 
treasury resources (MP2; 2016). 
 
The appointment of Cabinet from outside Parliament would reduce the number of by-
elections necessary except for those necessitated by death of an MP or if one resigns. The 
reduced number of by-elections would also reduce tension and animosity between the ruling 
parties and the opposition. This would also help to restore some trust by the electorate in the 
electoral process as tax payers’ money would not be wasted on “greed-based” induced by-
elections over the real needs of the people. 
 
The Heads of State in Zambia’s Third Republic have been using their constitutional powers 
to appoint members of the Cabinet from among MPs irrespective of their party affiliation. In 
appointing opposition MPs into the Cabinet, they enter into a patron-client relationship with 
them, buy-off their loyalty and support in exchange for power and privileges that come with 
the executive position (Blau, 1964; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Piattoni, 2004). 
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This amendment to the constitution, a ban on the appointment of the Cabinet from Parliament, 
would make such a relationship (patron-client) by which Presidents buy off loyalty and 
support of MPs from the opposition through Cabinet appointments not possible. It is this 
patron-client relationship between the President and the opposition MPs that they (opposition 
MPs appointed to the Cabinet) change their loyalty and allegiance from the party on whose 
platform and support they were elected to the President (and the ruling party) that starts off a 
conflict between the ruling party and the opposition. It would take away from the patron 
(Presidents) the means and from the client (opposition MPs) the incentive that motivates them 
to cross the floor.  
 
This amendment by itself could make a President to appoint whomever s/he likes.  To guard 
against this loophole that would allow the President to appoint sycophantic supporters to 
Cabinet, a subsection of this amendment must subject all Cabinet appointments to 
Parliamentary approval. Members of Parliament in the opposition and in the ruling party who 
are not looking for favours of Cabinet positions appointment would be in a stronger position 
to stop him/her from just filling the posts with unelected sycophantic supporters.  
 
The by-product of the transformation of the conflict through the appointment of ministers 
from outside parliament would be the strengthening of democracy. This would create 
conditions in which MPs from the opposition, the ruling party and independents would 
concentrate on their work as legislators as well as being the arm of government that checks 
on the executive branch and not being there to please the executive branch with the hope of 
being rewarded with appointment into the Cabinet by the President.  
 
This would make Zambia a much more democratic country because it would strengthen a 
system of separation of power between the legislature and executive which is lost due to 
among others, appointment of MPs into the executive branch. The control of the legislature 
by the same hands that control the executive branch makes it difficult to guard against 
arbitrary rule, abuse of power and state resources (Madison, 1788; Kiiza, 2005; Ikome and 
Kode, 2010). The appointment of Cabinet from outside Parliament would make MPs both 
from the ruling party and the opposition, freed from the expectation or desire of appointment 
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into cabinet, be more independent. This has the potential of making Parliament a truly 
separate, independent and co-equal arm of government that can provide meaningful oversight 
over government.  
 
7.3 Bar floor-crossing MPs from contesting by-elections and public office 
appointment. 
 
The other constitutional change that according to participants could be considered in the 
absence of the appointment of ministers outside parliament is, a provision that bars MPs from 
contesting by-elections they cause through floor-crossing. This would be a clause that 
stipulates that Members of Parliament once voted must serve a full 5 year term; and that any 
elected MP who decides to cross the floor to another party from the party they were a 
candidate of during elections before the expiry of their five-year term must not be allowed to 
contest the by-election they cause. Further, they should also be barred from eligibility in terms 
of appointment by the President into any government position during the same term. This 
constitutional change would compel MPs to serve the full five-year term under the party they 
were elected and only consider to change parties after the end of the term, during a regular 
election.  
 
This amendment would compel MPs to remain faithful to the people and party that voted for 
them and yet still be free to move away from their party to join a party of their choice once 
they have served their full five-year term and seek a fresh mandate on ticket of their new 
party. This saves the people, the affected parties and the country the unnecessary expenses of 
the treasury, and prevent the conflict it creates that endangers the wellbeing of the people. 
Here are a few quotes from study on a proposed constitutional amendment to compel MPs 
serving their full 5 year terms and barring those who floor-cross from re-contesting their 
seats. According to these interviewees, an elected MP elected on a particular party ticket must 
not be allowed to join another party for the 5 year duration term but that if they decide to do 
so, they should not be allowed to recontest the by-election they cause. The two interviewees 
suggest such an amendment as follows, 
if we vote for an MP in that particular constituency for that particular party, let that 
person serve for full 5 years in that particular party. If a person wants to move to 
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another one, let that person just step down and should not be even allowed to stand in 
the by-election (E12, 2016). 
 
So in the first place, I would love to see a constitution which does not allow a Member 
of Parliament who has crossed over to another party to recontest that seat. So if we 
can have a law that says that once as a Member of Parliament you cross over to another 
political party when that seat is going to be contested, you don’t qualify – I see a 
situation where Members of Parliament will stop crossing over (E6, 2016). 
 
An MP elected on a particular party platform must serve a full five-year term under her/his 
party. To join another party under this amendment would require them to resign from their 
party that sponsored them for election to the National Assembly. It would also mean that their 
seat would be declared vacant, meaning they would cease to be MP and should not be eligible 
to stand as candidate for the by-election they cause. 
 
The study further suggests that on top of baring opposition MPs from contesting the by-
elections they cause, these individuals should not be appointed for any public position during 
the five year period. One interviewee said the following, in line with this proposal,  
 
new constitution will come with caveats let’s say for instance you have been elected 
on the UPND ticket and you decide in your own wisdom that you should resign we 
will not stop you from resigning we will allow you to resign but the constitution will 
say that after you have resigned you cannot hold public office during that term of 
office. So you will not contest as a Member of Parliament, you cannot be appointed 
by the president in any public office during that five year period, you cannot even be 
appointed in the diplomatic service because you have resigned by yourself that is to 
us a way of saying we have cut down on the crossing of the floor, that is number one 
(CSO7, 2016). 
 
The constitutional amendment to bar opposition MPs from re-contesting the by-election they 
cause through crossing of the floor, should be complemented by a clause that make them 
ineligible for any public office appointment. This is to ensure that opposition MPs know that 
not only would they ineligible to contest the by-election, they would also be ineligible for 
appointed into any public office such as in the diplomatic missions as ambassador by the 
ruling party.   
 
This constitutional amendment, barring of opposition MPs who cross the floor from being 
eligible to re-contest their seat and ineligible for any public office appointment would create 
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conditions that strengthen democracy and lead to peace. This is so because it would compel 
MPs to honour and respect the electorate who voted for them in part due to the party they 
belong and their respective parties on whose support, sacrifice and infrastructure they 
ascended to the office of MP. As the study has shown in the preceding chapters, parties that 
lose MPs through floor-crossing consider it to be theft or poaching of their MPs making them 
angry and resentful as they consider it unjust. The electorate becomes cynical and apathetic 
as they question and reconsider the importance of their participation in elections in which 
they elect people who turn out not to be loyal to them.   
 
The barring of elected MPs from contesting the by-election they cause and from appointment 
to any public office would have the effect of helping them serve the full five year term under 
the party they were elected on or serve as independent if they were elected as independent. 
This would make the patron-client relationship that makes them shift their loyalty and support 
from their party to the President and the ruling party end.  
 
7.4   Introduction of a proportional representation electoral system 
 
One of the ideas proposed by participants within the realm of constitutional amendments for 
the transformation of the conflict around induced floor-crossing and by-elections is the 
introduction of a proportional representation (PR) electoral system. Currently, parliamentary 
elections in Zambia are based on the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system (Article 47(2) 
of Act. No. 2 of 2016 Constitution of Zambia (Amendment). According to the findings of 
this study, a system of proportional representation would ensure that in the event that an MP 
decides to cross the floor or resign altogether to join another party, there would be no by-
elections necessary as the next person on the party list, from the same party would then 
automatically take their place as MPs, allowing the person who wishes to cross the floor to 
join a party of their choice.  
 
Proportional representation, the study suggests would help in the transformation of the 
conflict between the party that sponsored the MP and the one to which he or she floor-crosses 
to. Besides floor-crossing and resignation, this system would also prevent a by-election even 
in the case of the death of a sitting MP. Thus, it would reduce costs of by-elections overall. 
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Here are some two quotes from the study that suggest the PR electoral system over the FPTP 
as a system that would help in the transformation of the conflict. According to two 
interviewees: 
some form of proportional representation. The original proportional representation in 
its own right so that in every case there can be no by-election. So that that the top 
person if he cannot continue as Member of Parliament if he resigns the next will be 
put into position (CSO3, 2016). 
 
I think Zambian people have been very clear and they have just been ignored. They 
have been asking for proportional representation. We should ensure that we don’t 
have by-elections and if this system works in such a way that if the candidates change 
parties it means the ticket on which the person won will be replaced by the next one. 
So we will avoid by-elections by introduced proportional representation. But also I 
think that if we had a proportional representation system members of parliament will 
not be sitting in parliament hoping to be given ministerial jobs and therefore they 
would hold government accountable to the laws that they make as it were (CSO6, 
2016). 
 
Proportional representation (PR) electoral system being proposed by the study would free 
opposition MPs who suddenly come to believe in the policies or agenda of the ruling party 
and want to work with or joint it (ruling party) without causing contentious, costly and 
unnecessary by-elections.  
 
Proportional representation without the ban on floor-crossing as proposed by this study would 
only partially work as it would only affect MPs who resign from their party or join other 
parties. This is so because under the current constitution, it is not illegal for an opposition or 
independent MP to be appointed into cabinet except in the case where an MP resigns from 
their party or joins another party (Kuchunga Edwin Simusamba v Attorney General, Greyford 
Monde, Richwell Siamunene, and Poniso Njeulu – 2012/HP/1561 (unreported): 2012). 
 
Although a political party could expel an MP who crosses the floor to another party without 
resigning from their party or joining another, hoping to have their seat declared vacant under 
Article 72 (2) (e) which says that an MP expelled from the party that sponsored the member 
for election, their office of Member of Parliament shall become vacant, but this wouldn’t 
render the seat vacant. Article 72 (5), (6), (7) allows the expelled MP to retain the seat unless 
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the court determines the expulsion justifiable or if the expelled MP does not challenge the 
expulsion within the prescribed time in court.  
 
In a case where an MP is expelled for being appointed into the cabinet and the subsequent 
change of allegiance since the appointment, the expulsion most likely than not will be deemed 
unjustifiable (as appointment of an opposition MP into Cabinet is not unconstitutional). 
Therefore, the PR system by itself will not help transform the conflict arising from the 
inducement of floor-crossing but would only be effective with induced by-elections unless 
combined with a constitutional ban on floor-crossing.  
 
Zambia inherited its first-past-the-post election system from its former colonial power. To 
deepen democracy it is now necessary that Zambia evolves this electoral system into one 
which suits its particular context and the proportional representation electoral system might 
be one such system Zambia needs. 
 
7.5   Impartial electoral process management 
 
The study findings indicate that the transformation of the conflict emanating from the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections requires independent, professional and 
impartial electoral process management by institutions such as the ECZ and the police. On 
many occasions during elections, there is a lack of professional, independent and impartial 
management of the electoral process by state institutions that are charged with this 
responsibility. It is almost impossible to hold and maintain peaceful and truly democratic 
elections without fair and impartial management of the electoral process and law enforcement 
by state institutions with the responsibility of overseeing the conduct of free and fair 
elections. Unfortunately, according to the study findings, these institutions lack impartiality, 
independence and professionalism.  
 
The study focused on the role played by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) and the 
Zambia Police Service (ZP) as the two play a central role in the electoral management and 
maintenance of law and order during elections. The ECZ as mandated by the Constitution of 
the Republic of Zambia in Section 4. (1) Act No 25 of 2016, has the responsibility of 
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directing, supervising and controlling elections in a fair and impartial manner. Impartiality in 
the electoral administration is just as important, as elections are central in liberal democratic 
politics (Jinadu (1997). The police according to Article 6 of the Electoral Process Act No. 35 
of 2016 has among others, the responsibility of maintaining law, order and peace; to not 
disrupt legally convened campaigns, rallies or meetings by all political parties; and to ensure 
that the office of the police is not used for the oppression of any party, candidate or supporter. 
Contrary to the law governing the electoral process mandating the electoral commission and 
police to manage, and maintain law, order and peace in an impartial manner, the study 
findings indicate that both have failed to be that. As a result of this failure, violence has 
become a common feature in elections in Zambia’s Third Republic.  
 
The electoral commission and police’s failure, inability or refusal to work in a professional, 
independent and impartial manner as required by the law is not necessarily a function of lack 
of training, competence or dislike for the opposition but is rather a function of political 
interference by the ruling party. The heads of these institutions serve at the pleasure of the 
President of the Republic of Zambia who is also the leader of the ruling party as his 
appointees, and they also rely on government funding to run their organizations (Carter 
Centre, 2002; SACCORD, 2016). It is therefore in their interest to not antagonise the ruling 
party to secure their positions, jobs and funding (Hindmor, 2010).  
 
There is a patron-client kind of relationship that exists between the Republican President 
(who is also leader of the ruling party) and the heads of these organisations (ECZ and ZP) by 
which these organisations largely do nothing to stop or punish members of the ruling party 
in exchange for job/s security and funding from the government they rely on.  Political 
interference instils fear in the leaders and rank-and-file of the electoral commission and police 
from ensuring a level, free, fair and equal playing field for all participants in the electoral 
process irrespective of party affiliation. This lack of a level playing ground has often led to a 
hostile, unsafe and restricted environment for the opposition while the opposite has been true 
for the ruling parties.  
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This failure by the law enforcement institutions to enforce the law firmly and fairly 
emboldens electoral law-breaking party officials and cadres from the ruling party who do not 
expect any disincentive in the form of serious consequences for their actions (Dutton and 
Alleblas, 2017). On the other hand, those who are dealt with harshly and whom are not given 
protection when they are attacked become angry for not being treated the same and look for 
other ways and avenues of venting their anger and protecting themselves which leads to 
electoral violence.  
 
The police ought to deal firmly with violations of the electoral process (Electoral Process 
Act, No 35 of 2016)   regardless of which party the perpetrators of electoral violence or 
intimidation belong. Failure to do so allows the violators of the act to do so with impunity 
while making those on the receiving end of the police’s heavy-handedness angry. Such people 
may find ways to repay violence with further violent attacks, thereby creating a cycle of 
violence and intolerance. This study proposes that in order to transform the conflict around 
the inducement of floor-crossing that creates a hostile and adversarial environment under 
which elections are held, firm and impartial, independent and professional law enforcement 
is a must.  
 
The following quotes from the study call for professionalism, independence and impartiality 
by the police if the conflict that leads to electoral violence is to be transformed. The need for 
professionalism and impartiality by the police is underscored by this interviewee saying,  
 
we need a police service which will be professional, which will be objective, which 
will not be acting according to instructions from the powers that be, but a police 
service that will protect the interests of Zambians whether they belong to one political 
party or the other so long it is in the interest of the Zambians (CSO8, 2016).  
 
The police must ensure that they act according to the law on how they interact with people 
during elections. It should not matter to them whether one belongs to the ruling party, 
opposition or is an Independent. The police is supposed to protect all law abiding citizens 
during the electoral process. 
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The police is, according to the study findings biased in the application and enforcement of 
law and order during elections in favour of the ruling party and against the opposition. This 
interviewee highlights this bias saying, 
 
if you engage in political violence and you are in the ruling party they do not arrest 
you. The signal and the message is very clear if you are in the ruling party you can at 
least be seen to perpetrate political violence and you will not be touched but if you 
are on the opposition the moment if there is any mention of any type of political 
violence you are clamped down upon in an instance; it compromises peace and 
security (SCO5; 2016). 
 
This biased or selective enforcement and application of law and order by the police gives 
allows those in the ruling party who are perpetuating acts of violence to do so with impunity. 
This creates an environment in which violence thrives during elections as there is no 
meaningful deterrence on perpetrators, usually from the ruling party who engage in acts of 
violence. 
 
The study asserts that one of the reasons that make the police to be biased or selective in the 
application and enforcement of law and order is due to lack of independence from political 
leaders of the government of the day. According to these two interviewees, the police is 
supposed to be allowed to work independently, saying,    
 
They should leave the police to work independently, and then the inspector general 
of the police should not have any link to the ruling party. He must work as a civil 
servant. The Inspector General of Police should not be appointed the President. He 
should be an independent person just like the officer-in-charge, officer-commanding, 
a civil servant in short, not a person who is linked to politics. As long as that continues 
where the president appoints the Inspector General of Police, it’s a problem because 
he will be compromised. He has to work to the tune of the boss (E9, 2016). 
 
Regardless of which party one belongs, all are supposed to be treated the same before the 
law. Those who engage in electoral irregularities such as electoral violence and intimidation 
irrespective of party affiliation are supposed to be brought to book. The study found that the 
state institutions such as the electoral commission and the police cannot be independent, 
impartial and professional unless they are provided with an environment that protects them 
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from political interference; empowers and encourages them to do so and dissuades them from 
not doing so.  
 
The appointment of those in top echelon of the police by the President of the Republic of 
Zambia who is leader of the ruling party creates a problem for the police to work 
independently. Those in the top echelon and the rank and file in the police find it easy to go 
against law breaking members of the opposition than those in the ruling party. The police act 
contrary to the Code of Conduct 3 (1) (h) in the Electoral Process Act No 35 of 2016 that 
mandates the Electoral Commission of Zambia to “ensure that police officers act 
professionally and impartially during the electoral process”. 
 
There is an implicit expectation of a “patron-client” relationship between the President 
(patron) and the police top brass (clients) (Blau 1964; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Piattoni, 
2004). That in order for the clients (police top brass and indeed the rank and file) to maintain 
their positions and privileges they should not act against members of the ruling party the 
patron (President) is head of. Acting against members of the ruling party as was the case in 
the Sesheke by-elections can result in police officers being retired or fired in the supposedly 
“national interest” by the President (Chisenga, 2019). Under such an environment laden with 
political interference without adequate job protections for professionalism and impartiality, 
the police act in ways that they perceive to be in their best self-interest in line with the theory 
of rational choice (Riker, 1995; Oppenheimer, 2008; Hindmor, 2010; Roskin, 2016). 
 
7.6   Curtail presidential powers 
 
The study found that the office of the President of the Republic of Zambia has too much 
power and that the transformation of the related conflict around floor-crossing and by-
elections requires curtailing some. The concentration of too much power in the hands of the 
presidency who is also president of the governing party stifles the ability of state institutions 
from executing their responsibilities in an impartial, professional and independent manner in 
matters involving members and supporters of the ruling party. The following quotes speak to 
the overconcentration of power in the office of the president and how that impacts on liberal 
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democracy and the state institutions whose impartiality and independence in the management 
of elections are compromised. 
 
The overconcentration of power in the presidency (head of the executive branch) makes it 
difficult for the supposedly state institutions that should make democracy thrive function. 
There is need to reduce the powers of the President, if democracy is to thrive according to 
this interviewee, saying,  
 
I think in most places in Africa, I think presidents are given too much power, and 
these powers have to be plucked so that we enhance democracy because democracy 
does not thrive with too much power given to one institution or one person, the 
institution or presidency. That is what causes conflicts in most countries, the 
institution of the presidency there is no way to check or balance this power. 
…excessive powers are inimical to democracy (MP2; 2016). 
 
The concentration of power in the presidency (executive branch) does not enhance democracy 
as it leads to arbitrary rule. The concentration of power in the presidency leads to abuse of 
power which then becomes a source of conflict as other stakeholders and citizens in a 
democracy become agitated.  
 
The constitution of the Republic of Zambia gives too much power to the President (head of 
the executive branch) that allows him/her to have influence over the legislature and the 
judiciary. As one interviewee observed, that interferes with clear separation of powers, 
saying, 
we don’t have very clear separation powers in terms of three arms of governance the 
executive and the legislator and the judicial we have bemoaned the fact that the 
president in Zambia is so powerful and the constitution gives the president a lot of 
power, that he can influence the constitution decisions in parliament he can even 
influence processions in the judiciary (CSO8; 2016). 
 
The control of the legislature and the judiciary by the President who is also head of the 
executive branch makes it possible for arbitrary rule, abuse of power and state resources more 
likely than not (Madison, 1788; Kiiza, 2005; Ikome and Kode, 2010). 
 
The state institutions that are supposed to be independent and impartial in a liberal democracy 
as required by the law become beholden to the President and the governing party of the day. 
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Some of the reasons why the institutions such as the electoral commission and the police are 
beholden to the President and the ruling party are that the President is the appointing authority 
at whose pleasure they serve. Their continued stay in the positions they hold lies in part with 
their loyalty to the appointing authority (the President and the governing party). The rank and 
file in the electoral commission and the police know that jobs are hard to come by without 
loyalty to the President and the governing party of the day. Their continued stay in the 
positions they occupy and their future promotions depend on their loyalty and support. 
 
The study findings show that part of what makes the independent state institutions that are 
vital in a democracy fail to function is the concentration of power in the presidency 
(executive). Independent institutions such as the police cannot work independently if their 
leaders are not only appointed by the President but continue to be connected to the ruling 
party. One interviewee put it this way saying,   
 
If the police are to work independently, then the inspector general of the police should 
not have any link to the ruling party. He must work as a civil servant. The Inspector 
General of Police should not be appointed by the president. He should be an 
independent person just like the officer-in-charge, officer-commanding, a civil 
servant in short; not a person who is linked to politics. As long as that continues where 
the president appoints the Inspector General of Police, it’s a problem because he will 
be compromised. He has to work to the tune of the boss (E9; 2016). 
 
In order to ensure that the electoral commission and the police operate in a professional, 
independent and impartial manner in matters pertaining to electoral irregularities and 
violence, the positions of the head of the electoral commission and police should not be 
appointees of Presidents and serve at their pleasure. There should be a very strong separation 
between the ruling party and the state institutions without which the lack of independence 
and impartiality by the state institutions will continue. One way can be through an open 
process that allows for people to apply for a vacant position and have a panel of experts who 
can shortlist applicants who have the right qualifications from which they can come up with 
a few names to be presented to President to choose one and further seek approval from 
Parliament. Secondly, there needs to be legal provisions that set out term limits (such as 5 
years that can be renewable for another 5); and that the President can only get to terminate 
one’s appointment if there is a clear violation of the terms and conditions and subject to 
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judicial scrutiny and approval. Thirdly, one of the conditions upon which one could be 
dismissed should be a demonstrable failure or refusal to professionally and impartially 
discharge one’s responsibilities. 
 
In this way, the heads of these institutions would not be beholden to the President’s whims 
but to the legal terms and conditions for the duration of their term/s. Without these changes 
it would, as it currently is, difficult for the electoral commission and the police to go against 
the ruling party members whose leader is their boss if and when they are engaged in electoral 
malpractices such as electoral violence. 
 
The concentration of power in the President allows him to have influence over all the three 
branches of government. That power allows him to engage in politics of patronage and 
clientelistic-based rule by distributing power, positions and privileges in exchange for loyalty 
and support allowing the President to rule unchallenged (Tripp, 2004). This leads to bad 
governance and gives impunity to the President and the ruling party as there is no structure 
within the state that can credibly provide checks and balances. 
 
In line with the theory of rational choice (Riker, 1995; Oppenheimer, 2008; Hindmor, 2010; 
Roskin, 2016), heads of these independent institutions currently fail or refuse to discharge 
their responsibilities in an impartial manner when ruling party members are involved for fear 
of losing their positions or jobs which would not be in their best self-interest. If the law and 
process of dismissal was amended as the study suggests, it would be in their self-interest to 
choose to be impartial for fear of losing their jobs or positions. 
 
7.7 Coalition government 
 
The findings of this dissertation indicate that the formation of the coalition government by 
the ruling party and opposition if considered would help in the transformation of conflicts 
arising from the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections. This comes from the 
understanding that one of the perceived drivers for the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections is the desire by the ruling parties to have a comfortable majority in parliament for 
governance. This is more so in cases where the ruling party, despite winning the presidency, 
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does not have sufficient seats in parliament and therefore resorts to the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections to increase their numbers in order to have a working majority in 
parliament.  
 
The governing parties also engage in inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections because 
of the need for highly talented, skilled and qualified MPs in the opposition who can contribute 
to national development through cabinet appointment. Instead of inducing floor-crossing and 
by-elections to get sufficient numbers or get skilled and highly qualified MPs from the 
opposition into government, they should engage in consultations or better still enter into a 
coalition government arrangement with the opposition to get the majority, talent and skills 
they need.  
 
The ruling party should not directly and arbitrarily, without regard for the opposition 
leadership engage and enlist opposition MPs for cabinet appointments as this, as this study 
has shown, leads to confrontation. Engagement, reaching out to the opposition parties and 
formation of a coalition government is actually one of the possible ways the governing party 
can have the working majority or support they need in the National Assembly from the 
opposition in a peaceful manner.  
 
The ruling party should engage the opposition by talking with them with the view of working 
with them if they need their support in Parliament or form a coalition. According to these two 
interviewees,  
They can talk to the other opposition party to work together…some kind of coalition. 
So there are avenues when you have a hung parliament to resolve that. It's dialogue! 
And you agree on a win-win situation. You harmonise what you stand for and work 
together and then you have the numbers for either voting or otherwise (MP1; 2016). 
So it is important that the ruling party has support and the only way to ensure that you 
get the support is by reaching out. So that you can come up with some form of 
coalitions. Some forms of guiding principles in terms of what you want to achieve if 
a political party is able combine efforts with another political party it becomes 
effective (CSO7; 2016). 
 
A hung Parliament should be an opportunity for the ruling party to enter into constructive 
and peaceful working relations with the opposition. A coalition government with the 
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opposition could be one way the ruling party can get the support needed in Parliament to 
govern successfully or even bring in highly qualified opposition MPs into Cabinet. 
 
This should be a negotiated process by which the ruling party and the opposition reach an 
understanding instead of using unorthodox methods such as inducement of floor-crossing or 
by-elections. The negotiation must be with the party leadership of the concerned opposition 
MP/s. Of the negotiations needed between the ruling party and the opposition, one 
interviewee said the following,    
 
It should be a negotiated process. If the government doesn’t have majority seats it 
should negotiate rather than use an unorthodox method to get members of parliament 
to the government side, and I think that is what democracy means…such a process 
must be done through the party structures, through the party president; the general 
leadership of political parties so that when the person goes they have the blessings of 
their party (CSO6; 2016).  
 
The process of having opposition MPs in the Cabinet should be one that is done in a 
transparent and official way with the opposition party leadership. The failure to do so is what 
has been driving the conflict as it turns it into floor-crossing. If the President needs to include 
opposition in the Cabinet in a way that does not result in conflict and floor-crossing s/he has 
to enter an agreement with the party to which the concerned MP/s belong. 
 
The same process of entering into agreement must be followed with the leadership of the 
opposition even for the purpose of tapping highly talented and qualified MPs from the 
opposition into Cabinet. One interviewee had the following to say on that.  
 
If the party in power has seen that in the opposition there is a Member of Parliament 
with special skills who can help in the development of the country, the party in power 
should not go directly to the Member of Parliament. They should go to the leadership 
of the party and request and say we want to use him for the common good. And the 
common good is the development of this country. We are asking that he be part of us 
so that we can develop this country together. And if that is done on the round table, 
then there will be no conflict of whatsoever (MP4; 2016). 
 
The idea of bringing in best qualified MPs even from the opposition into Cabinet for the 
common good of the country is a good one. Nonetheless it should not be done in a way that 
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it harms the opposition and start conflicts. It should be a negotiated and agreed arrangement 
between the President (ruling party) and leaders of the opposition for conditions and terms 
and how the concerned parties can work together. 
 
It is not surprising that one of the terms constantly used in referring to the inducement of 
floor-crossing and by-elections is poaching. The appointment of opposition MPs without 
consent of the opposition parties starts off a bitter conflict between political parties even if, 
as argued by some, it may be done out of recognition of special skills some opposition MPs 
have or as a way of having in the Cabinet MPs from the regions the governing party has no 
representation. If the ruling party is genuine about sourcing for special skills or having a 
Cabinet reflective of the national character, then it should be willing to enter into a coalition 
government with other opposition parties to avoid conflictual and divisive politics. 
 
The formation of a coalition government would be a statement of intent for national cohesion. 
It would respect the voters who chose candidates in part due to their party platform. It would 
also be respectful of the opposition and an indication that the governing party is not out there 
to destroy the opposition but work with them for the common good. Coalition government 
formation is a path towards peace because the opposition would feel respected, part of the 
process, trust that this is for the common good of our country and its people. 
 
The formation of a coalition government recommandation involving the ruling party and the 
opposition relates to what is at the core of the theory of conflict transformation. At its core, 
the theory of conflict transformation seeks to change discourses, relationships, attitudes, 
behaviours and interests by addressing underlying causes that make conflicts possible 
(Austin, Giessmann and Jäger, 2012; Lederach, 2015). Parties that form a coalition 
government make possible the change of relationship, interests, attitudes and behaviour by 
having a basic understanding  and agreement of common cause and the resolve to work 
together in the same government. 
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7.8   The dialogue between the leadership of political parties 
 
The study findings show that dialogue between political parties is a much-needed tool for the 
transformation of the related conflict around the inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections. The dialogue that has to take place should not a debate about contradictions or 
about what/who is wrong or right but should be oriented towards a future the parties want for 
themselves and their people (Galtung, 2004). It could therefore take place, according to this 
study, before or after the co-option of an opposition MP/s into cabinet takes place.  
 
The dialogue that should take place before the co-option of an opposition MP into the cabinet 
is supposed to be about the ruling party engaging the opposition party leaders to express their 
interest and need for a particular MP/s to serve in the cabinet. Thus this becomes a party-to-
party dialogue, not a dialogue between the ruling party and an individual opposition MP. It 
should seek prior permission from the opposition party through its leadership, and both 
parties agreeing to the terms and conditions under which such an arrangement will be 
implemented. In this dialogue, the ruling party should, out of respect, make a request and 
explain the reasons for which they require the opposition party’s MP/s and listen to the views 
and concerns of the opposition and arrive at a compromise or understanding. If both parties 
are agreeable, the memorandum of understanding between them should clearly lay out a guide 
on the expectations and obligations of the MPs to the executive branch and to their party 
during the duration of the agreement. This dialogue before any appointment of opposition 
MP/s if undertaken successfully would significantly reduce the likelihood of the conflict 
around floor-crossing from becoming destructive. 
 
If it is done after dialogue and with the agreement of the party in opposition then it becomes 
something that is agreed upon for the national interest, charting a way to further national 
development and in the interest of the people of Zambia. The study proposes transparent 
ongoing dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition party leadership of the MP 
being asked to serve in government, before any appointment can be made.  
 
The arbitrary appointment of opposition MPs by the President without any dialogue or 
memorandum of understanding with the leadership of the party the opposition MPs belong is 
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what starts conflicts. In fact there is nothing wrong for political parties to work together for 
the common good, as noted by one interviewee,  
 
There is nothing wrong for the ruling and the opposition parties to work together. 
What is wrong is to abuse somebody’s power… since they are serving the common 
man in the constituency, they should find means of sitting together and dialogue (E2; 
2016). 
 
Having dialogue between leaders of political parties is what can help them find common 
cause and understanding. It can also help them seek the help of each other to find solution to 
the many challenges facing the people they serve. That process begins with dialogue. 
 
For dialogue to be impactful and successful, it cannot just be dialogue between the President 
and the opposition MPs being considered for appointment. It must be conducted through 
legitimate party leadership structures of the opposition. This view is articulated by one 
interviewee as follows,  
 
all political parties must promote dialogue, and if a member wants to work with the 
government such a process must be done through the party structures through the 
party president, the leadership of political parties so that when the person goes they 
have the blessings of their party… So, clearly, therefore, the political parties need to 
engage in dialogue number one. I think it is seen more positively because it is a 
negotiated process I want to see it from that light that it should be a negotiated process 
if government doesn’t have majority seats it should negotiate rather than use 
unorthodox method to get members of parliament to the government side and I think 
that is what democracy means we must talk we must be transparent in the way we do 
it and that mechanism must be established through dialogue (CSO6; 2016).  
 
The study also proposes that dialogue has to take place even if there is already an existing 
conflict in which the ruling party had already appointed an opposition MP into Cabinet 
without consent from their party. The opposition consider the appointment of their MPs 
without their consent as unjust “theft” of their hard-won seat/s. This has been a source of 
discontent, anger, resentment, antagonism and hatred that inevitably lead to political and 
electoral violence. 
 
The study asserts that while there are many other issues that may be the immediate causes of 
political and electoral violence, the animosity, anger and resentment that builds between 
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political parties over the inducement of floor-crossing creates a hostile political and electoral 
environment for opposing parties to interact and compete peacefully. The dialogue between 
parties is an essential component towards finding peace and justice at an interpersonal and 
structural level (Lederach, 2015). It is a much-needed tool to help political parties chart a 
path towards transforming the conflict for a better peaceful non-violent future they deserve 
for themselves and the people they serve.  
 
According to the study findings, for conflict transformation through dialogue between hostile 
parties to be successful, they require mediation. The study suggests one possible mediator 
that could be considered for that task is the Church. The church in Zambia is perceived to be 
a neutral, non-partisan institution which is important for mediation in conflict transformation 
dialogue as it speaks to credibility and respect (Stigant and Murray, 2015). No meaningful 
dialogue through mediation would be expected without trust and respect or if the mediator is 
biased with a conflict of interest.  
 
This kind of dialogue, participants argue, is only possible with the intermediate help of truly 
independent bodies such as the church. The leaders from parties involved in the conflict need 
to have a dialogue not only on how to resolve and prevent the conflict from escalating but to 
understand where it comes from and how each party views it and the damage it does to 
democracy and peace in the country. So, dialogue can be an opportunity for parties to let out 
the anger and hurt; directly listen to how it (inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections) 
impacts the other and how it is perceived by the other. Here is a quote from one interviewee, 
articulating the need for an impartial, respected and neutral mediator, 
 
We need to have bodies that are independent, which can bring aggrieved parties 
together. There is a concept of inter-party dialogue. But, for example, when you talk 
about inter-party dialogue, you bring parties together… For example, there is under 
ECZ there is what they call a conflict management committee within… but those have 
been failures. They don’t even bring parties together during the polls to small issues, 
what about at higher levels. So we need to identify structures that can embrace 
dialogue among political parties; maybe the church. The independent bodies, the Non-
Governmental Organisations those which are independent, not those which are party 
affiliated because we have seen party NGOs which speak the same language. Those 
independent bodies especially the church (E2; 2016). 
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Polarisation, resentment, and animosity between the involved parties means that meaningful 
dialogue between or among them would be hard if not impossible to begin. Credible bodies 
such as the church that are respected by the parties to the conflict play a critical role in conflict 
transformation dialogue.  
 
Dialogue relates to the theory of conflict transformation. It is a fundamental resource needed 
for transformation of the conflict around inducement of floor-crossing, which involves face-
to-face communication between the affected parties to address it in ways that reduce violence 
and injustice resulting in constructive change (Lederach and Maiese, 2015). Dialogue among 
political parties must be on-going and not just embarked on when there is a conflict. 
 
7.9   Ideology (value based) politics 
 
The study findings identified the lack of ideological grounding by political parties and 
politicians as one of the weakness in the Zambian political arena that makes the inducement 
of floor-crossing and by-elections possible. This lack of value or ideology based politics but 
instead opportunism makes it easy for politicians to move from one party to another without 
any second thoughts. The ease with which the ruling party and the MPs from the opposition 
engage in the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is a testament to the lack of value 
or ideology based politics.  
 
Politicians should not only be motivated by self-interest and opportunism but should belong 
to a party because they believe in their party’s ideology as offering a better path for the 
development and wellbeing of their people they represent (Roskin, 2017).  Part of the solution 
to that, according to participants, required for transformation of the conflict around floor-
crossing and by-elections is the need to help build politics around ideologies, values and 
principles. The study proposes the need to build and support ideology based politics as 
opposed to self-interest politics that is one of the breeding grounds for inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections.  
 
The study asserts that one of the reasons for rampart floor-crossing inducement and by-
elections is the lack ideology-based politics. According to one interviewee, 
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They don’t have a firm ideological point and so defection becomes fashionable and 
when it takes place nobody cares because their main focus is self-interest. So, one of 
the lessons why you have floor crossing is lack of ideological foundation (CSO7; 
2016). 
 
The lack of value or ideology based politics is one of the reasons why the inducement of 
floor-crossing and by-elections that lead to conflict is even possible. If the opposition MPs 
believed in, and were guided by conviction of their parties’ ideals and principles, they would 
not change parties with such ease. They would remain faithful to their parties and not be 
swayed by opportunities and privileges appointment into Cabinet bring. 
 
The ease with which opposition MPs abandon their parties speak to lack of or weak 
ideological foundation grounding. This is how one interviewee explains, 
 
if you had an opposition which is true to its ideals, to its party ideology, that wouldn’t 
happen in the first place. But because it’s already weakened by lack of having a solid 
foundation, that will always happen…they don’t have qualms in switching positions 
(E10; 2016). 
 
All political parties in Zambia have manifestos that set out a set of ideas about how they wish 
to govern if elected. Yet politicians, as evidenced by a number of floor-crossing and by-
elections do not seem to care much about ideals as contained in party manifestos. They 
change parties with ease partly because for many of them it is about opportunities they stand 
to gain and not the ideals that guide their choice. 
 
One of the many possible elements needed for the transformation of the inducement of floor-
crossing related conflict is the need for a politics based on ideology. That what makes 
individuals join a particular political party is that they share in its ideology. That they share 
in a political party’s set of beliefs, opinions, and values about how the social, political and 
economic fabric of society or country ought to be and how that can be achieved (Freeden, 
2001; Erikson and Tedin, 2003; Knight, 2006; Jost, Federico and Napier, 2009). This should 
be what guides them in choosing which political party to join if they desire to serve as 
Members of Parliament as opposed to self-service which is centred on self-interest.  
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7.10   Summary 
 
The inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic 
has been a source of conflict that negatively impact on democracy and peace.  This chapter 
of the study explored possible ways the conflict generated by the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic could be transformed for a more 
democratic and peaceful Zambia. 
 
The study in this chapter has provided ideas that could constructively help in the 
transformation of the conflict. These ideas include constitutional and non-constitutional 
proposals that if implemented can transform the related conflicts around the inducement of 
floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia. The constitutional amendments proposed are 
meant to remove the legal justification, power and incentives that make the inducement of 
floor-crossing and by-elections possible in the first place. They also give protection to state 
institutions against undue political interference while holding leaders of independent state 
institution, commissions/ agents individually accountable for any failure or refusal to carry 
out the impartial and fair discharge of their responsibilities. The lack of impartiality by state 
institutions makes the already hostile political environment intolerable. 
 
The non-constitutional ideas proposed by the study invite political parties to address the fears 
that they have in a constructive manner that respects the democratic expression of the 
people’s will, enhances democracy and preserves peace in the country. The ruling party 
through dialogue or entering into a coalition government with the opposition can do away 
with the rancour, resentment and cacophony that come with the inducement of floor-crossing 
and by-elections. With the help of civil society organisations, they should help build a politics 
based on ideology and values. 
 
The study affirmed the theory of rational choice as a driver in the inducement of floor-
crossing and by-elections for opposition MPs seeking better opportunities that come with 
Cabinet positions (Riker, 1995; Oppenheimer, 2008; Hindmor, 2010; Roskin, 2016). It 
affirmed the theory of patron-clientelism that starts a beneficial unequal relationship between 
the patron (President) and client (Opposition MP/s) while provoking a conflictual relationship 
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between the ruling party and the opposition that needs to be transformed (Blau, 1964; 
Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Piattoni, 2004). Further, this study affirms the theory of conflict 
transformation by seeking to change relationships, attitudes, interests, behaviours and 
discourses between and among political parties in Zambia, without which, conflicts and 
violence will continue (Austin, et al., 2012; Lederach, 2015). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
The broad aim of this dissertation was to explore the inducement of parliamentary floor-
crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s third republic: the related conflict for democracy and 
peace. The objectives were  to explore the conditions that facilitate floor-crossing by 
Zambia’s elected Members of Parliament; to assess the impact of parliamentary floor-
crossing and by-elections on democracy in Zambia; to assess the consequences of 
parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on peace; and to explore possible ways of 
transforming the conflict generated by floor-crossing for a more democratic and peaceful 
Zambia. 
 
Three theoretical frameworks underpin this study. Namely: the patron-client theory; the 
rational choice theory; and the conflict transformation theory. These theories help the study 
to understand why, how and what the conflict around the inducement of floor-crossing is and 
how it can be transformed. 
 
The study utilised qualitative methodological approach aimed at providing in-depth, insights 
and conceptual understanding of the data collected. Purposive and snowball sampling 
techniques were used to identify and locate participants for the study. Ethical principles 
(informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality and voluntary participation) were followed 
before in-depth interviews were conducted for collection of data using digital voice recorder. 
This chapter presents the conclusion of this dissertation and further recommendations. It 
begins with the presentation of the key aims and objectives of the study. Guided by the key 
aims and objectives of the study, it then presents a review of the main findings from the study 
and a summary of recommendations.  
 
8.1    Chapter One 
 
This chapter introduces the study. It lays out the background; aims and objectives of the 
study; the research problems and objectives and key questions the study explored; study 
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design; participants; ethical considerations; procedure followed for the sampling of 
participants; data collection instruments; data collection procedure; method of data analysis; 
and the outline of the dissertation. 
 
8.2  Chapter Two 
 
This chapter examined literature on liberal democracy and the role that political parties: the 
ruling and the opposition play. It laid out the challenges liberal democracy faces among which 
are efforts by ruling parties to weaken opposition parties, undermining of separation of 
powers through the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections for the purpose of bringing 
the legislature under the control of the ruling party. The second part of the chapter examined 
the concept of electoral conflicts and violence. It explored some of the factors that cause 
electoral conflicts and violence some of which are due to lack of impartial electoral process 
management and an un-even electoral playing field by the electoral commission and police. 
 
8.3  Chapter Three 
 
This chapter explored the theoretical frameworks that underpine this study: the theory of 
patron-clientelism; the theory of rational choice; and the theory of conflict transformation. 
The theory of patron-clientelism shows what the nature of relationship between the 
Republican Presidents (patrons) and opposition MPs (clients) is and why they enter into one 
through the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections. The theory of rational choice 
theory also adds another layer understanding as to the question of motivation for the choice 
of a course of action: inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections despite wide-spread 
condemnation and resistance from citizens, the parties they come from and CSOs in the 
country; and its negative impact on democratic consolidation and peace. The theory of 
conflict transformation guided the study in the understanding of the dynamics of conflict and 
how it can be transformed into constructive outcome as opposed to destructive outcome. 
 
8.4  Chapter Four  
 
This chapter of the study explores conditions that facilitate floor-crossing by Zambia’s 
elected Members of Parliament. The study found that one of the reasons the inducement of 
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floor-crossing and by-elections are even possible is due to the constitution. The constitution 
of the Republic of Zambia allows the Republican President to appoint members of the cabinet 
from among the Members of Parliament irrespective of party affiliation. The appointment of 
opposition MPs by the Republican President with or without consultation and approval by 
the opposition leaders and irrespective of its impact on democracy and peace is still legal 
under the constitution.   
 
The other important reason why the phenomenon of inducement of floor-crossing abounds in 
Zambia’s Third Republic despite widespread opposition and its negative impact on 
democracy and peace is that of the Republican Presidents’ desire to consolidate power. The 
consolidation of power involves among others, the desire to have control over the legislature; 
to weaken the opposition, and to strengthen the ruling party. 
 
The third reason according to the study is due to the greed of opposition MPS. Opposition 
MPs only floor-cross to the ruling through appointment into the cabinet. They are attracted 
by the power, privileges, comfort, status and financial security that come with the executive 
appointment.  
 
This chapters confirms the two theories of rational choice and patron-client. The opposition 
MPs cross the floor through appointment into Cabinet in spite of fierce resistance anger from 
their party leadership, cadres and supporters because they consider it to be in their best self-
interest (Riker, 1995; Oppenheimer, 2008; Hindmor, 2010; Roskin, 2016). The unequal 
relationship they enter into, patron-client, with the President benefits them as their support 
and loyalty benefits the President (Blau, 1964; Scott, 1974; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; 
Piattoni, 2004).   
 
8.5  Chapter Five  
 
This chapter explored the impact of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on 
democracy in Zambia. The study findings suggest that the inducement of floor-crossing has 
a negatively impact on democracy in Zambia’s Third Republic in a number of ways and 
respects.  
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The first one being that it weakens parliament’s oversight role over the executive by its 
control it gains through the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections. The second 
negative impact it has on democracy is that it weakens the opposition by targeting its key 
members, MPs. Opposition party cohesion, the source of funding and the ability to win 
elections and keep the party in power in check in the house is diminished and in some cases 
leads to the demise of the opposition parties. The third negative impact it has on democracy 
is that it makes the ruling party too strong.  
 
The overconcentration of power in one party controlling the executive and parliament makes 
the task of checks and balances difficult in government if not impossible as the ruling party 
can get away with almost anything. It makes the abuse of power and resources easier without 
the government being held accountable.  
 
The fourth negative impact it has is on the electorate’s active participation in elections and 
politics generally. The electorate in Zambia mostly vote for candidates based on the party of 
their choice. When an MP changes party affiliation in pursuit of power and privileges 
circumvents the people’s expressed will through an outcome of elections. This leads to voter 
apathy and cynicism in politics.  The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections which is 
based on self-interest for power and comfort for politicians makes people lose trust in 
politicians and interest in politics which is not good for the growth of democracy. 
 
8.6  Chapter Six  
 
This chapter explored the effect of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on peace. 
The study findings show that the inducement of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections 
is a source of discontent, division, antagonism and hostility within, between and among 
political parties and the electorate. The electorate feels cheated and angry by politicians 
asking for their votes on the premise that they seek the office to champion their causes when 
that is not the case. In the opposition, members who would have invested resources, 
campaigned and voted for the MP also become angry as they feel betrayed and cheated by 
the floor-crossing MP. In the ruling party, there are some who also feel angry and cheated 
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out of the positions that should have been theirs, based on their loyalty and support to the 
party that made their victory possible. All these different reactions lead to conflicts that 
challenge peace in the country as the resentment and anger are not always constructively 
channelled.   
 
Intra-party Conflict 
 
The study findings show that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections is a source 
of intra-party conflicts that affects peace within them. There is a lot of resentment, suspicion 
and mistrust towards floor-crossing MP and politicians within their party who don’t seem to 
appreciate and honour the sacrifices, support and votes upon which they are elected to the 
office of MP. That a person can have no regard and respect for the people on whose sacrifices, 
support and votes they were elected into the office of MP lead to a lot of resentment towards 
the floor-crossing MP and politicians in the parties. Members within the opposition become 
suspicious and distrustful towards politicians as they have no second thoughts in abandoning 
the people who shouldered the burden of electing them into the office of MP at the offer of a 
more paying position with many privileges. In the ruling party, there is also a muted 
discontent and resentment. Ordinary members and MPs who would have been loyal to the 
party even before it came into power resent and are angry over the idea that they can be 
overlooked for appointment into a privileged position of minister for opposition MPs who 
worked hard against the party just for the sake of power consolidation. Their contention is 
that loyalty ought to be rewarded over opportunism. 
 
Inter-party Conflict 
 
The inter-party conflicts that ensue from the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections 
as compared to intra-party conflicts are the most disconcerting ones to peace in the country. 
The opposition that loses MPs consider it as an unjust “poaching,” or “theft” of the seats they 
won during the general elections at a very high cost to them considering the investment, 
support and enduring the many hardships associated with a hostile campaign environment. 
The fear of loss of power, a source of revenue and fear of destruction makes them angry 
towards the ruling party. The ruling party fearful of their power to govern being challenged 
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in parliament and fear of possible loss of power engage in the inducement of floor-crossing 
and by-elections for power consolidation in government and also to weaken the opposition.  
The inter-party conflict between the ruling party and the opposition is based on the fear and 
resentment they both have towards each other. The resentment and fear that the other is out 
there to take away power from them and destroy them, a consequence of which an adversarial 
and hostile relationship ensues. The resentment and anger by and of themselves are neither 
the immediate causes nor the only causes of the violence that have come to characterise 
elections and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic. But they have led to an adversarial 
and hostile political environment that is tested to the limits by unequal and biased electoral 
process management and application of the law including the public order act during elections 
(campaigns).  
 
Electoral Violence 
 
The failure, refusal or inability of an impartial electoral management process and 
enforcement of the law some elements in the ruling party to engage in acts of intimidation 
and violence with impunity as there is little to no cost or deterrence to their actions. The ruling 
party also uses the police to intimidate and through the POA deny the opposition the ability 
to equally and freely campaign. On the other hand, some elements in the opposition resort to 
violence as a way of standing up or revenging as they can’t expect protection or same 
treatment from law enforcement agents. All this has led to electoral violence that result in 
intimidation, maiming and destruction of property. Use of stones, machetes, panga knives 
and live ammunition that on few occasions have led to a loss of life. 
 
The findings in this chapter confirm what the theory of conflict transformation views as 
drivers of conflict. The pursuit of mutually incompatible and contradictory goals by the 
concerned parties (ruling and the opposition); and the perceived injustice by the opposition 
in what they consider to be “poaching” or “theft” of their seat/s or the injustice in non-
impartial electoral process (Diamond, 1994; Lederach, 1995; Kriesberg, 1997; Miall, et al., 
1999; Galtung, 2009; Austin, Giessmann & Jäger, 2012; Sheehan, 2014). 
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8.7  Chapter Seven  
 
This chapter presents a summary of the findings from the study focusing on a number of 
possible recommendations required for the transformation of the conflict around the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic that result in 
political and electoral violence. These recommendations from the study aim at changing 
relationships between political parties and power structures to transform the conflict for 
sustainable peace in the country (Frazer & Ghettas, 2013). What follows comprises a 
summary of various recommendations, either as standalone suggestions or in combination 
with others that would help in the transformation of the conflict around floor-crossing and 
by-elections for a more democratic and peaceful Zambia. 
 
Ban the appointment of opposition MPs into cabinet without their party consent. 
 
The ban on floor-crossing of any kind is one of the constitutional amendments recommended 
by the study. This constitutional amendment would mean that any opposition MP who floor-
crosses to another party, even by default without actually resigning from their party or 
becoming a card-carrying member of another party on which they were not elected to 
parliament should lose their seat. MPs should remain members and loyal to the electorate and 
their party for not doing so leads conflicts between parties and voter apathy.  
 
Appoint cabinet members from outside parliament 
 
The appointment of ministers from outside parliament would not only be good for the 
transformation of the conflict but would be good for democracy and good governance. The 
study findings show that the opposition parties who lose MPs through floor-crossing and by-
elections consider it as “poaching” and “theft” of their seats that brings resentment and anger 
that ultimately leads to adversarial and antagonistic relations between political parties. It also 
makes the opposition MPs appointed into cabinet and MPs from the ruling party not carry 
out their oversight role in parliament as their aspiration to maintain their positions cabinet or 
to be appointed into cabinet makes appeasers of the President of the Republic (the executive 
branch). 
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Bar floor-crossing MPs contesting by-elections 
 
The recommendation to bar floor-crossing MPs from contesting by-elections and public 
office appointment is a disincentive to opposition MPs who would wish to join the ruling 
party. This is precise because the opposition MPs who actually resign from the opposition to 
join the ruling party do so on the hope of being adopted by the ruling party to recontest the 
seat; be appointed or re-appointed into the cabinet or to be appointed into any other 
government position if not adopted or if they lose in a by-election. 
 
Coalition Government 
 
Ruling parties that come to power with a hung parliament in need of having more MPs in 
parliament for a stable government or for some other reasons should consider forming a 
coalition government with the opposition. This would reduce the tension, animosity and 
hostility between political parties; help the ruling party and opposition find common ground, 
and strengthen the possibility of peaceful co-existence and working together in a non-
confrontational and adversarial manner that leads to political and electoral violence. This is 
born out of the experience Zambia has had in the Third Republic that the idea that the ruling 
party can just “poach” MPs from the opposition who would have invested so much in them 
has been a source of resentment and acrimony (conflict). 
 
Proportional Representation 
 
The FPTP electoral system should be replaced by the PR electoral system so as to do away 
with unnecessary, costly, contentious and violent by-elections that ensue from floor-crossing. 
It would also allow opposition MPs who may want to join the ruling party for whatever reason 
to do so without subjecting the country, political parties and the electorate to unnecessary 
chaos, divisions, and cacophony that ensue in the event the floor-crossing leads to by-
elections. Another added advantage to the PR electoral system is that even in the event of the 
death of a seating MP, no by-elections and extra expenditures would be necessary. This would 
lead to peace; prevent disruption of opposition oversight in parliament; and save the people’s 
money for much needed public services delivery instead of holding expensive by-elections. 
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Independent Electoral Process Management 
 
The study recommends for the electoral management process to be impartial and independent 
the heads of the electoral commission, the police and other independent state institutions 
should operate under a framework that insulates them from political interference. This would 
entail the leaders of these state institutions, commissions or agencies serving for one none 
renewable term of office to reduce the tendency or temptation of wanting to please the 
appointing authority for possible re-appointment at the cost of independence, impartiality and 
professionalism. The termination of the appointment should only be valid subject to 
independent judicial (court) processes and approval; and based on legitimate legal grounds 
such as failure, refusal or unwillingness to discharge their responsibilities in a professional, 
impartial and independent manner. 
 
Just as their positions and work should be protected against political interference, they should 
also be subjected to judicial scrutiny by aggrieved parties or individuals in their individual 
capacity. Aggrieved parties, stakeholders or citizens who allege being disadvantaged due to 
lack of impartiality, independence and professionalism should be allowed to challenge the 
heads of these institutions in their individual capacity and the legal fees should be paid by the 
institutions they head but if found guilty they should repay the legal fees from their own 
pockets and the guilty verdict by the court should be grounds for termination of employment. 
These measures would empower, protect and encourage the heads of state 
institutions/commissions to carry out their responsibilities in an independent, impartial and 
professional manner. On the other hand, these measures would put them on notice that their 
positions are safe and secure from any interference except for conduct that is not impartial, 
independent and professional; and therefore this would be both an incentive and deterrence. 
 
Ideology (value) Based Politics 
 
Political parties must not just recruit and attract new party members for the sake of numbers 
and votes, as important as that is, but they must also invest in cultivating a loyal party 
membership anchored on a set of beliefs, opinions and values (ideology). The party ideology 
must be inculcated in party politics; should be the focal point in as much as winning elections 
is central or risk losing members to any highest bidder. In that effort, political parties, civil 
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society organisations, non-governmental organisations must endeavour in educating the 
citizens about the need and importance of joining, supporting or voting for political party 
candidates based on their set of beliefs, opinions and values; and how they wish to implement 
them. 
 
Dialogue between Leaders of Political Parties 
 
Dialogue should be employed to constructively transform the conflict around floor-crossing 
and by-elections, before or after the co-option of an opposition MP into the cabinet. The 
dialogue that should take place before the co-option of an opposition MP between the 
opposition and ruling party leadership would result in an agreeable and amicable 
understanding what it means, why it should be and how the arrangement would be 
implemented. The dialogue that takes place before co-option prevents the conflict from being 
destructive being an agreed arrangement between the leadership of the concerned parties. The 
dialogue that should take place in case of co-option without prior agreement between the 
leadership of the concerned parties requires a credible, neutral mediator. 
 
Curtail Presidential Powers 
 
The Republican President in Zambia has sweeping powers that allow him/her to exercise 
control over the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary even though these are supposed to be 
independent branches of government. Some amendments such as the appointment of cabinet 
outside parliament would be one way of not only helping in the transformation of the conflict 
around floor-crossing and by-elections but would limit if not eliminate President’s control 
over the Legislature as MPs would not be in the house to please the President for possible 
appointment into the cabinet. 
 
Another amendment in the law that should be introduced would be one that either takes away 
the President’s power to appoint heads of independent state institutions or have a diverse 
independent panel of experts recommend names based on qualifications and competence to 
the President from which he/she can appoint. And that once the President has made the 
appointment, his/her power to dismiss those appointed must also be curtailed by subjecting 
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such decisions to judicial processes and approval based on legitimate and credible legal 
grounds such as failure, refusal and unwillingness to discharge their responsibilities in a 
professional, independent and impartial manner. 
 
The recommendations in this chapter affirm what the theory of conflict transformation 
considers to be a process that lead to a constructive outcome of a conflict over a destructive 
outcome such as violence (Diamond, 1994; Lederach, 1995; Kriesberg, 1997; Miall, et al., 
1999; Galtung, 2009; Austin, Giessmann & Jäger, 2012; Sheehan, 2014). All these 
recommendations as a whole or in part aim to bring justice to the perceived injustice in the 
inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections phenomenon and creating a level, fair and 
impartial electoral process and application of law and order in the political arena. 
 
8.8  Summary 
 
This study, in exploring the phenomenon of inducement of Parliamentary floor-crossing and 
by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic sought to highlight the impact of the ensuing 
conflict on peace. This is the gap that has been amiss from among the studies done on the 
subject of floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic.  
 
According to the study findings and contrary to the benign assertions by its proponents, it 
(inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections) is mostly about the pursuit of power 
consolidation and self-interest. The Republican President and the ruling party’s quest for 
power consolidation through control over Parliament; and the opposition MPs’ quest for a 
life of more comfort, privileges, status and power that come with the cabinet position makes 
floor-crossing and by-elections possible. The study also cites the constitution as an enabler 
as it does allow the Republican President appoint any MP regardless of party affiliation into 
cabinet. 
 
The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections deprives the country of the much needed 
checks and balances that is critical in a democracy. It depletes the number of MPs for the 
opposition in parliament that keep the party in power in check; turns parliament into a 
rubberstamp for the executive. Consequently, the overconcentration of power in the 
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Republican Presidency (and ruling party) makes the abuse of power, state resources and 
institutions easier and common. It destabilises and in some cases destroys the opposition 
thereby destabilising the party system that ultimately weakens liberal democracy based on 
separation of power, plurality and rule of law that guarantees freedoms and equality for all 
citizens.  
 
The study findings show that the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections affects peace 
in the country as it leads to a conflict within and between parties. Within parties there is 
discontent, divisions and mistrust as members feel cheated and abused by politicians whose 
seeming interest in seeking their vote and support is self-interested and connected to power 
and privileges. Between parties, adversity and hostility ensues as parties seek, or fear losing, 
power. The opposition at best faces a loss of power, and at worst faces destruction. The ruling 
party through the Republic President becomes intent on consolidating power irrespective of 
the effect it has on peace. This is induced through floor-crossing and by-elections. State 
institutions and law enforcement agencies cannot professionally, impartially and 
independently apply law and order, especially during elections under instructions from and/ 
or the fear of the ruling party. This situation under the already prevailing hostile environment 
between parties gives impunity to violent ruling party cadres and opposition cadres taking 
the law into their own hands as a way of seeking retribution and defending themselves. 
Ultimately, violence during elections abounds out of a floor-crossing and by-elections 
provoked hostile environment; the corruption of state institutions and law enforcement 
agencies that cannot independently, professionally and impartially function. 
 
Recommendations 
 
The transformation of the conflict around the inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections 
requires the following constitutional amendments and non-constitutional interventions:  
✓ Ban on the appointment of opposition MPs into the Cabinet without the consent of 
their party.  
✓ Ban MPs that cross the floor from participating in by-elections and appointment into 
public office. 
✓ The introduction of a system of proportional representation in the electoral system.  
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✓ Formation of coalition government when general elections result in a hung 
parliament. 
✓ The reduction in the powers of the Republican President.  
✓ The protection of office bearers in independent institutions and law enforcement 
agencies from political interference and limiting the terms of office to one term; 
whose termination should only be possible through judicial processes among which 
should be their failure to be professional, independent and impartial.  
✓ Fostering genuine on-going dialogue between leaders of political parties;  
✓ The building ideology (value) based politics. 
 
Contribution to knowledge 
 
This study has reaffirmed the validity of the theory of rational choice (Riker, 1995; 
Oppenheimer, 2008; Hindmor, 2010; Roskin, 2016). The opposition MPs who cross the floor 
to the ruling party from the opposition do so not out of regard for the good of the people they 
represent or because they believe in the mandate of the ruling party. They make the choice to 
cross the floor out of regard for what they consider to be in their best self-interest even if it 
may be against popular opposition, and even as it brings them scorn, ridicule and threats, as 
the study has shown.  
 
This study also affirms the theory of patron-clientelism in the relation between the President 
(and the ruling party) and the opposition MP/s who cross the floor (Blau, 1964; Scott, 1974; 
Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984; Piattoni, 2004). The inducement of floor-crossing and by-
elections pulls away an opposition MP from the opposition into an unequal patron-client 
relationship between the President and the opposition MPs in which both benefit. The patron 
(President) provides a cabinet executive position and in return the opposition MPs offer 
loyalty and more importantly votes within Parliament to the President (and the ruling party). 
It is a relationship between two unequals, based on mutual interest and benefit. 
 
The study affirms the theory of conflict transformation (Diamond, 1994; Lederach, 1995; 
Kriesberg, 1997; Miall, et al, 1999; Galtung, 2009; Austin, Giessmann & Jäger, 2012; 
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Sheehan, 2014). The inducement of floor-crossing and by-elections leads to conflict as it sets 
the ruling party on a path in search of goals that are incompatible and contradictory with those 
of the opposition, and with zero sum outcomes. It’s transformation requires an examination 
of the root causes of this conflict that, in Zambia, include power structures, attitudes, 
behaviours and contradictions that need changing.  
 
The main knowledge contribution from this study is that the inducement of parliamentary 
floor-crossing and by-elections in Zambia’s Third Republic is a source of conflict that erodes 
liberal democracy and peace. It confirms that the lack of impartiality and justice undermines 
democracy and peace.  
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APPENDIX II 
INTERVIEW GUIDE I 
 
LEADERS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
Parliamentary Floor-crossing and By-elections in Zambia’s Third 
Republic: the implications of related Conflict for Democracy and 
Peace. 
General 
1. Could you please tell me the name your organisation and a bit of what it does?  
2. How and when did you become involved with this organisation?  
3. What are the specific matters of society your organisation address?  
4. What is the scope of your organisation’s role and activities in addressing and 
responding to matters of democracy and peace? 
5. Is your organisation in favour of or opposed to parliamentary floor-crossing and 
induced by-elections in Zambia? 
 
What are the conditions that facilitate floor-crossing by Zambia’s elected Members of 
Parliament? 
 
What do you understand to be the reasons of floor crossing?  
Under what circumstances do members of parliament floor cross? Why? 
What reasons of floor-crossing to the ruling party do opposition MPs give? 
Why do you think it is mostly opposition MPs who floor cross to the ruling party? 
Why do you think political parties have failed to be consistent in condemning/supporting 
floor crossing? 
What are the reasons that prompt the ruling parties to co-opt opposition MPs to join their 
ranks? 
Are there other factors other than the reasons they give and the advantages they gain that 
make them cross the floor? 
 
How does parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections impact on democracy in 
Zambia? 
 
What do you think is the effect of floor-crossing on the ruling party? 
What do you think is the effect of floor-crossing on the opposition parties? 
What processes do opposition parties engage with co-opted MPs? 
On what basis do opposition parties expel their defecting MPs?  
In which ways do you think floor-crossing has influenced and shaped relations between 
parties? 
What forms of electoral conduct and behaviour are emerging in these floor-crossing 
induced by-elections? 
What role has the state 
In what ways do political parties respond to by-elections induced by floor crossing? 
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In which ways has relations between party members and floor crossing MPs ensued in 
host parties? 
Do you think floor-crossing complement or violate the electorate’s mandate? How? 
According to your organisation, is democracy weakened or strengthened as a result of 
floor-crossing and induced by-elections in the country? How? 
 
What are the consequences of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on peace and 
security in Zambia? 
 
In what ways do you think floor crossing and by–elections affect peace in the country? 
Explain how? 
Why do you think by-elections flowing from floor-crossing have increasingly been 
characterized by violence? 
What has been the nature of the conflict around floor-crossing and by-elections? 
In what other ways, apart from violence, does the conflict emanating from floor-crossing 
and by-elections manifest itself? 
According to your organization’s observation, is peace and security weakened or 
strengthened as a result of floor-crossing and induced by-elections both in the country? 
How? 
 
 
How can the conflict generated by floor-crossing be transformed? 
 
What are the grievances/issues at the heart of the conflict around floor-crossing and by-
elections does your organization perceive to be in need of addressing? 
What are the different dimensions of conflict that ensue after floor-crossing? 
What practical steps need to be done to transform this conflict? 
What changes/improvements should be considered regarding the law that governs floor-
crossing and by-elections? 
What role should the state play to ensure peace and security in the country in the conduct 
of induced by-elections? 
In what ways should a ruling party that doesn’t get two thirds majority in parliament 
govern? Why? 
What underlying issues around floor-crossing need resolving for transformation to take 
place? 
What processes should political parties engage each other as regards to floor-crossing? 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE II 
ELECTED MPs FROM THE RULING AND OPPOSITION PARTIES 
Parliamentary Floor-crossing and By-elections in Zambia’s Third 
Republic: the implications of related Conflict for Democracy and 
Peace. 
General 
  
Male/Female? 
What is the name of your party?  
Opposition or ruling party?  
How long have you been a member of this party? 
How long have you been in politics? 
Has your party ever experienced MPs crossing the floor either to or from? 
Have you ever switched from one party to another?  
How long have you served as MP?  
Is your party in support of or opposed to parliamentary floor-crossing and induced by-
elections in Zambia?  
 
What are the conditions that facilitate floor-crossing by Zambia’s elected Members of 
Parliament? 
What do you understand to be the reasons of floor crossing?  
Under what circumstances do members of parliament floor cross? Why? 
Why do you think it is mostly opposition MPs who floor cross to the ruling party? 
Why do you think political parties have failed to be consistent in condemning/supporting 
floor crossing?  
 
How does parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections impact on democracy in 
Zambia? 
 
What do you think is the effect of floor-crossing on your party (negative/positive)? 
In which ways has floor crossing influenced and shaped your party’s relations with other 
parties? 
What forms of electoral conduct and behaviour and practices are emerging in these floor-
crossing induced by-elections?  
In what ways has your party responded to by-elections induced by floor crossing? 
In which ways have party members reacted in host parties where the floor-crossing MPs 
have gone? 
Do the National Executive Committee (NEC) members of your party have a say on floor-
crossing in your party? What is the process like? 
From your experience, are the electorates in constituencies of floor-crossing MPs 
participants or spectators in the process? If yes, how? If not, why? 
In your opinion, is democracy weakened or strengthened as a result of floor-crossing and 
induced by-elections both in your party and the country at large? How? 
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What are the consequences of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on peace and 
security in Zambia? 
 
Does the floor-crossing of an MP from or to your party spark tension/s or conflict within 
your party? Explain how? 
In what ways do you think floor crossing and by–elections affect peace in your party? 
Between parties?  
Why do you think by-elections flowing from floor-crossing have increasingly been 
characterized by violence? 
What has been the nature of the conflict around floor-crossing and by-elections? 
In what other ways, apart from violence, does the conflict emanating from floor-crossing 
and by-elections manifest itself? 
In your opinion, is peace and security weakened or strengthened as a result of floor-
crossing and induced by-elections both in your party, other parties and the country at 
large? How? 
 
How can the conflict generated by floor-crossing be transformed? 
 
What are the grievances/issues at the heart of the conflict around floor-crossing and by-
elections your party has that need addressing? 
What are the different dimensions of conflict that ensue after floor-crossing? 
What practical steps need to be taken to transform this conflict? 
What changes/improvements should be considered regarding the law that governs floor-
crossing and by-elections? 
In what ways should a ruling party that doesn’t get the majority in parliament govern? 
Why? 
What role should the state play to assure and encourage peace and security in the country 
through the conduct of induced by-elections? 
What underlying issues around floor-crossing need resolving for transformation to take 
place? 
What processes should political parties engage each other as regards to floor-crossing? 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE III 
ELECTORATE 
 
Parliamentary Floor-crossing and By-elections in Zambia’s Third 
Republic: the implications of related conflict for democracy and 
peace. 
General 
Salutations 
Age? 
Gender? 
Employed/ self-employed/ student/ unemployed? 
Have you ever participated in elections? 
Are you aware of the phenomenon of floor-crossing in Zambia? 
4. Are you in favour of or opposed to parliamentary floor-crossing and induced by-
elections in Zambia?  
 
What are the conditions that facilitate floor-crossing by Zambia’s elected Members of 
Parliament? 
 
What do you understand to be the reasons of floor crossing?  
Under what circumstances do you think members of parliament floor cross? Why? 
Why do you think it is mostly opposition MPs who floor cross to the ruling party? 
Why do you think political parties have failed to be consistent in condemning/supporting 
floor crossing – when in opposition, they condemn it, when in government support it?  
What are the reasons that prompt the ruling parties to co-opt opposition MPs to join their 
ranks? 
Are there other factors other than the reasons they give and the advantages they gain that 
make them cross the floor? 
 
How does parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections impact on democracy in 
Zambia? 
 
What do you think is the effect of floor-crossing on the ruling party? 
What do you think is the effect of floor-crossing on the opposition parties? 
In what ways do political parties respond to by-elections induced by floor crossing? 
On what basis do opposition parties expel their floor-crossing MPs? Justifiable? 
In which ways do you think floor-crossing has influenced and shaped relations between 
political parties? 
What forms of electoral conduct and behaviour are emerging in these floor-crossing 
induced by-elections? 
In your opinion, what role has the state played in the conduct of induced by-elections? 
Fair, balanced, neutral or biased? 
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In which ways has relations between party members and floor crossing MPs ensued in 
host parties? v 
Do you think floor-crossing complements or violates the electorate’s mandate? How? 
In your opinion, is democracy weakened or strengthened as a result of floor-crossing and 
induced by-elections both in the country? How?. 
 
What are the consequences of parliamentary floor-crossing and by-elections on peace and 
security in Zambia? 
 
How does floor-crossing and by-elections impact on peace in the ruling parties? 
In what ways does floor-crossing and by-elections impact on peace in opposition parties? 
In what ways do you think floor crossing and by–elections affect peace in the country? 
Explain how? 
Why do you think by-elections flowing from floor-crossing have increasingly been 
characterized by violence? 
What has been the nature of the conflict/violence around floor-crossing and by-elections? 
In what other ways, apart from violence, does the conflict emanating from floor-crossing 
and by-elections manifest itself? 
In your opinion, is peace weakened or strengthened as a result of floor-crossing and 
induced by-elections in the country? How? 
 
How can the conflict generated by floor-crossing be transformed? 
 
What are the grievances/issues at the heart of the conflict around floor-crossing and by-
elections that need addressing? 
What practical steps need to be done to transform this conflict? 
What changes/improvements should be considered regarding the law that governs floor-
crossing and by-elections? 
What role should the state play to ensure and encourage peace and security in the country 
through the conduct of induced by-elections? 
What ways should a ruling party that doesn’t get majority in parliament govern other than 
resorting to floor-crossing? 
In what ways should the governing party and the opposition parties relate? 
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APPENDIX III 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
My name is Peter Mulinda Mudenda (208511198). I am a PhD candidate studying at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus. The title of my research is: 
Parliamentary floor-crossing and by-election in Zambia’s Third Republic: the 
implications of related conflict for democracy and peace. 
The aim of the study is to (Explore the related conflict of parliamentary floor-crossing and 
by-elections on democracy and peace in Zambia’s Third Republic; and seek its possible 
transformation). I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and 
observations on the subject matter. 
 
Please note that: 
 
• The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only. 
• Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to 
participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for 
taking such an action. 
• Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name    
nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study. 
• The interview will take about (30 to 60 mins). 
• The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a 
password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a 
period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by 
shredding and burning. 
• If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a 
separate sheet will be provided for signatures) 
 
I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal,  
Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: petermudenda@gmail.com and 
208511198@stu.ukzn.ac.za; Cell: 0786759204 
 
My supervisor is Prof. Suzanne Francis who is located at the School of Social Sciences, 
Howard College Campus, Durban of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: 
email: suzannefrancis@gmail.com Phone number:  
My co-supervisor is ………………….. who is located at the School of Social Sciences, 
Howard College Campus/ Howard College Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
Contact details: email ………………………. Phone number: ………………………….. 
The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as 
follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email:  
ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone number +27312603587. 
 
Thank you for your contribution to this research. 
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DECLARATION 
 
 
I………………………………………………………………………… (full names of participant) 
hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, 
and I consent to participating in the research project. 
 
 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I 
understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate. 
 
I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable) 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT                                        DATE 
 
 
.…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
